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## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

19980616 107

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-88-049

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31 OCTOBER 1988

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### Estonian CC Plenum Discussion

18000054a Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in  
Russian 11, 13, 14 Sep 88

[ETA report: "The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum. With the People in the Interests of the People."]

[11 Sep 88 pp 1-3]

[Excerpts] The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum is sharply distinguished from the quite long line of plenums at which the ETA journalists reporting today have attended. And the conversations in the intervals between the sessions have confirmed that this is also the opinion of the plenum participants themselves. Perhaps the main thing that distinguishes this plenum is the really thorough analysis of urgent problems and tasks combined with the candidness and openness of the opinions being expressed and with the equally candid and open reaction from the hall to what each speaker says. It is a long time since we heard applause during the report, not to mention the statements made during the discussions.

Since we all followed the work of the 19th All-Union Party Conference we can say boldly that the course of work at the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum, which has discussed the tasks for communists in complying with its decisions, has taken place in the same key as was heard at the conference itself.

Those living in the rayons, including Khaapsaluskiy rayon, have always had to deal with the problems of supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods, the long-term location of production forces, and the ecology, the first secretary of the Khaapsaluskiy rayon, A. Vyali, said in his speech. There are many problems and independence and sometimes even reason and sense are lacking.

In our party organization we often ask ourselves what we can do in our rayon without asking for permission "from above," and what we have been able to change ourselves.

The decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference have clarified many times over the answer to this question. How, notwithstanding, to develop self-management in the rayon and implement in a practical way the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!"? Achieving this true fullness of power is also the basis for the further development of the organs of power in the rayon, particularly the soviets of people's deputies, and the entire rayon. The basis of this real power is not listening, permitting, banning or ordering, but a close link between the enterprises, establishments and farms located on a given territory and the corresponding rural, settlement or city soviet.

The speaker noted that this can be achieved by changing the tax system. The magnanimous "donations" by the enterprises for culture, education, sport or the provision

of amenities should disappear. The enterprise or establishment should be subject to only one state tax that the soviet of the corresponding territorial organ of power should use to provide for the socioeconomic development of a given region and to plan its own life. The richer the territorial economic region the greater its opportunities for further developing production forces. In other words, the superstructure will be brought into line with the base. In Khaapsaluskiy rayon there are 13 of these regions. Their presence stimulates development of production forces and generates competition and eliminates subjectivism in management. Within the rayon a council of elders functions, to which a deputy from each soviet is elected. Regardless of the number of voters, all the regions are equally represented. On the same principle it would be possible to form under the existing Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet a commission for legislative proposals in which each territorial unit would have one deputy of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet who would work there permanently; it could have its own budget and would be able to hire experts and propose legislative acts that would be accented by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and by which the republic government would be guided.

In connection with implementation of the Law on the State Enterprise the speaker proposed that leaders elected by the labor collectives should be confirmed at sessions of the rayon soviet in order to protect them against departmental pressure.

The platform of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee should be monolithic, without cracks, and progressive, and it should be implemented through the communists working in the labor collectives and deputy party groups, A. Vyali stressed. But if, as before, we continue with the generally accepted procedure under which no decision is made without "soul searching" by the party organizations, we shall not go anywhere, not a centimeter. Bureaucratic centralism must be replaced by democratic centralism. This is one of today's main tasks. Communists in Khaapsaluskiy rayon believe in perestroika, they believe that together with all communists in Estonia they will find solutions even to the most difficult questions.

In his speech, chief of the department of political economy at the Tallinn State University, delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, Academician of the Estonian Academy of Sciences M. Bronshteyn, said that it has already become an indisputable truth that our party leadership is not abreast of events. But I am not about to assert this so categorically, particularly about its actions before and during the 19th All-Union Party Conference. And today, V. Vyali's speech shows that our party leadership is deeply concerned with those problems and phenomena that are occurring in the republic, and has drawn up a constitutional program around which we can unite.

Let me deal with several problems that are cause for concern. As an economist I am to some extent associated with the problem of republic cost accounting and it seems to me that here, as in the resolution of other problems, a serious and responsible approach is needed. Because this program affects not only our internal republic affairs but also relations between the republic and other all-union republics, and the problems cannot be resolved through pressure and ultimatums. If we had tried to work in that way at the 19th All-Union Party Conference the very idea of republic cost accounting would have been destroyed. It is essential to have a serious scientific concept, each part of which has been well considered, and a developed strategy and tactics for solving problems. It must be said that a major advance has now been noted in the concept of republic cost accounting. In particular I read with interest and satisfaction R. Otsason's article in RAKHVA KHYAEL, but there is a whole series of questions that, I think, requires clearer and more precise explanation.

Up to now we have been dealing with the viewpoint that the main thing in the concept of republic cost accounting is subordination of enterprises and the transfer of all of them from all-union to republic subordination. In my opinion, however, it should already be clear to everyone that this is not the crux of the matter. And as M.S. Gorbachev stated precisely at the CPSU Central Committee July Plenum, our own bureaucrat is not some sweet person; he would like to switch to a rigid administrative system for himself, and replace the monopoly of all-union departments with an internal monopoly.

I have already written that given all my respect for the managerial abilities of Yu. Kraft, I consider monopolization of all light industry in the hands of a single concern to be a profound error. Apart from high prices and a decline in living standards, we shall gain nothing from this. And it must be said that this monopolization covers not only light industry. For it is very difficult for the cooperative system and the family system to win through because the large enterprises are also a form of monopoly—their land, their equipment, and their marketing system. It is essential first and foremost for every enterprise to have free access to our natural all-union market. It is essential also to try to move into the international market, even though this is not easy. And all enterprises—large, medium-sized and small, state, cooperative and family—should be placed under equal conditions. For the market consumer will check their efficiency and their ability to bring profit into the republic.

But this does not mean that we must operate only from market regulators. Throughout the world the state affects market conditions. It is the more important to have economic regulators in a socialist cost accounting republic. It is essential first and foremost to devise a clear-cut concept for development of the republic under the conditions of the all-union and international division of labor and antimonopoly legislation. It is also extremely

important to have an innovative mechanism for financial and material support for everything new and progressive; this gives us high competitiveness both in the domestic and the all-union market. Unfortunately, we do not have such a mechanism and even the proposals that I read do not have it. But this is the foundation of economic regulation used extensively in the developed countries and the European Common Market.

The next key question cannot be postponed. It is, of course, the question of equivalent exchange with the all-union republics on prices for agricultural output that we supply. This has been an extremely difficult year. And we are losing R150 million to R200 million annually quite illegally in purchase prices. No one can explain why, given equal conditions, our peasant receives 20 percent to 30 percent less than in Moscow Oblast or Leningrad Oblast. This year the production costs for certain kinds of output are rising, and prices for combine harvesters and equipment are also rising. How can we deal with agriculture in such a financial hole! What sort of republic cost accounting is there here... Incidentally, we are underpaid and then they say that a negative balance has accrued in relations at the all-union level. These are the grimaces of the statistics: PRAVDA recently published that we eat more than the norm for meat. Because the norm is 70 kilograms. However, 70 kilograms is not the scientific norm for consumption. But as RAKHVA KHYAEL proves, even the 90 kilograms that each inhabitant of Estonia is supposed to eat is a fiction. We must therefore resolve as a first priority the problem of prices for agricultural produce supplied at all-union level and outside the republic. It contains the link that can pull up the entire chain. And it is essential to show firmness in mutual relations with all-union organs. From the beginning of 1989 we must have normal equivalent exchange. Everything else can be resolved somewhat later.

To continue I would like to deal with interethnic relations. It would seem clear that if our interethnic relations here continue to deteriorate and intolerance and extremism win through we shall ruin the republic and do colossal damage to perestroika and to the country.

Everyone is now watching to see that will happen in the republic. For we are a civilized country and any civilized country adopts a social contract. This is what our first secretary said today, and there is a social contract. It is elementary and should be understood by any thinking person: the Estonians have lived for millennia in the Estonian SSR and they have no other land. On their land the Estonians have created a high level of material and spiritual culture. We must therefore all recognize the priority of the interests of the Estonian people in the Estonian SSR: preservation of its majority and priority development of the Estonian language and culture. But the priority of the Estonian people does not automatically mean the dominance of any Estonian here over a Russian. I think that any normal person understands this. There must be full equality and a person must be



assessed according to his abilities and his contribution to the development of the republic, and of course, there must be no kind of discrimination!

An official language? Take the example of neighboring Finland. There, all these issues have been resolved: priority of the Finnish people, Finnish culture, and the Finnish language in no way infringes upon the rights of the Swedes who make up only 6 percent of the population. But the Swedes can handle all their affairs in any establishment in their native tongue, and they are understood.

There is another factor to which I would like to draw attention. I assess very highly our social movements and comrade E. Savisaar personally, who has done a great deal for the general idea of republic cost accounting, and M. Lauristin, whom I know well. During the 19th All-Union Party Conference we worked well with comrade Aare. But if ultimatums are delivered how will our activity be brought to a conclusion? I think that this is very bad. We worked beautifully, reasonably. But why do our public activities sometimes move in this direction? Whence the intolerance of other opinions, the sense of ultimatum and so forth?

Speaking in Tartu my friend V. Palm said the following: there is a social psychology; it is objective reality and it must be taken into account; comrade B. Saul may be a competent and fine person but his social psychology is such that people move away from him. But we ourselves create this social psychology. These things must be understood and we must sense the responsibility for the content and form of our statements to the masses. And leaders lack a high sense of responsibility. It also happens that the leaders of our movements criticize but assume no kind of responsibility for the state of affairs. And those who do assume responsibility will live with the thought of future elections, that suddenly they will not be elected, suddenly forced into retirement... And we shall make over-hasty decisions so as to win popularity among more people, and we shall all have to pay for this.

It must be said that our entire apparatus finds itself in a very difficult position. It does not enjoy special privileges, particularly the middle-level echelon. The pay is low. Now it may remain in a leading position for only two terms and then leave. And an old profession has already been lost... Yes, many things must still be seriously considered, and social guarantees must be given to our apparatus. Naturally it must be reduced. But there are spheres where clear-cut governmental direction is required. This includes economic levers, influence on market prices, tax policy. Monitoring of the ecological situation is essential, likewise quality control over output, particularly foodstuffs, since the cooperative societies and enterprises will not themselves monitor the quality of our life and the condition of the environment. We should not therefore thoughtlessly lop off the bough on which we are sitting.

There is no doubt that the report that we have heard was not disappointing and it did justify the hopes that we had placed in it, said S. Kallas, deputy editor of the newspaper RAKHVA KHYAEL. I would like to share with you some thoughts about the political problems that we face on the road toward renewal of the republic's economic and political sovereignty, he continued. What is the backdrop against which we are developing the concept of cost accounting and trying to implement it? The basis for this is the report of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary at the July Plenum, in which he also spoke a great deal about economic problems. In his speech comrade V. Vyalyas also said that the central organs support the idea of achieving economic and general independence for the republic. I agree that the top leaders in the country support these ideas but the same can by no means be said about lower-level leaders. Our plan for cost accounting is undoubtedly encountering fierce opposition, but we shall nevertheless present a real plan.

In today's edition of the newspaper RAKHVA KHYAEL a small piece entitled "Finishing with a Spurt" has been published, containing a review of the responses received by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers from many all-union organs to the proposal to extend the republic's independence. It is total rejection and total opposition. Undoubtedly this will also be the case in future. I would therefore like to say that all our people look to the leadership of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee in the hope that it will show an adequate sense of resolve in defending the ideas that have been put forward and will stand up for them despite opposition. A whole series of such political factors must be resolved such as, first and foremost, our monetary system and the special regime for movement of the labor force. These are very complex issues, but the situation itself is also complex. Evidently we must choose the lesser of two evils and opt for the radical variant. There is another possibility: remain as before and accept with both hands the incomprehensible resolutions like the one following last year's July plenum. In this event a sharp reaction would follow if we take into account the fact that our idea of cost accounting is at variance with the USSR Constitution. There has recently been much criticism of those who have gone beyond its framework, taking what we might call tilts at the individual. The impression is being created that the more highly placed the figure that you want to remove, the more forceful the speech you make. Undoubtedly this is not the path that we should now follow. Going down that path we shall soon find ourselves at an impasse. What is needed is a united front. Undoubtedly what is needed is constructive cooperation and dialogue with all political forces and movements since this will promote democracy and the realization of common aims. And of course, it is fine and essential that the party central committee become the central force in realization of the perestroyka movement and the idea of cost accounting. We have taken a major step in this direction at today's plenum.

I fully support all the thoughts about deep and trusting cooperation between the organs of power and the public, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A. Ryuytel emphasized. Our people are the true bearers of power and have full rights as masters. They enjoy the right to demand and offer counsel. Various proposals, requests and demands are being sent to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. In these letters one can sense people's pains and hopes, and also what they are hiding—their despair. As is known, a number of working groups are working under the Supreme Soviet Presidium to make their contribution in solving society's painful problems. Problems cannot be resolved in haste. While working on amendments to legislation we must watch carefully lest we act at variance with the existing legal system, and insure that drafts are substantial and acceptable to the popular masses. However, the work in the groups does not always yield results. Deep study of the problems requires time. Sometimes the working atmosphere is destroyed by people flying into rages. We believe that one of the most acute questions now is the language question. The demand by representatives of the indigenous nationality—the Estonians—is the same: the Estonian language should be the official language. This is the only real guarantee that the Estonians will be able to conduct their affairs on their own land in Estonian. And it is so logical that in principle no one disputes it. Here it is not a question of some kind of national privileges. Essentially it is a guarantee for the continued existence of the Estonian people and the return of hopes that have disappeared. The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has drawn up appropriate drafts for improvements to the constitution, including the question of a law on language. We support the proposal to proclaim the Estonian language as the official language in the Estonian national republic with guarantees for all other languages used by the population of Estonia, and also the language used for interethnic dealings, namely, Russian. Here, the main emphasis should be laid on the law on language that is being prepared. We want to present both drafts for national debate so that we can then resolve the question at the forthcoming session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Another issue that concerns the entire population is citizenship. The republic constitution makes mention of citizenship of the Estonian SSR but in such a way that the concept itself is not clarified. We expect decisions from the amendments planned to the USSR Constitution. But this does not mean that we have no grounds for a decision in principle. The key to this is the existing constitution, where it states that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium will make decisions on citizenship of the Estonian SSR. An appropriate commission has been set up but up to now it has been engaged in the granting of citizenship of the Estonian SSR to persons without citizenship. Obviously it is essential to augment the work with new and specific content and set about solving the problem.

In connection with republic cost accounting I would like to note that the disputes about this idea still continue.

Sometimes we observe an oversimplified understanding of the problem. At the stage reached today we should no longer be arguing about general issues; the time for this is past. I hope that the article by Reyna Otsason published in the 1 September edition of the newspaper RAKHVA KHYAEL will serve for further constructive debate and comprehensive realization of republic cost accounting. I would like to add to the thought expressed in the report about the poor results from the experiments conducted within the republic that in most cases the final word has unfortunately remained with the all-union organs, and that the content of our proposals and aspirations are sometimes altered in a direction that is unacceptable for us. Therefore, now, as we switch to cost accounting, we should try to realize our own justified aspirations.

In his speech comrade V. Vyalyas offered an assessment of the many civic initiatives forming the foundation of the mass movements. A working group on questions of public self-activity by citizens has prepared a proposal for a republic legal enactment that would define procedure for the legal formation of and legal guarantees for the activities of associations, societies, unions and other organizations and mass movements created at the initiative of citizens. We can no longer delay in the adoption of such laws since the legal status of the mass movements and questions of registration of documents require immediate solutions.

The report named the priority directions in our development. Development of the social sphere in the countryside is particularly significant. Since farmsteads are being set up in outlying districts there should evidently be more assistance from the state than envisaged heretofore. The status for the leaseholders now proposed is not favored by the farmstead community. Delay in resolving questions such as economic aid, loans, working and vacation time, privileges, inheritance and so forth is inadmissible. During the time of Soviet power we have adopted two constitutions and the first was changed repeatedly—even on the basis of orders. Should we not consider the question of restoring some of the provisions of the constitution? For example, the urgent and perpetual issue of land use. There should be no impediment to fixing in the Fundamental Law of the Estonian SSR all the permitted forms of ownership.

During the course of the further democratization of the activity of the Soviets and their organs, attention should be focused mainly on a reform of the political system: strengthening the legislative functions of leading and control organs and the soviets of people's deputies, improving the organization of soviet work, and renewing the electoral system. It is essential to resolve these questions so that proposals concerning improvements to legislation can be moved forward for adoption of all-union legislative enactments by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. It is our opinion that all-union legislative enactments could provide the foundation on which each republic itself could draw up laws in line with specific conditions and situations.

Comrade Ryuytel noted that when talking about the past it is essential to recognize that the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Buro could not have prevented the painful issues or have foreseen their consequences. And it must also stand at the head of the rapidly developing process of perestroika.

As a member of the buro, A. Ryuytel said, I should act more consistently and decisively. We must now consider the situation that has been created within the republic by proceeding from the tasks of creating a legal state. We must not be deflected from this path.

First secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Narva Gorkom, V. Malkovskiy, noted that if he were to offer an assessment of the processes taking place in Estonia in recent times he would have to say that they are probably to be expected. However, the impression is sometimes created that some democratic movements want to become an alternative to the party and soviet apparatus. And here we recognize that some of the negative factors that are today showing through in life in the republic and in the development of our democracy have helped the party organizations to show themselves in a way that they failed to do during the process of growing public activity by the masses, and to take the initiative.

Let us look at ourselves from the standpoint of our common history and our personal history. We all learned at school where it was necessary to respond in the way that the teacher said, and all of us, except the women, did our service in the army and are well aware how command must be obeyed. Take our VUZes, where most of those sitting in this hall did their studies. In order to pass a test or examination we had to say the same things that our teachers said. Thus, a stereotyped thinking was shaped. And because of this each one of us—party worker or representative of the Popular Front or the “Greens”—must recognize that in each of us there is a piece of life lived in negative history. And in the resolution of acute issues it is precisely on this basis that we shall consolidate.

This is what is still happening: a subscription fails to turn up—the party is to blame; there are no potatoes—the party is to blame; something else is lacking—the party is to blame. And one of those speaking before me said that our task is to give an idea. You know that today there is so much giving of ideas that there are not enough hands to take them and act on them. I think that if the energy with which we have set about perestroika could be transferred into concrete practical deeds then we shall achieve much. Comrade Bronshteyn said figuratively that perhaps it will happen after some time that only fools will remain working in the party apparatus. I have watched and I have thought about it: indeed to some extent we already find ourselves in this incomprehensible situation. You go into a labor collective and are beaten on one cheek for economic failures. You turn to offer the other cheek. This is well known to any first secretary or ispolkom chairman, and it must be changed.

We now appeal to the republic organs concerning all the problems that we encounter. Perhaps this is right, but I would like to have a clear-cut mechanism at the city level. I have an earnest request for the scholars engaged in work on the concept of republic cost accounting: is it not advisable to look at city cost accounting? So that we may have a clear idea of where we are and where we should build further?

We have started to barter above-plan output with other rayons in the republic and country and even with foreign states in order to obtain additional consumer goods. In this case the slogan “The Better We Work the Better We Live” does not sound hypocritical in a specific collective.

One acute problem for the city remains supplies of agricultural products. I think that I express the opinion of the majority when I say that the fruit and vegetable base for the “Narva” sovkhoz, and subsequently the “Narva” sovkhoz itself, perhaps, be offered for lease in order to get it moving.

In his report V. Vyalyas talked about incorrect understanding of the question of northeast Estonia. The fact is that in the party city committee, especially of late, incomprehensible voices have been ringing out concerning whether or not a meeting should be held on the subject of separating the city from the republic. Evidently some people would very much like this kind of “hot pie.” I say definitely and with a proper sense of responsibility that the city of Narva has been and will be a city of the Estonian SSR and that the people of Narva are ready to share all their sorrows and joys with the Estonian people. And I ask that this issue be raised no more.

At the same time we expect the same attitude toward ourselves. We sometimes encounter the opposite, of the “we are not your people” type. Let me cite examples. It is difficult to understand when the Krengolmskaya manufaktura Combine, the largest textile enterprise in the republic which has made a quite substantial contribution to its economy, is told that no housing can be planned for it because 90 percent of its output is sent outside Estonia. When the construction administration at the Estonian GRES asks to be switched to the wholesale trade and it is told that it is located closer to Leningrad Oblast and that means that the question must be resolved there.

We are particularly concerned by the problems concerning, unfortunately, the number of Estonians living in Narva. Estonian culture is found somewhat aside from the city and we would like to appeal to comrade Beekman, who was born in Narva. Come and visit us! We would also be happy to meet other representatives of the creative unions!

Today the question of recognizing Estonian as the official language on the territory of the republic is being discussed. In general we support this. At the same time this approach is not shared by all people in the city

because the majority do not speak Estonian. And not because of obstinacy. Let me explain our situation to you. There are very few Estonian language teachers. In many schools Estonian is not studied at all. In the No 2 Secondary School, a national school, there are no teachers... We have been appealing for help for many years. But they feed us false hopes, say they will think about it, consider it. We talked in the central committee with comrade Toome about the need finally to break out of this vicious circle. They are strident enough in telling us that our graduates are unprepared for linguistic dealings at the level, say, of the schools in Tallinn, and they therefore refuse to enroll them in the pedagogical schools. This means that we do badly in preparing our students and they cannot be enrolled, and we are correspondingly deprived of teachers.

There is no need for haste in the question of the status of the Estonian language. Let us consider it at the level of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. I, to my shame, am speaking to you in Russian. I do not speak Estonian but am ready to learn it. But consider how a first secretary works today. If his day starts at 0800 hours and ends at 2100 hours, then probably what is needed is an order: OK, Vladimir Sergeyevich, three weeks off to sit down and study Estonian.

I have frankly said that this is painful for me. I would like to express my gratitude to the press. Truth to tell, it offers us the opportunity to look at ourselves differently.

Chairman of the Estonian SSR Union of Writers and delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference E. Pyldroos noted that unfortunately we have recently been talking much more than we have been acting. Notwithstanding, I cannot say whether or not we have talked too much or too little.

We have talked much about the events of 1940 and other difficult matters. We must know the truth no matter how heavy and shameful it may have been. But we have also been saying that our line of behavior today cannot be determined only by the assessments of those distant events but rather by the actual political situation in our time. But it is possible to reconcile ourselves to our destiny up to a certain limit. It seems to me that this limit is defined by how the situation today corresponds to those constitutional guarantees on which Estonia was made part of the USSR in 1940 and in which—and this I would like to emphasize—a majority of our communists nevertheless truly believed. Guarantees that in truth are worth no more than the paper on which they are written provided a quite extensive degree of sovereignty for the all-union republic. The limit of compromise is defined by the honesty in dealings with Estonia over the past 48 years.

When talking about the crimes during the period of personality cult what we mainly have in mind is repression. Obviously we must realize that the problem goes deeper. Crime is a deliberate illegal activity. Thus we

must realize that the greatest crime of Stalinism lay in transforming the country's constitution into an empty scrap of paper, and that it was precisely this that led to the start of the chain of all subsequent crimes. This applies both to repression and to, if I may say so, the Stalinist national policy that consisted of the criminal destruction of the constitutional sovereignty of the national republics and nations. Up to now a significant part of the relations between the all-union republics and the central authorities has been based on the unconstitutional foundation created at that time.

The idea of the socialist legal state cannot be limited merely to defending the rights of the individual, which is how we often represent it. It must inevitably also affect state law and include internationally recognized concepts that are also recorded in our own constitution about self-determination and the sovereignty of the nations and the national republics. I am not about to repeat the anecdotal histories of interference by the central departments in our day-to-day affairs. I would like merely to emphasize that if we are now raising the question of constitutional sovereignty of an all-union republic then this is no way means begging for additional privileges and some kind of special experimental conditions. It is a question of rights of which no one can deprive us. And it is from this that we should and must proceed in our proposals concerning the laws on federation and an all-union pact that have been drawn up. I am deeply convinced that the contribution from the all-union republic in strengthening the USSR as an all-union state can be effective only when it is based on an interest and as a sovereign choice rather than on the whims of a central department. Notwithstanding, we now face a sad and difficult reality. Demographic relations, including national relations, have become extremely complex. But this is the reality and we face the choice of making the chaos even greater or of trying all the same to create a viable whole. I speak candidly: the cornerstone of this whole can only be the idea of Estonia as the only place in the world where there is a true Estonian people and its culture. And the responsibility and obligation stemming from this must be laid ineluctably on the decisions that we are making today and will make in the future. This applies in particular to the language question and the question of protecting the Estonian language, whose spheres of application in our republic are being constantly curtailed. The only approach that I can see is to make Estonian the official language on a constitutional basis. This should be accompanied by a detailed law on language. Every national group living in Estonia should retain the right to its own language and its own culture. For everyone so desiring, there should still be opportunity to conduct his affairs in Russian in all official establishments, namely, the trade spheres, services, medicine—everywhere in the official world. It goes without saying that we cannot establish some kind of mass obligation to study the language, with the exception, perhaps, of those posts where a knowledge of languages must be regarded as an integral part of professional qualifications. Our language

policy should rely on reasonable and tactful incentive and the creation of an atmosphere that makes mutual knowledge of languages essential for people. It is essential to create opportunities for language study.

I imagine a model of a future national policy in the form of a system made up of three interconnected problem levels. The first is the level of society and includes the approach to Estonia as a protected zone for the Estonian language and Estonian culture. This also applies to the regulation of demographic processes for the purpose of preserving the nation. I note in passing that lack of an active and effective demographic policy is one of the most serious reproaches that I would like to make, among others, to the republic leadership.

The second level is the individual level of the citizen. Here our attention should be focused steadily on never, under any circumstances, making human rights dependent on national affiliation. Total equality should reign among all citizens of Estonia regardless of national affiliation, and there should be full equality of opportunity depending only on the individual worth of the individual himself.

Between the societal and individual level there is another level—the group level. This means cultural autonomy for national groups, free opportunities and state support to develop their culture and education. I think that revealing these problem levels should become basic in our national policy.

Our national policy cannot be aimed at coercive assimilation of other national groups. Each person must be given the opportunity to remain what he is—the Russian, the Armenian or an Armenian. They all have a right to their own culture.

Now the problem of citizenship in the republic. This idea arose as a reaction to the threat of the extinction of the Estonian people. But now the backdrop has become much broader and expansive. Rapid migration threatens not only the existence of the Estonian people but also the quality of life for every local inhabitant. Republic cost accounting is impossible without a curb on migration, and migration cannot be curbed without the establishment of citizenship, while without republic cost accounting we shall not achieve any decisive change in the quality of life. This is the logical series. And in this case citizenship does not become a factor that scares the individual but makes it possible to rally and protect all inhabitants of Estonia who, regardless of their nationality, regard this place in the world as their motherland and want to work for its good.

And in conclusion, a small comment. It concerns those ultimatums that many of the public movements are so quick to issue. I agree completely that an ultimatum is not the way to achieve anything. There is no place for ultimatum in normal democratic procedure. And this is quite right. Unfortunately, the situation is such that we

lack the procedures that would enable the public movements to exert their influence. And then they resort to ultimatums. Until we find these procedures I fear that we shall not be rid of the ultimatums.

[13 Sep 88, pp 2-4]

[Excerpts] Chairman of the Tartu Gorispolkom T. Mendelson noted that relations between the people and the republic's leading organs have recently deteriorated. Many of Estonia's inhabitants therefore hope that the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum will find political solutions to at least some of the accumulated problems. It is now no longer enough to provide an objective survey of the position in the republic. It is no longer possible to avoid the adoption of principled decisions. Further waiting for who knows what may lead to a final loss of the people's faith in the authority of the party and Soviet power. And when they assess today's plenum the people, in my opinion, will proceed from a single, rigid position. The inhabitants of Estonia set forth their problems and aspirations in the platform carried by the Estonian Communist Party delegation to the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Now we must respond specifically to the people and tell them what decisions have been adopted to realize that platform, and what has been done and will be done. An answer to these questions must inevitably be given. Of course, there are various major reasons why implementation of particular provisions of the platform have been postponed. But it is a question of those questions that could be resolved today.

In the platform for the All-Union Party Conference, exile was recognized as a crime against humanity. The Estonian SSR Council of Ministers is proposing that during the examination of property petitions for repressed citizens we be guided by the 1947 law covering exile. The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has also compiled a draft on recognizing the Estonian language as the official language, but the latest draft for a law on language proposes that in four cities in the republic Russian nevertheless remain the business language. The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has recognized the national flag but this latter proposal in fact bans its use; the national flag supposedly cannot be flown alongside the state flag of the Estonian SSR. This can be understood in no other way except as a ban on their simultaneous use. And how should we assess the fact that preparations for reform of the soviets of people's deputies are being conducted in secret from the people and soviets? To date neither the public nor its representative organs have been involved in the discussions. Will not the people as a result of the reform of the electoral system lose the right to elect directly to the Supreme Soviet and will not the next set of obstacles be placed on the road to the free promotion of deputy candidates?

Even though up to now insuring public order has been within the competence of the city and rayon soviets, a procedure has been devised, without their participation,

for implementing public measures organized at the initiative of citizens. It would be logical to conduct a national debate on this issue.

Are such examples particular cases or do they reflect inconsistency in the actions of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus in the present situation? Do they not reflect the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Council of Ministers and other central organs throwing in their lot with the inconsistency of the central apparatus? I think that first and foremost we must criticize the activity of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus up to now. Under conditions in which what is needed in a united front of the soviet organs in the struggle for perestroika, neither the Supreme Soviet Presidium nor the republic government has done anything to create it. On the contrary, as before they are trying to resolve questions affecting the local soviets, and also questions of republic importance, without the urban and rural "goals." The representatives of the soviet organs therefore deemed it necessary to gather together and assess what is going on and the opportunities for reconstruction. Some workers in the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus responded to this by proposing that a meeting be held following the plenum. Was this proposal the position of the Central Committee?

A meeting did nevertheless take place on 7 September. The problems noted above were discussed and I was empowered to express our common position. We fully support the appeal of the Tartu State University to the inhabitants of the Estonian SSR. We also support the activity of the republic government in establishing the time zone in the Estonian SSR.

The positions worked out at the meeting will be published in full in newspaper EDASI. But I would like to inform the central committee and the plenum guests about the main issue. Because the draft ukase on establishing liability for violations of procedure in the organization and conducting of public measures will be discussed at a meeting of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, we deem it necessary, following public debate, to adopt an Estonian SSR law on public measures conducted at the initiative of citizens.

The 28 July ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the obligations and rights of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops when protecting public order is at variance with the USSR Constitution and the Estonian SSR Constitution. Thus, provision was made for the use of internal troops with the permission of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and it is forbidden to make them subordinate to local organs of power and local management organs. On the basis of this ukase, republic organs are also regarded as local organs.

We also think that combining the posts of first secretary of city and rayon party committees and chairman of the corresponding soviet is not in accord with the principles

of the reform of the political system. We consider it totally unacceptable to restrict the nomination of candidates for the posts of deputy by imposing on them various requirements, including the determination at district electoral meetings of which of the candidates should be entered on the ballot paper. We believe that formation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet at congresses of people's deputies limits the right of the people in forming their own representative organs and is not in line with the course of democratization.

In accordance with the Estonian SSR Constitution it is necessary to devise a republic electoral system, but this work has still not been started.

All ispolkom chairmen of urban and rural soviets support the assessment and positions contained in comrade V. Vyalyas' report and hope that they will become a guide for action for all members of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and workers in its apparatus.

Chairman of the board of the Estonian SSR Union of Journalists Yu. Paalma started his speech as follows: The well-known journalist Ilmar Roden, taken from us in so untimely a fashion, always taught his young colleagues to look carefully to see where the scythe would fall. Can it be said that we have learned this? We have an opportunity to make efforts, puff out our chests and say Yes, Yes, because we no longer write in the editorial style, in the dreadful language of a boring history. But the value of a newspaper is now measured by that, first and foremost. I recall the young associates at NOORTE KHYAEL who thought that their newspaper was a good one because they used a different print method and it was wonderful for wrapping herring. Unfortunately, there is no herring now, but fortunately the old style newspaper is also gone.

Nevertheless, it is precisely now that there is greater danger of becoming euphoric as we enjoy this. Only now is society revealing its essential nature to itself, while the press is revealing society. We still do not know exactly who we are. We have a maxim that society develops in a planned manner even though many plans remain unfulfilled; the following question therefore arises: whose plans were they and was it deliberate that they were not fulfilled? Or perhaps it is a question simply of deception. We are now changing the structure but are doing little to change our way of thinking. Economists know better than me that planning is a way of thinking. We must begin to learn to plan social processes and the work of our editorial offices. This means that we must try to achieve clarity about where we are now and where we want to go.

Here we have been talking about statistics. The greatest problem for journalists is obtaining reliable figures. We are reproached often enough for lack of objectivity but this lack results precisely from the fact that we do not

have reliable figures. And if there are no figures then there is no opportunity, or even possibility, of interpreting them correctly. Publications must study their audience and research the interests of the different categories of their readers. Unfortunately however, there are no facilities for doing this.

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and Estonian SSR Council of Ministers have in recent times tried to do something to improve the information available to journalists. But we lack the main thing, namely, this troika's vision of the most important problems. And it happens that some important problems and decisions are unexpected for the public and result in bewilderment and, unfortunately, even distrust.

It was this speaker's opinion that the main task for the press is achieve stabilization. This does not mean a rejection of analysis of problems of vital importance for all of us, or of objective criticism. It means rejection of the vanity sometimes shown. It means a sense of responsibility to the future, looking at the blade of the scythe to see where it will fall. Stability is also the key to the transfer to cost accounting, and each person and each communist should understand this regardless of his nationality or attitude toward questions of language and citizenship.

It simply amazes me, Yu. Paalma said, that the republic, in other words, the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, should have the right to change the names of city and rayon newspapers and have to give permission for distribution at enterprises and farms. For at the same time, recent party documents have been talking about differentiation in ideological work. The following question arises: how have we trusted the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and other organizations to exercise leadership for the publications already being published? If it a question only of paper, then I propose that the CPSU Central Committee be requested to give the republic the right to decide for itself what new publications to publish, within the limits of the total paper available.

We have had problems with adequacy in the transmission of information, or, more accurately, with distribution methods within the USSR. Some days ago I was approached on the subject of the inadequacy of information being made available in newspapers in the socialist countries. I simply informed members of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee about this and tried myself to make contact with appropriate editorial offices to clarify the source of this information, because in one of the Polish newspapers an event that had taken place in the Tallinn city hall on 23 August this year had been interpreted as a nationalist gathering.

And in conclusion, once again about language, but not quite the usual aspect. Normatives are still in effect for compositors in printing houses, according to which they

are paid by the number of lines composed. A type-setting normative based on the Russian language promulgated by the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs operates in the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee publishing house. Because of this, each month type-setters dealing with Estonian-language texts in our party printing house lose an average of R45 compared with their colleagues composing Russian-language text. True, they get on splendidly with each other and no conflicts have arisen because of this, but I think that the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Administration of Affairs and the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs could eliminate this discord, if not in days, then in weeks.

I have spoken in many schools, said E. Kaup, director of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History, and have been asked, not without justification, which of the products produced by the institute in 40 years or more could today be used in the training process or in propaganda activity. The output has been considerable—about 200 original works—and I have answered that they include a whole range of books that should be used today, be they collections of documents, memoirs, or various kinds of monographs, for example, the works of Khans Pegelman, Yaan Anvelt and Viktor Kingisepp. But at the same time many works have not stood up to criticism. Much has been said about the reasons why historical works contain so many shortcomings and distortions of the truth. Everyone knows that there was a time when historians simply commented on events. They had precise instructions about what to write about, whom to write about, and how to write it. But I do not agree with those comrades who by taking advantage of democracy and glasnost are now trying to shift their own guilt onto the poor state of historical science and the great limitations of that time. Among both the historians, including party historians, and among the veterans of the revolution who wrote their memoirs, there were in those difficult days people who despite all obstacles sought out and tried to publicize the truth. Some succeeded well, others not so well. But there were also those whose manuscripts were handled with very long poles. And this is the truth. Therefore, it is not fitting to blame everything on restrictions. There are many works that could at the same time be improved. A large blank spot essentially still remains regarding the entire 1905-1907 revolution. True, for many years we did publish some modest research and a voluminous collection of documents in the Russian language, but we did nothing to add to this. And in the archives in Tartu and Moscow and in other places, there is an enormous amount of material on the 1905 revolution. It is essential to bring into circulation the works published in their time in Leningrad ("The Year 1905 in Estonia") or "The Year 1905 in Lyaznema" by Mikhkel Aytsam. It is worth considering re-publication of research works published long ago.

I would like to note that until recently pressure was being applied to us to meet plan targets unconditionally and on schedule. But life has made significant amendments to



the plans. This occurred, for example, with the fourth volume of the Outline of the History of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. Since we were among the first to handle the preparation of the manuscript on the complex transition of the period 1959-1985, it was considered in our head institute that this manuscript should be prepared for publication. We held a meeting in November of last year in Tallinn in order to define our position and assess the period of stagnation. At that meeting we concluded that since there was such an amount of complex and open questions and amendments and additions nothing could be corrected and it was necessary to write the history of that period anew. It is essential to visit the archives, work on all the necessary material and create a new concept that is in line with present-day requirements. And if the scholars could give sound answers, as became possible in 1961 when a program was adopted at the 22nd CPSU Congress for the building of communism, one of whose boundaries was, as is known, 1981, then why in the interval between these two dates did the term or slogan on developed socialist society gain currency when in fact it did not exist, and finally, why are our store counters still so empty today, and is it possible that they worked seriously?

The report rightly criticized our institute. Because material written in the old spirit is still showing up. One subject of criticism was the article published in the journal *KOMMUNIST ESTONII* in which the deputy director of the institute and the director of the party archives, Viktor Voykov, considered foreign policy factors in the 1940 socialist revolution. We discussed the criticism and responded that the viewpoints presented in the article are the private opinion of the author and should not be regarded as the institute's position. We are witnesses to how in the last year or year-and-a-half serious problems have been taken up by the press. Facts that at first are difficult to check are made public. But they are facts. Historical truth must triumph fully both about the 1940 revolution and other events. There are no facts or events that would not be amenable to Marxism-Leninism assessment.

The sore points now are the blank spots of 1917-1920, 1920-1940, 1937-1938, 1939-1940, the 8th Estonian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee Plenum of March 1950, the mass deportations in 1941 and 1949 and many other complex historical events. And in this connection the question of how things are in the archives arises immediately. As is known, in general things are bad with respect to access to archives. This is true. Our party archives are closed but members of the party and Komsomol do nevertheless have access. In earlier years additional restrictions were imposed on them concerning the use of closed material. In fact this material was not so voluminous. Only two or three percent of 1.5 million items stored. But today the situation is such that whatever the problem may be we have not researched it and it is essential to use precisely those materials. It is difficult to publicize the truth if the archive rules adopted during the period of stagnation in

1980 hamper the establishment of that truth. Thanks to the energetic influence of Indrek Toome we have been able to offer researchers the material that they need without violating the existing rules.

I would like to deal with two subjects that now concern me, chairman of board of the Estonian SSR Union of Writers V. Beekman said. First, the political leadership. Like V. Udam in his article in *RAKHVA KHYAEL*, I would like to say that many recent phenomena testify to the shortcomings of our political leadership. For example, our convulsive efforts to partly to reorganize schemes for the management of the economy. We have still failed to implement the main condition for republic cost accounting, namely, equivalent exchange, nor have we managed to rid ourselves of the old fund system, namely, limits. But we are already rather quickly reorganizing the ministries into committees and merging them and separating them. Will this offer anything for our economy or social development? Permit me to have serious doubts on this score. My life's experience says that formalism and the desire to demonstrate change are in fact preserving everything old. This phenomenon has its own roots. In my opinion one of those roots is our apparatus and its usually poorly qualified workers.

Individual people are not always to blame for this; some are more talented, some less. It is always thus in life. All in all our apparatus is made up of children of the system of party indoctrination during the period of stagnation when in the higher party schools and social sciences academies certain clichés and dogmas were beaten into their heads. They did not learn to think for themselves, they are afraid of that, and they are also afraid of making a mistake; for it is known what happens after a mistake. We have received this as a legacy and now we are suffering dreadfully. Until recently this spread right into the central committee bureau. I am talking about the bureau up to 16 July.

In my opinion the bureau has been busying itself with thousands of quite useless trivia that have nothing to do with the function of a central committee bureau or our top political leadership. For example, I went to the bureau with K. Kiysk to present a report about my personal participation in political-indoctrination work, that is, about how we presented papers and materials prepared by the party lecturers' group to the collectives. But we could have presented the report in our own party organization, which would have been more exacting toward us than the central committee bureau. These formal reports and formal confirmations of economic leaders, and the endless meetings exhaust a person spiritually and time is wasted on them and as a result our leaders are simply unable to lead as they really should.

This is why the situation of upsurge in public activity today, in today's atmosphere of perestroika in politics, amateurs—the creative unions, scholars, journalists—are being forced increasingly to become involved. In politics we are amateurs, not professional politicians,



even though some of us will probably become politicians. The quality of political activity is undoubtedly suffering because of this, and the people see this. Hence the great claims, amounting to ultimatums. This is happening because they can find no other way to react.

We amateurs are doing everything we can, good or bad according to his abilities. We do it despite the fact that we should long ago have been busy with our own immediate affairs. Our literature and art will quickly die out because we have no time to engage in it. Then, of course, the question of language would solve itself. But no one wants this. Hence also the chronic lagging in political activity in our party organs behind societal and social development. Our party is losing its authority because it sometimes drags along behind because it cannot predict and evaluate how events might develop, and prepare for this. I think that this is a very serious mistake and there is now little time to correct it.

Or take our unified political days. I am happy that comrade Vyalyas touched on this subject in his report. They have been devised in a not bad way. But I have already said that, as if we had no head on our shoulders, we obtain material from the lecture groups and must present it to a random audience put together by chance, and explain things about which we are not well oriented. At the same time, we are forced to turn down invitations to collectives where they do want to meet us. Even the busiest people, top-echelon leaders, who day after day are dealing with thousands of very important and significant issues, dissipate their time and spiritual strength and energy. This is the kind of formalism, a rudiment of the period of stagnation, from which we must urgently rid ourselves. Every one of our days should become truly a political day.

I am not saying that top leaders should not visit the labor collectives. But they should visit them only if there is a real need for it. As for the rest, we have our mass media and electronics and television. Sometimes the activity of leaders and leading organs is public enough. Then many questions will be resolved by themselves. Our people are not stupid. Give them information and we have no need to rush about like peddlars hawking our policies.

A second problem that I cannot pass by is the language problem. I am a member of the working group under the Supreme Soviet Presidium dealing with the question of the status of language. In my opinion, the confusion about the levels of discussion is the main reason for the present contradictions between the various groups in the population in the matter of an official language. M. Bronshteyn has already said here that different levels exist. There is the personal level and there is the level of society. All of us, regardless of national affiliation, are quite equal at the personal level. Any preference for anyone is antidemocratic and even uncivilized. But at the level of society there exists the nation, which has other rights. This must be understood. It is elementary and natural. However, the leaders of some movements

confuse this level, and I would make bold to say that they do it specially in order to fire the emotions. Sometimes they are confused simply because of lack of political and human culture. Some say that if the Estonian language acquires the status of the official language in Estonia then no one will respond in Russian, but if he does then he is a second-rate kind of person.

Assertions such as this are nothing but elementary nonsense. Unfortunately, however, people believe things when they are constantly repeated. This has helped to insure the extremely negative consequences of Stalinist national policy, and indoctrinated whole generations of people either devoid of national sentiments or with perverted national sentiments, people who do not want or are unable to look at these problems in any other way. Let me give you one small example. I hope that it will be perceived as a lyrical digression for at one time I wrote prose to earn my bread. In Tallinn there exists the Estonian SSR Union of Writers, and Estonian writers abroad are members of the Stockholm Union. When the Union of Estonian Writers Abroad in Stockholm receives a letter or document from a Swedish government establishment the letters are written in Swedish, and this is quite natural because the Estonian writers in Sweden are strangers in a strange land, guests if you like. But when the Estonian SSR Union of Writers consistently receives all its letters and most legislative enactments and drafts for agreement from the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers only in Russian, then pardon me, I do not regard this as normal. And not because this causes difficulty for me personally. I think that it is wrong that we are led by the bridle by some dumb, lazy, feeble and arrogant official. We should have the opportunity to protest this at the legislative level. And so an official language is also needed precisely at the national level. I believe that this is not an extreme demand.

And what is the state of affairs in reality? The working group has done its work and we have two, and perhaps three, absolutely acceptable, and in my opinion almost equal proposals to amend the constitution that could be adopted tomorrow. We have draft legislation on language with which I recently familiarized myself, drawn up without the participation of the working group, and it will not do at all because it reflects nothing. In this draft one provision contradicts the other. Entire very important fields in the use of language are absent. In short, it must now be passed on to experts who will make their amendments. Only after this will an intelligible draft be published so that everyone can see it. It should offer all guarantees that in Estonia no obstacles will be raised against the use of any language. Then it will be clear to everyone that all these rights are guaranteed. When the draft has been debated it should be adopted at the following session.

First deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Industry, Estonian SSR minister Yu. Kraft said that there is a danger that if we fail to take effective steps then Estonians will become a minority in their own

land. Undoubtedly the blame here also lies with industrial development since for many years we have been importing manpower from other republics. A situation has now taken shape in Estonia that cannot and must not continue. Hence also the hostile attitude toward, and even rejection by the public of industry and the prospects for its development. Here, they do not want or are unable to understand that our living standard also depends on industry. Where is the golden mean that will bring the producer closer to the consumer?

In my opinion the structure of industry in the republic needs fundamental reorganization. On the basis of official statistics we acknowledge that we are debtors to other all-union republics. Who owes what to whom and how much we shall leave to the economists. What is clear is that by producing small parts and semifinished goods for the machine builders we shall never rid ourselves of the burden of debts. While suggesting that we are nevertheless competent in some things, I propose that the republic government jointly with the scientists and leaders in our industry solve the problem of the structure and location of industry: what to produce and where, so that new enterprises will not be located in an unorganized fashion where the population is already fully employed. I am talking about this because there are already more than 150 economic organizations in Estonia whose offices are located thousands of kilometers away in other republics. It is time to recognize the degree of efficiency in our work.

We are also alarmed by the fact that this year a very complex situation has been created in light industry. There is a manpower shortage: whereas we lost 6,300 people over the past 12 years, last year the figure was 1,000, and for the first 8 months of this year, about 500. Here, it should be said that we are not allocating an adequate amount of highly productive equipment to compensate for the smaller number of workers. If the outflow of workers continues then light industry will inevitably decline. This affects not only light industry but also the entire population of Estonia directly. I see the main reason for the decline in manpower in the rapid development of the cooperatives. If you like, also in the competition that is seen primarily not so much in output but in better wages. Whereas, for example, the average wage for a worker in light industry is more than R200, in the cooperative system, where labor intensity is in no way higher, he may receive R400 or more. This is quite tempting. And herein lies a paradox: prices for output are increasing but wages for most workers in the state sector remain at their previous level. What is the solution? From experience I can say that transferring a state enterprise to leasehold or setting up small enterprises is always accompanied by a sharp rise in prices. I see the solution in the following: the tax introduced for the cooperatives should really regulate the relationship between wages and incomes. The cooperative system is an essential movement but we must seriously analyze what the cooperatives are producing and at what prices they are marketing their output. It is common knowledge

that part of the output goes outside Estonia. In many cases this becomes a source of "artificial money." I hold to the opinion that it makes no sense to protect those cooperatives that receive money from the state but do not provide for money circulation of commodities. Their activity should be halted.

Life demands positive expenditures but it also demands content and the further development of state industry. Sad to say, it is precisely here that we are encountering impassable obstacles. In order to slow down inflation what is required is the preferential development of consumer goods. Whereas in the preceding five-year plan limits for contract work in our light industry were set at R8 million annually, in this five-year plan the average is R1.5 million. Only one of the new construction projects has gone into operation. Why? The ispolkoms are trying in every way possible to prevent acceptance of these projects because others are more important. And here it is no secret that we have shortages of knitted articles for children, footwear, underwear and much else. There is yet another opportunity for expanding the production of consumer goods. Following the example of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries, develop labor-intensive production, first and foremost the manufacture of sewn and knitted articles and uppers for footwear, for example, in Vietnam or North Korea, where there is adequate manpower. This may seem strange, but we ourselves do have similar experience. Now, for example, we are obtaining uppers for footwear and knitted articles.

The struggle for unity of word and deed is still failing to produce good harvests. Last year the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) was passed, which a superior department cannot alter at its own discretion. This also applies in all respects to light industry enterprises in Estonia, the more so since plans for the following year were in line with the control figures for the five-year plan. However, since in the Soviet Union there is a shortage of consumer goods and our plan was increased R40 million above the 5-year target, which now has to be spread among the enterprises. Thus, the rights of the enterprises were disregarded. They are refusing to accept the extra millions. It is a bad thing that this kind of distribution of "air" for which there is no commodity backup remains in Estonia's market allocations and of course is reducing the already meager commodity backup. Polemic has recently erupted about the acute question of prices for light industry output. It is asserted that positive results can be obtained from the experiment only by raising prices. But let us look at the facts. In 3 years we have achieved growth of R166 million, including 28 percent through price increases, or about R47 million.

In his speech, first secretary of the Estonian Komsomol central committee, A. Almann, said that one thought that today links all the speeches at the plenum is the question of how, in the context of growing sociopolitical problems, we insure and devise guarantees for our policy of perestroika.

The essence of the question is how to insure the irreversibility of democratization so that society develops toward a truly legal state and toward ethical and moral health. In our opinion one such guarantee is achieving a correct attitude toward the rising generation and giving this generation greater access to the social experience gained with such difficulty by today's generation of perestroika. You will agree that although today we talk little about this, this attitude is extremely fragile. The deformed link between society and the rising generation has today given birth to a multitude of complex problems in the youth sphere. A contradiction has arisen in which youth lives in society with a sense of being a debtor, while in fact it is society that is a debtor to it. Society's debt is the cumbersome legacy of the past; it is today's lack of protection for the young family, the decline in the value of education, a closed cultural sphere and so forth. These and other contradictions in the youth sphere have intensified in a situation in which perestroika is being accompanied by increased social and political activity among youth and dissatisfaction with the negative aspects of public life. At the 19th All-Union Party Conference it was recognized that we lack a republic youth policy. The need to draw up and implement such a policy was also underscored in the report to this plenum.

A. Almann noted that resolution of this task as a guarantee for perestroika cannot be delayed. He thought it essential that already this year a standing or ad hoc organ should be discussed and set up at the level of the republic government to coordinate the activity of the various departments that handle youth affairs, and that funding should be provided for a youth policy to be drawn up on a scientific basis, and that real links should be established with the republic's legislative organs. In implementing a state youth policy, A. Almann added, it is essential also to define the role of youth itself in drawing up and implementing this policy since one of the principles of the process of democratization is to emphasize the political subject. The youth groupings that have come into being also want to take part in politics as its subject. It is essential to define and guarantee their position when drawing up and implementing a youth policy.

In a situation in which there is no state youth policy but, as is known, nature abhors a vacuum, the Komsomol has started to fill this place, A. Almann continued. Because of its position it has been unable to do this because a public organization can never replace state policy. If, for example, we analyze just the tasks set for the Komsomol by the party and by government organs in past years we see that they are tasks of state policy that, since they were set for a public organization have remained without underpinning by economic, legal or organizational guarantees. In order to overcome this and other contradictions it is necessary to provide and guarantee a place for the Komsomol within the political system because declarative rights both in the field of legislative initiative and in the field of nominating one's own candidates as

deputies, along with a real opportunity to defend the interests of youth in party, soviet and economic organs have sometimes remained an empty show.

Second, we must restore proper relations between the party and the Komsomol. Just as Lenin envisaged it during the years of the creation of the Komsomol. So that the Komsomol can work under the political leadership of the party and retain full organizational independence. Party leadership of the Komsomol has been transformed into a typical bureaucratic administration, and from being a political aide and reserve it has been transformed into an executor of orders and an appendage. A didactic command style has started to dominate with respect to the Komsomol, and together with organizational independence the organization has lost its political character. Relapses into this kind of situation can be found even in the recent past. Today the following question has been raised: where are the Komsomol discussions about perestroika? In May of this year a plenum of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee took place when for 2 days there was discussion of the thrust of perestroika in the Komsomol organizations in our republic, and of ways to destroy the braking mechanism of the period of stagnation, which threatens its organization and perestroika itself. After the plenum, instead of thinking together about how to implement the proposals that the plenum had presented to the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and republic government, within the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and also within the Komsomol Central Committee they started to compile information materials about what had been said at the plenum and in the speeches there. A personal question about one of those who had spoken was raised in his party organization.

It is high time to seriously revive the political and organizational independence of the organization and define the mechanism of political leadership for it, which should be seen in party support for the ideas, proposals and aspirations of the Komsomol organization in pursuing a correct cadre policy in the Komsomol organization.

If the party does not value its reserve there is a danger that it will also be unable to raise up and value youth. Organizational independence also depends on attitudes toward the Komsomol. The existing centralized system of administrative control, both in society and in the public organizations, including the Komsomol, hampers the dynamic implement of perestroika. The Komsomol Central Committee is now reviewing the proposals from the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee on restoring organizational independence. The support from the CPSU Central Committee notwithstanding, this process is still moving with difficulty and pain through the Komsomol Central Committee.

And in conclusion. Perestroika is looking ahead. The thrust of today's plenum is also to look to the future. However, while moving forward it is sometimes also essential to glance back so that our advance is really guaranteed.

Today we are talking about sovereignty, an official language, republic cost accounting and economic problems, and about the unity of the people and of society, deputy director of the Maynor Association design and planning buro E. Savisaar said in his speech. We are also talking about the party, and this is as it should be because it is essential to start with the party. All that is happening in the party is not only the internal affair of the party since constitutionally it is assigned a special role. We should therefore relate internal party affairs to our common affairs. It is impossible to achieve relations of trust in society if they do not exist within the party. I would formulate the goal thus: the party should open itself up to the people. Movement is taking place in this direction and this is characterized on the one hand by the activity of the Popular Front. Several months we in the party apparatus and in other places were showered with anxious questions about how to understand the independence declared by the Popular Front and its lack of subordination to anyone, and whether the party was notwithstanding directing the activity of the Popular Front and so forth. Now another trend can be seen. It is not only the party through the Popular Front that is influencing the people, but through the Popular Front the people are influencing the party. I think that this is a cleansing and positive influence. Cleansing, or rather self-cleansing, is essential for us along three avenues. First and foremost, as before there is concern about the lack of decisiveness in the party. For years we have been saying that we are engaged in a leading ideological struggle but the leading requirement for independent thinking is particularly great. Independent thinking should also lead us to an understanding of what interests we nevertheless represent and whom we should defend. In Estonia there can be no democratic and stable authority if the Estonian people have doubts about the ability of communists to defend their interests. Until there is total trust underpinned by specific deeds, nothing can help. This viewpoint is unusual for many communists. Only recently has it become possible for the voices of communists to ring out against contractions in the sphere of the use of their native tongue. Only recently have we started to regard national pride as a factor that promotes the further development of society. These re-assessments were first made not by the Estonian Communist Party but from the side.

Another problem is the selection of cadres, which has been dealt with according to the well-known principle of obedience, and which for along time led to the failure of leading cadres.

A third problem is the lack of true ideological clarity among many communists. The understanding of Marxism is sometimes so superficial and essentially contradictory that some of our party functionaries are incapable of responding adequately to questions about the real goal of socialist society or what a planned economy is. The dogmatism of many party workers of the older, middle, yes and even the younger generations in these matters has led to a divorce from youth because young

people want to understand the essential nature of the matter and have a distrustful attitude toward wordy rhetoric. The party is a political organization and it should be actively engaged in politics, which in no way means that it should endlessly prevent and fight against things, which is unfortunately the main thing for some functionaries. I am not sure that the present accountability-and-election campaign will help the party in its self-cleansing. The fact is that some party organizations have remained in the so-called zone of silence. One reason is that the activity of many communists and nonparty people has been shifted outside the sphere of the activity of the party organizations into the Popular Front, the "Greens" and other organizations where they are able to realize themselves more fully. The danger, however, is that if we in the party organizations fight for a victorious conclusion then we shall thus untie the hands of conservative forces in the party ranks. They have already started to consolidate and they have their own platform, in which, true, they express the demand to strengthen the leading role of the party even though this essentially means a return to the old times and to the command-order system. Some of these people assume that no consolidation of the supporters of perestroika has yet taken place within the Estonian Communist Party, but this consolidation is taking place and today's plenum will help this.

And here, as a communist I express the attitude only of one communist. As it applies to the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum, and first and foremost to the party community, and indeed the community in general, others, of course, should speak. What, in my opinion, can the rank-and-file communist expect from the party? Here are some of my thoughts on this subject. We all agree with the thesis that the party should be made up of progressive people. This is now extraordinarily important. But nothing remarkable is happening in this direction. Has not the time come to proclaim party mobilization in support of perestroika? First of all, of course, a program should be drawn up for the Estonian Communist Party that takes local specific features into account. There is nothing unprecedented in that. We drew up a platform for the 19th All-Union Party Conference. If we do not have a clear-cut program then removing the restrictions on admission to the party may harm it instead of bringing advantage and its ranks will be flooded with even more careerists. If we have adequately clear-cut directions for party activity—radical enough and strict, requiring true struggle and triumph over ourselves, as is inherent in communists, and it is known that the people do in fact exercise control over party activity, then true fighters and progressively thinking people will join the party. On the other hand, we must indisputably rid ourselves of the ballast. I do not mean a party purge. But I do think that those who for some reason cannot or will not follow the party should be given the opportunity to leave the party without trouble. It also seems to me that if we are unable to influence the people by commands then we can influence them by two methods, namely, through the intellect and through

personal example. And they expect this of us. For example, in language study the party apparatus should without doubt be in the front ranks.

We talk a great deal about explanatory work among the non-Estonian population and the representatives of other nationalities. But the most diverse rumors about Estonia, not always substantiated, are circulating throughout the country. But nothing in particular is being done to refute them. I think that this process must not be allowed to drift on. Extensive explanatory work is needed, and it precisely the Russian party members who should be a bridge into the other republics. They will be better believed and psychologically this is understandable. It is essential to explain extensively the aims of our national policy and make direct contact at all levels. Otherwise they will again fail to understand us, as, they say, was the case at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The Russians who have joined the Popular Front are more than pleased to help in this. It would be fitting if the appropriate organizational work were done on a party basis.

The question has recently been repeatedly raised on control over party means by the public or at least rank-and-file communists. The impression is being created that the use of party monies has been centralized to the extreme and is in the hands of a narrow circle of people, and that party democracy is still not being extended into this sphere. Each party member needs systematic and freely available information on the expenditures of the apparatus, party capital investments and income, expenses for election propaganda and so forth. But rank-and-file party members do not know even the most elementary things about the financial affairs of their own organization. Obviously it is necessary to issue an appropriate detailed quarterly financial statement. And the question of wages for workers in the party apparatus should be within our competence—the rank-and-file communists.

Communists have the opportunity to set an example in one important matter. Academician Bronshteyn also said earlier that enterprises should be subordinate not to Moscow or Tallinn but to economic and legal rules. But here a very serious question arises: whose interests do these rules represent and where are they essentially adopted—in Moscow or in Tallinn? Within the all-union state does the priority of law in an all-union republic take precedence over all-union law? This is not presently the case, and I see no possibility of abandoning the desire to transfer all-union industry to the authority of the Estonian SSR. I would, of course, like to say that this problem is first and foremost a scientific one. At the same time, however, I would like to say that if we all come to an understanding that it is very essential to subordinate all-union industry to the republic then it is precisely the communists who must strive for what they want and make political preparations for the issue in their own labor collectives.

The concept of my speech, said V. Udam, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Pyarnu Raykom, has been published in the newspapers and many people have read it. But I have decided to add some further thoughts. We held a meeting of the party aktiv and the concept as set forth in abridged form in the report published in the newspapers was approved by that meeting, as it has been by the voters in my district. So that I am able to say that it is now mandated by the people of Pyarnu.

At the same time I would like to say a word as chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet commission on the agro-industrial complex and say that although for me this is a public obligation and I am engaged in it along with my other main obligations, I consider myself responsible for this entire reshuffle that has taken place in the agricultural leadership in the republic in recent years.

I would like to say that the position was stable when we had a minister of agriculture and other ministries functioning separately. I am reproached for the fact that as the "father" of the agro-industry at the rayon level I myself let the genie out of the bottle. I would like to emphasize that at the rayon level even now there is nothing unnatural and that the rayon agro-industrial complexes can function fully. And even if we convert them into associations the basis will remain the same. And when we decided 15 years ago what was to be done and how, the rayon wing settled down better. Everything that happened subsequently happened after the CPSU Central Committee May Plenum, and I participated in the preparations for it. Very correct words were written at that time to the effect that the basis of the development of agriculture and the basis of the agro-industrial complex is agriculture, and everything else is subordinate to that. But everything became distorted as soon as the All-Union USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee was set up. The processing people assumed authority and the rest, right down to the agricultural communes and the farmers, were squeezed into the third and fourth ranks. It is the same, of course, in the republic. I would therefore today like to state the following: comrade Tynspoyeg has replaced comrade Veldi, but the troubles remain. The system was developed despite all the laws of management and the times of the bourgeois republic, and despite the laws of capitalism and socialism, despite our economic laws, and no one single person can rescue it. Perhaps the fact of the matter is that... You see, I was also on all the commissions—Tynspoyeg's, Upsi's, Veldi's, and before that on the Tynurist commission. I have a bad kind of reputation: I interfere, I criticize. And when everything had been decided, I then said—and I submitted my proposal in writing—that if all those ministries and other institutions were combined they must represent an independent bloc. And what is happened is the same as in the Tootsi affair, when all the seeds were mixed up, and now the system is out of hand and no normal person can put it right. The instability came about after the creation of the republic agro-industrial complex which has now been in existence for

5 years. And during that time we have lived through three re-organizations. Last year it was announced that it would be cut back. Something is being rearranged or combined or separated all the time. Since there is a new leadership in the agro-industrial complex I would like to advise it to think about how to organize it.

Of the 15 members of our commission on agriculture 10 are agricultural experts and several are candidates of science, and the commission includes a group of scientists made up of the most eminent specialists in the republic. But very many of the businesslike decisions we have made just remain on paper. As chairman of the commission I am also to blame here. It is essential to move on to a meeting of the Council of Ministers and a meeting of the leadership of the agro-industrial complex and to protest or oppose, and monitor. But I have my own work in the rayon. I would like to say that in the future, when at least some deputies will be paid chairmen of commissions, things will start to move.

In conclusion I would like to touch on several other problems. It was recently decided that from 1 January, at least in principle, the additional payments for livestock weight will be abolished. We have calculated that if this occurs, then in Pyarnu rayon alone 1,500 to 2,000 tons less meat will be available, while at the republic level it will very sharply reduce meat production. If we are not paid for weight then cattle weighing less will be offered. This means that the position will deteriorate. The question of shutting down the production of cellulose in Tallinn is now being decided, but that facility provides us with about 4,000 tons of yeast for fodder. This means that we shall again experience a shortfall of thousands of tons of meat since the fodder will be unbalanced. These decisions must not be made rashly. There is something else. By a decision of the all-union government, or, more accurately, by a decision made by just two or three people, in the middle of the year, and in the middle of the five-year plan, from 1 July the price of concentrated feed was raised 50 percent. I asked the manufacturers what they would do if the price for their raw material was raised 50 percent. They told me that they would raise the price for their output and they have already moved to trade at the higher price. But the rural worker must sell his milk and meat at the earlier price. In agriculture the cost of raw materials is deducted from the volume of output sold. Bonuses and other expenditures are also figured in. For example, workers in Pyarnu rayon are incurring losses of R4 million annually. How does it still happen that in our state such decisions are made so hastily? Who makes them and sanctions them?

I consider it essential as chairman of the Council of Ministers, B. Saul said, to express here today at this plenum my opinion on the key problems in the present state of the economy and in socioeconomic strategy. The more so since success or failure in renewal in all fields of life starts with the economy. It is not a simple thing to assess unambiguously the 3 years of perestroyka in the economy of Estonia. There have been many changes that

both open up the way ahead and hamper the advance. What is more important, however, is the desire of the people to make economic life democratic and efficient and to decide for themselves which path to choose. All this has made it impossible to use earlier methods and principles, and sometimes has forced a re-evaluation of values. As we reorganize our public life we are changing at the same time.

The present lineament of our economy is characterized by a trend toward socioeconomic improvement and an increasingly palpable social emphasis and improving efficiency in social production, and on the other by insignificant changes in satisfying urgent and vital needs.

For many years the illusory idea dominated that our economy was developing harmoniously. The first major crack in this idea appeared through the emotional assessment of things at the joint plenum of the creative unions. Subsequent rational analysis confirmed that over the past decades, essentially since the liquidation of the national economic councils, there had been no unified strategy for economy development based on the interests of the region. The economic mechanism was subordinated not to objective economic laws but administrative control that entailed disproportions, lack of agreement and splintering of the sectors of the economy. Our geographic position, the level of the social infrastructure, and the state of the economy in general brought the all-union departments here, and they brought the economy into subordination to their own narrow departmental interests along the path of irrational specialization. This promoted disruption of the ecological balance, nonequivalent barter with other regions, and a weakening of the links between production and the local organs of power. For example, machine-building and instrument-building enterprises of all-union subordination now pay only 2.5 percent of their profits into local budgets.

And these plans were always compiled with a faith in the development of the economy. They were approved at the appropriate party forums and confirmed at their sessions. But the administrative-command economy led us to the formation of an economy hostile to man. Did we know this? Probably. But we did not do much to investigate because we were in no condition to alter the all-union rules of the game.

As chairman of the Council of Ministers and also a member of the Central Committee Buro I here acknowledge and recognize my fault and responsibility.

However, even the years of perestroyka have still not brought to our economic base the changes that would correspond to the change that has taken place in the consciousness of the inhabitants of Estonia and in their expectations. Hence today's tension and public dissatisfaction with the activity of the government and crisis of

trust in the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Today they have acquired such a scale that it would be improper to pass them by in silence at this plenum.

I have been carrying out the duties of head of the government for four-and-a-half years. They have been years of intense work and search, and of joy in the windfalls, but also years of error, pain, loss and disappointments. There has been everything. I can say for myself, and even on behalf of the entire government, that we have tried honestly to do our duty to our consciences and to Estonia. The years of perestroika have renewed the composition of our government more than half. This process will be continued in the future also. Changes in Estonian Communist Party cadre policy are also increasing opportunities for the chairman of the Council of Ministers in forming the government. Recent changes in the composition of the government and the formation of teams confirm this.

I ask the plenum to express in particular its opinion on the possibility of my further work in the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. I am prepared to resign immediately. I am also prepared to work, but without trust it is impossible to work.

Work on the concept of cost accounting for Estonia should become the unifying line that makes it possible to deal with future and present tasks and involve in the process of economic renewal the overwhelming majority of Estonia's people and their intellect, love of labor and will, and the Popular Front. Hence, the priority political and social task today is to make use of all necessary forces so as to prepare an integrated, scientifically sound concept for republic cost accounting in the shortest possible time.

What must be done for this? In my opinion it is necessary first to accelerate work on certain still unresolved key theoretical problems of republic cost accounting. This involves questions such as the mechanism for organizing interrepublic barter under the conditions of republic cost accounting, principles for price setting in barter between cost-accounting republics, the basis of money circulation in the cost-accounting all-union republic, problems of national ownership of the means of production in the all-union republics, and so forth.

In parallel with work on the scientific concept and a national debate, we must set about drawing up the normative documents essential to realize the concept. I would think that the most important work is extending the republic's rights and defining the boundaries of the competence of the USSR. Our corresponding proposals are now being considered by all-union organs, and I have already talked here about the opposition to them at the middle level. Up to now we have been proceeding on the principle that the law on federation should be made more exact with regard to the entire Soviet Union as a whole. Today it seems that we shall be ready for cost accounting before the corresponding laws on federation

are ready. As is known, on this subject a plenum to deal with this subject will be held only in the middle of next year. Possibly we should now proceed from fundamentally new positions: present for Moscow's consideration the viewpoints only of those rights and obligations that during Estonia's transition to cost accounting would remain within the competence of the central organs. The republic itself could resolve the rest. This path seems to be more realistic and rational. And this is how the question was put to the USSR Council of Ministers.

Today, problem No 1 is the shortages of foodstuffs, and it will remain so during the immediate future. A government program for taking the bite out of the problem, and for the preferential development of agricultural production has been included in the draft decision of the plenum.

The main basic points of this program are as follows:

- comprehensive assistance for agriculture and the processing industry. As soon as the final years of this five-year plan we must allocate a significant proportion of capital investments for big industry to agricultural construction. In this way rural construction workers would annually receive additional funds of almost R3 million;
- bold introduction of family farms, private subsidiary farms and farmsteads, and new production relations;
- the production and energetic acquisition of additional food resources both in Estonia and beyond its confines, and reductions in the amount of foodstuffs exported from Estonia. This must be accompanied by the rational marketing of foodstuffs without losses, both in trade and in public catering.

Our farmers need state and popular support. Particularly now, when a very difficult situation has taken shape in agriculture. Drought at the beginning of the year and constant rain at the end have led to poor harvests, which in turn has directly affected livestock farming. And even though the draft plan for 1989 makes provision for the allocation of R1.2 tons of concentrated feed, with a similar amount already promised for this year, the stall period promises to be difficult. According to predictions made by the State Committee for Statistics, because of the complex situation in agriculture there will be a shortfall of about R200 million in national income.

There are other concerns. About a month ago news arrived in the republic about price increases for concentrated feeds, which will result in additional major expenditures for farms (R78 million in 1989) and increase milk and meat production costs. Under the conditions of cost accounting this is impermissible. We are also requesting that the agro-industrial complex be returned to republic subordination. The problem of the range of foodstuffs and its solution should remain the primary



concern of the entire republic government, particularly the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee and the ispolkoms of the local soviets.

Another major sore point is the production and distribution of consumer goods and the reorganization of trade and everyday services. And here the republic government has been working on draft resolutions. Following consideration of additional proposals at the plenum, the documents will be formulated next Monday at the meeting of the Council of Ministers Presidium.

A third and very important problem is the ecological situation. The technocratic attitude has left a heavy legacy, particularly in the northeast of Estonia. Naturally this is a matter not just of past but also today's ability, I would even say desire, to handle production so that we can bequeath to future generations an environment that is suitable for life.

An example. A working visit to Finland 2 weeks ago brought us to the Salmisaareskiy power station in Helsinki, where an extremely simple method is used to remove sulfur compounds from the smoke emissions. The leadership and engineering and technical personnel at our Narva GRES do not use these methods. And the Estonian Main Administration for Power Services and Organizations is reluctant to make provision for this kind of equipment even for the Baltic GRES, now under reconstruction. Here it is a question of obvious irresponsibility, and such outdated decisions cannot be confirmed by the government. We expect assistance from the environmental organs and the "Greens."

The government program for priority measures could be as follows:

- bring all available environmental protection installations and equipment into operation and additionally install more efficient, reliable and inexpensive equipment;
- permit the opening of new industrial enterprises only if the ecological situation is noticeably improved in the region, and to make no provisions for migration;
- halt or re-plan production in Estonia associated with major pollution;
- improve in every possible way ecological education for production leaders and all workers.

All these provisions will be precisely included in a long-term comprehensive program of environmental protection that is now in its decisive stage.

[14 Sep 88 pp 2-4]

[Excerpts] In his speech sector chief at the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute, M. Titma, said that the key question in perestroyka is undoubtedly the

question of power. We in Estonia can no longer say what we should do, how we should start to activity, as the people demand of us. And if we do begin to act then we shall be the first in our country to achieve a situation that from the standpoint of perestroyka is decisive. If public forces recognize their own interests then the will formed on the basis of these interests will inevitably clash with political activity. Conflicts are inevitable.

Turning to the deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee department V. Babichev, he continued as follows:

Vladimir Stepanovich, the issues associated with the nationalities that have surfaced in the Baltic, and particularly in Estonia, are in no way an expression of the national question as such. They are an expression of the future of perestroyka.

We are now talking about pluralism. Society cannot stop pluralism of opinion. These opinions will necessarily begin to express the interests of broad circles of people. Those interests express not only nationality but also the working class, the peasantry, the populations of cities and regions and so forth, and broad strata of our population. And our trouble is that it is natural that this process has started with nationality because we are a multinational state. Unfortunately, during the Twenties our society was unable to withstand the clash of interests. The party apparatus with Stalin at its head started to use brute force at first against the NEP people and then against the peasants and then against the entire people. That was the prospect when the CPSU Central Committee encountered a situation in which social forces were expressing their interests and will. This is inevitable at the next stage of perestroyka, and the party must obviously be ready for this.

Now I would like to turn to an issue that was raised by comrade Yegorov. Why has the Intermovement platform not been published in the press? Our political culture is not very profound. This can be seen from the events associated with Nagorno-Karabakh. We must not allow ourselves such broad pluralism of opinion that propaganda can be given to extreme viewpoints that could be taken up by quite numerous groups of people. What is the aim of Intermovement? In order to be understood let me cite what might be called the Moscow example. Figuratively speaking, it was an attempt to unite the so-called limit people and on the basis of their group interests to pursue a great-power policy. Of course, it is not the fault of the people who recently arrived in Estonia that they were sent here to work. It was connected with the construction of enterprises. But all these people came here voluntarily, leaving their own place. Now Intermovement wants to unite them and weld them into a real force. Through Intermovement they have started to impair inter-nation relations in our republic, failing to understand that for Estonians this is the only place where Estonians live, and that this tiny nation really is threatened with extinction. I therefore think that the party Central Committee has acted correctly in



refusing to give extremist Estonians the kind of cause that a publication of this kind would inevitably provide. Advancing the slogan of seceding from the Soviet Union would be inevitable after this. I support comrade Malkovskiy, who expressed the position of the people of Narva quite unambiguously.

We can democratize our life only if all kinds of monopoly rights are eliminated. It therefore obviously makes no sense, for example, for the problem council on republic cost accounting to strive for some special position and the rights of a ministry within the government. Cost accounting can be implemented in Estonia only if the responsibility for it is assumed by the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, the government and the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Our duty is to fight for a situation in which the composition of these bodies includes people who are serious about their business. We can understand the expression of mistrust and certain pressure from the public on the leadership. One reason for this has also been the behavior of our prime minister. Although in principle I cannot agree with the kind of escalation of pressure that has recently been applied. Essentially we have started to pressure the new first secretary without giving him a chance to familiarize himself with the situation, as is usually done in any democratic state. Political will must be used very carefully, in a well-considered and sensible way. It must be understood that by resorting to the stick we may do great harm to perestroika in Estonia. On this plane I welcome the initiative of city and rayon leaders. The most frightening thing is this sense of danger. People feel an almost physical danger, but the feeling can evoke two different reactions. One is fright, fear, defense. The other is a desire to take the leaders in hand and start to activity constructively. Leaders in the cities and rayons have understood this. They are feeling the pressure from below and they have begin to act. Obviously, the apparatus and the entire power structure must start to act. In this case the most important factor is professionalism. We are short on this most of all. Let us try to be loyal and patient and let us give the leadership the opportunity to pursue a cadre policy not when under daily pressure but with a knowledge of the matter.

I make bold to assert, said T. Laak, first secretary of the Tartu party gorkom, that even though it has not consciously demanded it, the general public has been involved in the major change that our plenum is making in party life, even though it did not prepare for it in the direct sense of the word. It is probable that press publication of the theses of the report could have made preparation for this major change possible. This demand was voiced at a meeting of the party aktiv in Tartu, and I think that it should be taken into account when preparing for subsequent plenums.

I should probably say, and self-critically admit, that up to now discussion of many of the main ideas of the plenum have been discussed more in the lines for the bath houses or in stores than in party meetings. Those

who have received appropriate training as party propagandists have little enough to say about the issues of an official language and citizenship. I therefore have a specific proposal: immediately start to make up for lost time by forming a special lecture group made up of our eminent social scientists. It could be small but capable. These lecturers could be released temporarily from all other duties and sent to the labor collectives and into national groups to provide a truly scientific, in-depth and practical and consistent party explanation of what the all-union alliance, an official language, citizenship, sovereignty, republic cost accounting and much else that makes up the aggregate of the main content of today's plenum mean. If we, the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, do not organize this work then others whom we do at all trust will take it up.

Now a few words about taking the initiative in today's political situation in general. I fully endorse the thought that has been expressed here at the plenum repeatedly that consolidation of all progressive forces around the political line of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee assumes maximum reflection of the basic interests of the inhabitants of Estonia, not only in the declarations of our Central Committee and government but also in the day-to-day activity that takes place among the public. And I am convinced that in order to solve many of Estonia's important questions we must break down the mistrust or simply bureaucratic barriers of Moscow's departments. But it still seems that when most problems are being resolved our own departments simply look for precedents in some particular field or wait for instructions from above, rather than making decision themselves and risking calling down someone's anger on them. And in such cases no defense can be expected from anywhere. We have still not rid ourselves of the preperestroika attitude that every initiative is punishable. At the same time, today it should be the other way round: any lack of initiative is punishable. I would draw one important conclusion from today's plenum: the most reliable way of seizing the initiative in Estonia is to embark on a day-to-day realization of the republic's Sovereignty. I hear and have heard that limited sovereignty does not exist. Perhaps in a day-to-day realization of the Estonian SSR's sovereignty, for example, a common viewpoint could be asserted or a central committee plenum decision could be passed to protect a person who, finally, here among us, is in a position to confirm a recipe for rye bread or the price of a cinema ticket and not as a result be reeled in by the Moscow departments.

The concrete program of action formulated at the plenum by comrade Saul for independently solving economic questions in my opinion offers very favorable initial positions for this.

There is more. If this plenum does not state decisively and unambiguously that protecting public order in the Estonian SSR relates only to the competence of the state power of the Estonian SSR and that legalization of a procedure for holding gatherings and meetings, street

events and demonstrations should be preceded by public debate on appropriate draft legislation, then we shall again lose the initiative in a very important matter.

And now perestroyka in the work of the party organs. The main reorganization should promote full economic independence for the party committees, which usually also means full cost accounting with all the rights and obligations stemming from this, and also freedom from petty—and I use the word advisedly—tutelage.

The Organizational Party Work Department should probably be formed only from members of the elected party committee headed by its secretary as overseer. And the state apparatus should be in the service of the departments, and we should transform the party committee bureau according to specific requirements. Significant improvement is necessary in the links between the party raykoms and gorkoms. For this it is essential to replace the existing institution of inspectors with plenipotentiaries, perhaps elected and answering to the representatives of the city and rayon organizations under the central committee. We do not need full-time go-betweens to pass on the instructions of the central committee apparatus in the form that they now do, when sometimes they travel to Tallinn in any event to clarify the meaning or lack of meaning in an instruction. As far as everything else is concerned I fully endorse the already well-known reasons for the reorganization.

And in conclusion a few more details about affairs in Tartu. We have been working for a long time in the city party organization on a plan for hi-tech production. At the All-Union Party Congress our delegates L. Karu and M. Bronshteyn passed on to the CPSU Central Committee a proposal on the creation of a science park. Today we have received very positive comments, which encourage us to talk about it sooner. The plan is based precisely on the startup of an innovative mechanism and the launching of Tartu's scientific potential not only to work on new ideas but also to materialize and replicate on the basis of more complete use of available instrument-building capacities. It is probably necessary to emphasize separately that this idea should necessarily be placed in the service of republic cost accounting.

Our proposal has evoked interest not only in Moscow but also much further afield. Specialists from the most varied countries led by the president of the International Association of Science Parks have traveled to find out about it on the spot. At this moment it is clear that without international experience it is virtually impossible to realize the idea of a science park. In this connection we again turn to Tartu's "Achilles' heel"—its status as a closed city. Hence my now traditional appeal in my speeches at plenums: the USSR Council of Ministers must without delay take steps to open Tartu for all the foreign contacts essential for our science and culture and our people.

S. Tarakanov, editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, noted that here in the republic many very acute problems have arisen in virtually all spheres of life. We newspaper people are especially aware of this as we examine the letters to the editor.

Giving due consideration to the opinions of our readers I would like to review the problems of interethnic relations and as far as possible formulate our understanding of the place of the Russian-language press in elucidating them. Let me stipulate at once that no Russian-language press has been needed for the majority of readers to accept the main cause-and-effect link on which our work is built. Namely, that an extensive economy led to forced migration and upset the demographic situation and the ecological balance in the republic. This circumstance had to influence the psychology of the Estonian people and evoke their active desire to protect the national culture and language and the environment.

The growth of national self-awareness must not be equated with nationalism. An extensive economy is alien to a person. It has also exerted its baneful influence on the people who have migrated Estonia, whom it has torn from their historical roots. At one time people cried for help to develop the republic, and they were promised apartments. This is no small matter if we take into account the fact that the indigenous population obtained much less of the good life. And what about spiritual wealth? Did no one think to offer the new arrivals an opportunity to learn the Estonian language, learn about its history, and the customs of the people in a republic that had become home for themselves and their children? And if this tangle of interconnections is plunged into a stagnant pool and is disheveled by a combination of the command-bureaucratic style of management and the dictate of the central departments, then we get a yarn from which it is very difficult to weave the fine cloth of mutual relations in our common home.

And if we judge only from the letters to the editor, we—most citizens—are resolving national questions each in his own sweet way, and we are imparting to normal squabbles and clashes the features of inter-nation conflict, and we know little or nothing about those living next door, about their language and culture and customs, and we are inattentive, make no contact, and are sometimes rude, and we forget the simple truth that there is no such thing as a bad people. Of course, we are all different, we have our achievements and our shortcomings. Undoubtedly, there are more achievements. And we have much in common. For it is as clear as day that if we are solving common economic, social and regional tasks then at the same time the knot of national problems will be loosened or completely untied.

Shortcomings should be criticized, but not another people just for themselves. Self-criticism and self-criticism alone is possible in the sphere of relations between nations. Criticism from the side does nothing but alienate, not draw closer.

Of course, firmness is required for this position. It is much easier for someone to talk pleasantly, especially with his own people, and to lisp and use soothing words—perhaps they notice, perhaps they do not. Firmness of position during the course of the elucidation of problems concerning inter-nation relations means maximum exactingness and criticalness to oneself and a sense of goodwill toward others. For as the writer Ye. Nosov said, democracy is not when you are permitted to do something but when you do not permit yourself to do it. And one should always adhere to this: both human communal living and the common cause, and self control. And this is possible when a person learns to shorten himself rather than others.

We should not forget that interethnic relations constitute an emotional sphere, and this must be taken into account. We try to consider the possible consequences of what we publish. What is published should not be salt in the wound or injections to boost national arrogance. This in general terms is the concept that determines the task of the Russian-language press.

Now the problem of adequate information and lack of information for the Russian-speaking population, and the complex questions of public life in the republic raised in the report. Even though the acute nature of this has recently been somewhat blunted through the efforts of the Russian-language newspapers and journals and the editorial offices in television and radio, which can be seen from the letters to the editor, the problem remains. On the one hand, the possibilities for the Russian editorial offices of printed publications and the electronic press have not been completely exhausted. On the other, given the mass information and propaganda system existing in the republic it is in fact difficult to find a final solution to the problem. It is not simply a question of insufficient newspaper and journal space or of time allocated in television and radio broadcasts for the Russian-speaking population. It is essential also to take into account the different levels and interests of immigrants into Estonia that are also not fully satisfied by the republic press. It is not therefore happenstance that part of our reading and viewing audience is oriented on the central publications and broadcasts put out by Central Television and All-Union Radio. It is clear that a need has arisen to take this factor into account during the expansion in the structure of the republic press. A positive role in improving the degree of information available to immigrants into Estonia is undoubtedly played by fluency in the national language, which helps in reading the Estonian periodical press. In this connection I think that without exception, when all problems concerning the adaptation of immigrants into Estonia are being resolved, we must proceed from the existing realities. So that in our common home, justice and dignity and tolerance can prevail. So that as a unified family we make our home more beautiful and rich, and the atmosphere more spiritual and warm. So that the Estonian people are really masters in their own land, and so that all who have linked their lives and their destiny with this land will feel this in their souls.

Today, said deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Estonian SSR Gosplan R. Otsason, permit me to speak as director of the Economics Institute and talk about two things, namely, republic cost accounting and the dangers, and the interconnection between them.

Yesterday's report was almost completely convincing in saying that we can realistically hope to realize republic cost accounting, and therefore each person at his own work place should think about what he is doing specifically and what he can do to realize this.

It seems to me that in scientific circles we can state with satisfaction that preparations on the concept are proceeding normally. The well-known "article of the four" published last year has become a very good basis for awakening activity in this matter and work on many important provisions. Since then the Economics Institute has gone to the Council of Ministers with a proposal to give us special permission to set up under these extraordinary circumstances a temporary working collective to examine these matters in detail. And, as is known, we obtained this permission. About 40 people are now working in the collective.

If we proceed from the very correct principle of pluralism of opinion and from the fact that no organization has the right of monopoly, then another important factor is that in parallel with this many collectives of researchers have come into being on a voluntary basis, and it would be a very fine thing and would undoubtedly encourage both the research collectives to work better (they are now combined within the framework of the problem council on republic cost accounting) and possibly achieve better results. I believe that this would also be an achievement in that we would have succeeded in eliminating monopolism.

As is known, both scientific research collectives have agreed that the concepts will be ready by 1 November.

And in this situation the article "Republic Cost Accounting in Danger" published on 31 August in the newspaper EDASI greatly concerns me and evoked a sense of real danger. One of the conclusions drawn from publication of this article has been the alleged adoption by the government 10 days ago of a decision to create a new commission headed by the Gosplan chairman V. Paulman. But as you know, following his return from Finland, the chairman of the Council of Ministers took only half a day to be convinced of the incorrectness of that decision, and it was rescinded on the Monday. The article appeared on the Wednesday but was probably prepared for press on Tuesday evening. Of course, I think that the editorial office already knew that the decision had been rescinded. I assess this as someone trying to increase tension artificially in this matter, even resorting to arguments that were not strictly in line with the truth. At least the newspaper could have noted that the government had rescinded the decision. This, for

example, is what NOORTE KHYAEL did with an article published a day earlier. This is why it also seems to me that a real threat exists that may hamper preparations for the concept of cost accounting. What I have in mind is the threat of using the concept of cost accounting and the preparations for it to achieve political or other aims. I would say that one possible danger may be a situation in which at the final stage of work on the concept we shall begin to abandon the desire for unity and create artificial contradictions. The problem that comrade Titma dealt with could become a manifestation of these kinds of artificial contradictions. He noted that one of the collectives engaged in cost accounting, namely the problem council on cost accounting, has proposed the creation on its base of a state organization that would initiate preparations for republic cost accounting. It seems to me abnormal that several months ago we were fighting for pluralism of opinion and now we are beginning to fight for monopolism. The second question is that creation of that kind of committee means in reality a certain split in governmental control. The fact is that our economy is a unified one and the present economic mechanism is controlled by the entire system of state institutions. If we create a new organization to introduce republic cost accounting (and its introduction signifies management of the economy on new foundations) then we shall have a dual system of state institutions. Is this necessary? This might be necessary in the event that we set ourselves the firm goal of scrapping the existing structure of government institutions. In certain revolutionary conditions this might be the need of the time, but I am not convinced that this is the situation in our republic today. I would therefore consider more correct an attempt to include as far as possible all those who want to help in the implementation of republic cost accounting and promote them within their own economic organizations to the kinds of posts in which they could most usefully apply their abilities.

This principle should be applied not only to middle-echelon workers but also to leading posts in those government institutions that exert a direct influence on the further development of the economy. We must be sure that in the future we totally reject the quite widespread but incorrect approach in which workers who are not coping in one position are transferred to another post scarcely less important so that they do not feel insulted, while at the same time no concern is shown for how this will affect the future work of the institution.

A second, daily danger is how the all-union departments regard our proposals, and also their direct representatives in the republic—the enterprises of all-union subordination. It is quite proper that we should not have an oversimplified, nihilistic attitude toward enterprises of all-union subordination. If we think in purely economic terms then what do we want from the enterprises of all-union subordination? First that they bring adequate profit to the Estonian budget and second that they observe all the requirements of the comprehensive development of the republic's economy. If they observe all

this then let them operate as they wish and to what subordination they wish. What is decisive is that they operate efficiently. But with some enterprises complex problems also arise. Take the enterprise that is now polluting the atmosphere in Lasnamyae. And these problems must be resolved by proceeding from the interests of the republic. But in general the enterprise of all-union subordination should not fear that its status will be disrupted merely because Estonia is switching to cost accounting.

With regard to the all-union departments, I would say that I regard some of them as a very sick man who does not really understand himself how sick he is, or that we would really like to help him. The fact is that we really want to be rid of many of them and ourselves assume responsibility and ourselves answer for the republic being adequately provided with foodstuffs and industrial goods. We want the all-union enterprises and departments not to complain that things are being handled poorly in a certain region or city and so forth.

Another very important factor is that cost accounting in Estonia become the key that can fully and consistently realize the Law on the State Enterprise and even advance a little compared to the existing legislation. In this sense we would insure for all enterprises, both of all-union subordination (present all-union subordination) and all others, the best conditions for the kind of management that the economists have long been suggesting.

These, then, are the two real threats to cost accounting, but together they are undoubtedly surmountable.

In conclusion, one other problem. Republic cost accounting will operate not only in Tallinn. In reality republic cost accounting is a key issue in the democratization of our society. We are now talking about democratization in many other aspects—glasnost in opinion, freedom of the press and so forth. But the most important thing is that each of us, no matter where he may live, recognize that through our own actions and words we can decide with will happen in the countryside, city or rayon where we live. For this it is essential that cost accounting for all of Estonia be linked inseparably with cost accounting in each country and rayon. This should undoubtedly be taken into account by everyone working on the concept of cost accounting. If we are to succeed in reaching a unified opinion on the main questions of the concept of republic cost accounting then this will be a major step toward a rapid and actual transfer to it.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference, said first secretary of the Leninskiy party raykom in Tallinn city V. Saluste, and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee July Plenum testify to the fact that very serious changes are taking place in our sociopolitical life. I am convinced that our plenum with its candid statements and wishes and the humanistic thrust of the report will make a contribution to the cohesion of all progressive forces in the republic.

I traveled here this morning by taxicab. The conversation was about yesterday's report at the plenum, and in response to the question of whether he was pleased by it the cab driver answered "Absolutely!"

A common goal unites us—to create favorable conditions for the development of our republic and of each family and each individual member of society. People are impatiently expecting from us concrete action in questions whose resolution depends on us. I hope that the viewpoints expressed at the plenum will help many people to overcome their doubts in the resolution of questions connected with the sore points in the life of the republic.

Our republic has at its disposal an adequately powerful economic potential to develop a model for our economic life and to predict ways for its development and publish these predictions and show the reasons for particular negative and positive development trends.

This kind of information for the population will help in dispelling the great tensions that exist, and on the other hand it will provide important information for economic leaders.

It is essential to publish comparative figures on the standard of living and the subsistence minimum. Publication of such figures and their constant updating could serve as a point of departure for revealing those in need of social assistance.

The population of the republic expects full and up-to-date information on everything happening in our life and in our republic, first and foremost at government level, in the form of regular briefings.

The people are also waiting for the personal opinion of each leader and his position on issues affecting enterprises, private subsidiary farms, migration, inter-nation relations, regional cost accounting and anything else.

When talking about private subsidiary farming at enterprises I cannot remain silent on the fact that under our conditions they are the result of a shameful economic policy.

The resolution on private subsidiary farms at industrial enterprises is unacceptable across the enormous territory of the Soviet Union. In 1987 profitability at the private subsidiary farms at enterprises in Tallinn city was minus 50 percent. For those enterprises switching to full cost accounting this should be a purely voluntary matter. Sixty years ago N. Bukharin calculated that together with intensive development in industry steps must be taken aimed against population migration from the countryside into the city and insuring a high technical level for agricultural production and its intensification. Perhaps a more correct method would be to transfer the funds spent on private subsidiary farms directly to agriculture, where they would be used much more efficiently.

On 1 September the newspaper VECHERNIY TALLINN published the position of the city party committee bureau on the political situation in Tallinn. Interviews with secretaries of the primary party organizations showed that they regard the publication if late at least a document that offered people landmarks and instilled confidence. It is essential to continue in this direction. The question of the need to convene an extraordinary congress was not raised at this meeting.

The thought on the need to enhance the value of education, expressed in the report, was a pleasing one. The words spoken 110 years ago in 1878 by that eminent figure of our culture Karl Robert Jakobson will again be honored: "The school should always be united with life, and only life itself can educate." Thus, we are turning our gaze toward the future, to the young people who will shape the lineament of the start of the new century. I fully support the idea of switching to 100-percent funding for national education from the state budget so that it does not find itself in the role of a suppliant.

Today's CPSU Central Committee plenum, said editor of the newspaper EDAZI, M. Kadastik, is the first in which I have had the opportunity to participate. I have been working as the editor of EDAZI for 6 years. And during all those years I have had three face-to-face interviews with the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. All three were in the past 2 months. Now, with hindsight, I understand that it was even good that the previous party leader in Estonia held back from establishing contacts with the press. Why am I talking about this? So that you all understand how unusual an event it is for the editor of a city or rayon newspaper to be speaking at today's forum.

I number myself among those who joined the party in the early Eighties, that is, during the period that we now call the "peak" of stagnation. My contemporaries as communists assumed the role of vanguard in society without the slightest struggle. No one had to show us our moral right to be the leading force in society; we simply moved to where we were needed, settled in where we were needed, paid what had to be paid, and probably more, and no one showed us. Perhaps this is why all the slogans about the party as a combat detachment of the proletariat and the mind, honor and conscience of our age are especially unacceptable for us. We in no way deserved this enthusiasm; we are ashamed when we are singled out in society just because we have a party affiliation. It is probably precisely because of this that we feel so acutely the need for rapprochement between party and people. This is our mission. We want to be not so much representatives of the party as a special sector of society, but rather precisely representatives of the people within the party.

We are now honestly asking ourselves the following question: how great is the influence of the Estonian Communist Party on the average Estonian or inhabitant of Estonia? How much can we really inspire the popular masses with our ideas? I believe that from our position

we are making a drastic re-appraisal of this. Why does no one want to join us? Because there was nothing and no one to join. For many years the Estonian Communist Party has been unable to offer its people a set of ideas or a positive program acceptable to the majority. And it is not therefore surprising that no negative program could unite the people, both party members and nonparty people. Let us boldly admit to ourselves that it was precisely the personality of Karl Vayno that started to fulfill a very important psychological role as the integrator of society. Since time immemorial the people have rallied behind the rejection of something or someone. But even then, last spring, the most perspicacious people started to have doubts about what would become of this unity after the negative personality disappeared. And he did disappear. For some time it was necessary to retain it under the banners of the 19th Party Conference, but only for a time. The conference offered no specific program to improve life in Estonia, and indeed could not. The Estonian people still had nothing on which to rely. And it is not surprising that the people's natural desire for cohesion again began to be realized on the basis of negativism. What I have in mind is the squall of attacks that have erupted in these last weeks against the prime minister. This is the psychological backdrop against which the criticism of these last weeks has been provoked, not any specific errors made by the chairman of the Council of Ministers these last 2 weeks.

I would like to take this opportunity to respond to comrade Otsason's remarks. The article "Cost Accounting in Estonia in Danger," by which he probably has in mind the appeal of the Tartu collectives, was not an editorial. When preparing the material for publication we unfortunately did not yet have information about what had occurred in the Council of Ministers. This information always becomes available with great delay.

It is only now at this Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum that for the first time in many years has it been possible to propose a program that has a chance of winning the people's trust. Only now do we have the chance to enter into candid dialogue with the people. But it is still only a chance whose probability may fall during the realization of many other different directions of ideas. It is very likely that these other directions have already crept into the draft resolution, which does not coincide with the report.

Many of the radical proposals in V. Vyalas' report have caused a certain concern. And this is understandable. It is no secret that there is also unease in the ranks of the communists. It is a question of possible inter-nation confrontation. What should be done? I understand that if the communists should not and cannot join the EPNN then they will not, but on the other hand they should also stand aside from Intermovement. It should be clear that no matter what the subjective aspirations of the extreme nationalist groupings, objectively they are exacerbating the domestic political situation in Estonia and provoking an inadequate response from the opposing side. In

politics of this kind, actions are called provocations. At least the communists should do everything possible to rally all nationalities in a united front in which debate should take place. If necessary, in Russian. The Tartu committee of the Popular Front, of whose 15 members almost one-third speak Russian, conduct their meetings devoted to official status of the Estonian language in Russian. Consequently, we are ready for contacts, not obstacles and mistrust. It seems to me that there is a very genuine internationalist reality. But at the same time, it is impossible to explain something in Estonian in the so-called International Movement. This is now a crucial period, in which the opposition of one movement to another must be ended. And if something must be expressed sharply, then it must be done in a person's own national language and in the press of that language, as my colleague S. Tarakanov from SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA has said. This means that it is the Russian-language press rather than the Estonian-language press that should criticize migrants, lack of culture on the part of immigrants, chauvinist statements and so forth.

At the same time, it is not the Russian-language press but the Estonian-language press that should critically analyze questions of national symbolism and official language, parochialism if it is manifest, and so forth.

Now, under the pretext of statements of differing opinions everything happens in exactly the opposite way, which can lead to a deepening of national contradictions. A patriot in a land of more than 100 nations can act only with extreme exactingness and criticism toward himself and extremely mild and benevolent attitudes toward others. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA recently wrote that this applies in particular to the Russian people as the largest. Let the Estonian-language newspapers try henceforth to create an understanding of this approach among Estonians. With regard to today's plenum, a step toward creating balanced inter-nation relations has already been taken. Not once have I heard the word "nationalism" here spoken in Russian or the word "chauvinism" spoken in Estonian.

For a long time, said OGONEK Baltic correspondent D. Klenskiy, they have been saying in the republic press that for a long time the central press has been covering very incompletely life not only in Estonia but also in other regions of the country. One example is the coverage of the situation in Armenia. This is a very serious problem because incomplete information has resulted in a distorted, and sometimes speculative idea of what is happening. I think that the CPSU Central Committee should give this its most serious attention.

One incident comes to mind: many years ago I was preparing material on the "Norma" Association when I was told this story. Constant arguments at meetings of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply led to a situation in which the chairman of one of the meetings in that department told the "Norma" representative: "You stop throwing your

stones; these are parochial interests and there is no room for nationalism here." Why do I say this? This is the situation that has taken shape in the international question: on the one hand we proclaim the equality of the republics within a united family, and on the other, when a representative of the republic starts, god forbid, to criticize an all-union department this is immediately qualified as nationalism. But today any person knows that local interest is the basis of all-union interest.

We talk a great deal and debate things. But it is high time to start to act. What I have in mind is what we were talking about yesterday—claiming through increased purchase prices to shift those losses that we are carrying from the sale of milk, or actions aimed at liquidating a situation in which the life expectancy of a person in the countryside is several years less than an urban dweller. All these things are necessary. But more is also needed. For we cannot turn to Moscow with every petty matter, and it is therefore necessary to undertake something cardinal so that we can deal with this.

Why is there so little action? Well, because when we raise problems we do not know how to politicize them, and we conduct the debate not at the economic level but at the level of the lines to the store counter. This leads to a situation in which, for example, we confuse civil war and a "war of liberation." Previously we recognized only civil war, now only wars of liberation. But they were both wars at the same time. Let me say it once again: we do little to politicize what is happening. This applies in particular to the events of 1939-1940. We are unable to look at things objectively and we therefore swing from one extreme to another.

Take, for example, A. Aarelayd's statement in the newspaper RAKHVA KHYAEL. The interesting article "The Two Cultures of Estonia" unfortunately also contains the following: they say that today the people of Estonia are unable to entertain non-Estonians to dinner. In my opinion it is very shameful when this is written in a party newspaper. And how did I dine yesterday with my colleagues in the editorial office?

The trouble lies not in facts like these but in the fact that we do not fight against them. But we have no political standards for this. Another thing. I can in no way understand why such facts are not assessed by the party. I am totally unable to agree with the opinion of comrades Kadastik and Tarakanov that the fight against Estonian nationalism should be waged in the Estonian-language newspapers while the fight against chauvinism should be waged only in the Russian-language newspapers. We must write and act from party positions, not national positions. That is my opinion.

The representatives of the cities and labor collectives where a Russian-speaking population predominates who spoke yesterday said through somewhat pursed lips that the Russians respect the Estonians and the Estonian people and their culture. If this is so why do not the party

workers and communists of Russian nationality carry out explanatory work about the situation that has taken shape in Estonia? Yes, privilege according to national attribute is impermissible. But how can a Russian person not understand the other side of this: that a priority does exist for the Estonian people and their culture on their historical land? Why is there no respect for the desire of Estonians to have their own official language, or citizenship? How is it possible to stand at the dais and admit that a party leader has no time to learn the Estonian language, or remain silent about the fact that the word "fascist" is bandied about in the lines of Estonians?

At the beginning of the century the hero of Tammsaar, Mr Marsus, went "into Russian society to solve Estonian problems." Figuratively speaking, the Russians living in Estonia at the end of the century must resolve their own affairs in Estonian society.

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#### **Vyalyas Address to Estonian Popular Front Congress**

*18000063 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 2 Oct 88 p 3*

[Speech by V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee, delivered in the founding congress of the Estonian Popular Front: "With Responsibility for the Future"]

[Text] Esteemed delegates and guests of the congress of the Popular Front!

First, it is a pleasure and an honor for me to pass on to our people the greetings and wishes for success from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which he conveyed to me during a lengthy and comradely conversation conducted in a spirit of full mutual understanding held the day before the plenum. (Loud applause)

Yesterday's plenum of the CPSU Central Committee confirmed once again that the party's course toward radical changes that satisfy the people's yearnings is irreversible. The Central Committee sees creative initiatives coming from below in all domains of life as a strengthening of the success of this course. One of the very vivid manifestations of initiative is the Popular Front which has come into being in Estonia and a number of other regions of the country.

Together we must look at our effort today, taking as our point of departure the new thinking in the Soviet Union in the domain of international life. Its triumphant advance is an obvious political reality for the entire world. Peace through the triumphant advance of human reason is the dominant idea of history. This is the pledge to our future, and that is the course of our party in foreign policy.



But now let us return to our own affairs. The present age has been termed a new age of awakening. Recollection of those decades in the last century when the peasant became aware of itself as a people capable of independent existence and able to create its own inimitable culture has been clearly preserved in the consciousness of the people. Our time is also typified by an awareness of unity and of the moral force that lies in the popular consciousness. Our people has expressed its unanimous readiness to build a just Estonia that meets its conceptions even at the price of sacrifice. (Loud applause)

But the new age of awakening differs from the centuries of the remote past in that the "alarm clock" rang in Moscow—at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Restructuring was initiated by the party. Together with all the progressive forces of our country, the party members of Estonia also began restructuring. But we would not be accurate if we did not add that at first the Estonian CP Central Committee was not among the initiators of restructuring.

Everyone has been caught up by the "singing revolution." The need to strengthen and maintain the process of restructuring has given the Popular Front movement a vital force and legitimacy. But it seems to me that today this stage in our social development should already have been passed. We can, of course, sing, and we need to sing—otherwise we would not be Estonians. But there is no more time. The time has begun to begin the movement, the time has come to start work. There are specific concerns demanding resolution. Problems in our agriculture, industry, environmental protection, education, health care, and culture are so serious, the contradictions inevitably evoked by realization of the conception of a cost-accounting Estonia are so acute and every day demand that wise decisions be made, that we have an obligation today to immediately move on to an arduous political, organizational, and economic effort, to renewal of our spiritual life.

The Estonian Communist Party considers it its principal task at present to outline and in a short time implement legislative and organizational measures which would effectively guarantee the economic, social, and cultural sovereignty of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. A particularly important place is taken by legislative measures, which guarantee the Estonian people psychological and practical protection as the authentic master of the land of its forefathers, the continuity of our language and culture on that small piece of ground where we live.

In juridical terms this means statehood on the basis of a union agreement. The union can be strong only when each of its constituent peoples is strong. History has shown that it is a free people that possesses the sense of its own dignity that looks with respect to all other peoples, nationalities, and ethnic groups. We must become a republic that guarantees the full protection and sense of being in their own home to all the sons and daughters of other nationalities who consider Estonia

their homeland and who have been making their contribution to make it richer and more humane. It is not an easy road that leads toward attainment of that state of affairs, which is the only possible one for civilized society, but the goals have been set, and we are seeking conceptions for their attainment. The Ninth Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee stands as convincing evidence of that.

Like it or not, we have become experimenters. Accordingly, Estonia finds itself at the center of both international and also all-union attention. Development of processes in Estonia must demonstrate the prospects for our principles. The process of restructuring, its initiators and those who are carrying out restructuring in practice, also need Estonia's experience. Our mission is to provide that experience both with our own initiative, consistency, and radical thoroughness, as well as with our prudence and our political and moral sophistication.

As I have already said, the political situation, which is becoming more strained, has provided an impetus for the Popular Front movement in Estonia. But this does not mean that society needs the Popular Front only in extreme situations. People's growing political activity, their desire to take a direct part in restructuring, have found and will continue to find an expression in various movements. It would be difficult to overestimate the role of these movements in people's political education. Tens and hundreds of leaders who enjoy authentic trust, who have an abundance of determination and energy to turn our general programmatic principles into reality, have emerged in recent months both from the ranks of those who do not belong to the party as well as from among party members. Party members who have become actively involved in the Popular Front movement also spoke up in the recent plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee. I would go further: the existence of the Popular Front is one of the factors making it possible to make restructuring irreversible.

What is the Popular Front's place in our political system? Our country's entire history convinces us that in the one-party context, when the Communist Party is the ruling party, movements that would balance out and enrich political life are indispensable to society's development. There is no reason to be afraid of certain differences between the party and the popular movements both in points of view and also in activity. When the party is expressing the will of the people, the Popular Front cannot take shape as a movement in opposition to the party. To the contrary, the awareness of common goals—and today we can say that we are effectively united on the fundamental issues—that situation creates a favorable opportunity for strategic cooperation. But cooperation also has an obvious need for the continuing ideological openness of the Popular Front so that in the framework of programmatic unity differences in opinions would also be allowed there, so that the Popular Front would become a social movement receptive to criticism and seeking reasonable compromises. For its



part the Estonian CP Central Committee supports the idea that the status of the Popular Front in our political system needs to be set down in legislation, consistent with the spirit of the 19th Party Conference. (Applause)

The Popular Front is helping to express the will of the people and is making it possible for worthy representatives of the people to emerge. Elections of people's deputies to soviets at all levels will even over the next 1.5 years provide important opportunities for that. So that there is a renewal of personnel in essence—not a change for the sake of change—we must refrain from setting the activity of the Popular Front in opposition to that of party and soviet authorities. The Popular Front can aid the democratic election procedure and also lend support to worthy candidates. Let that candidate be a party member or not, a worker or a university graduate, a veteran or someone quite young. The Popular Front will be an authentic movement of the people only if it becomes one of many competing movements, if along with the party it takes on itself the role of a true unifier, if it persistently seeks out what unifies the people, not what divides it.

In spite of the ongoing explanatory effort, in spite of the recent forum of the nationalities of Estonia, so far there are comparatively few representatives in the Popular Front of other nationalities living in Estonia. The understanding that the Popular Front is called upon to advocate attainment of strong friendship and mutual understanding among nationalities in Estonia must be the guarantee that the Popular Front's program and activity are in line with the fundamental interests of all inhabitants of Estonia. Measures sponsored by the Popular Front must especially refrain from expressions that spread ethnic intolerance or mutual reproaches.

Allow me on behalf of the Estonian Communist Party to assure you that not a single political movement relying on a narrow ethnic base has a future in today's Estonia nor an opportunity to act, since however noble the slogans they take up, such political forces lead only to constant conflicts in our specific situation. It remains only to add that it does not take much intelligence to spread ethnic or political enmity, but a great deal of intelligence, judiciousness, and sense of responsibility are required to rebuild human society. The people have a saying: It does not take brains to spoil the mood, any moron can do it. (Applause)

I predict that the leaders of the Popular Front face difficult times requiring great political sensitivity when the time comes for them to make decisions which perhaps at a given moment will not always be popular with the people. Lenin taught us to distinguish the momentary mood of the masses from their real historical interests and to see that they do not always coincide. Only those leaders whose activity proceeds from protection of the long-term fundamental interests of the people, not achievements of momentary popularity, deserve the constant honor and respect of the people. All of us—

both in the Estonian Communist Party and also in the Popular Front—must be mindful that we will have to be responsible for our words and our promises in a year's time, in 10 years, and beyond that.

Why do I say that?

Well, because the Estonian Communist Party wants to see the Popular Front of Estonia as a mass social movement which is willing and able to join the party in taking responsibility for the transition from today's Estonia to tomorrow's Estonia. One which is willing and able to achieve Estonia's renewal. (Applause)

Esteemed comrades, people of like mind, and party members who are present here!

I want to wish all participants in today's congress the wisdom, responsibility, and political intelligence to achieve that goal. We are in many respects being looked to by the entire country of soviets and not by our own country alone. And, most important—we are being looked to with hope by the honest and sparkling eyes of children in all the homes in Estonia. This imposes on all of us a responsibility for tomorrow. (Applause)

07045

#### **Belgorod Obkom Chief Ponomarev on Ways to Accelerate Restructuring**

*18000610 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Jul 88 p 1*

[Interview with A. Ponomarev, first secretary of the CPSU Belgorod Obkom, by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent Ye. Kotyayev: "No Dead Ends in Our Movement"; interview took place in Belgorod, time not specified; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] How can we accelerate restructuring? A. Ponomarev, first secretary of the CPSU Belgorod Obkom and 19th All-Union Party Conference delegate, shares his thoughts.

[Kotyayev] Aleksey Filippovich, at the present time, when social expectations for achieving tangible results in restructuring have become so acute, the experience of Belgorod Obkom, which has been able in recent years to make rather noticeable progress in agricultural production development, has invited special interest. Along with healthy envy, however, we have seen doubts expressed that the experience can be imitated. It is argued that the Belgorod success was achieved in large measure through strong-willed, pressure tactics which in no way conform with the new principles of organizing the economy.

[Ponomarev] I won't argue with you. Perhaps the food products raised in the oblast have a certain "methodological" flaw in this sense. But, seriously, it seems to me

that what we're seeing is a dogmatism dressed in new clothes appearing behind the anxiety over "purity" of method, as if to say that if real life does not fit into the schematic—then too bad for real life. The schematic we have now is of an innovator-tenant farmer on a dilapidated farm with the expectation of staggering results. No attention is paid to anything else. Place such a new, progressive propagandist alongside a modern, integrated livestock enterprise and he will become depressed and long for the barn. I would ask that you correctly understand one thing—I am not in any way saying that these recovery methods that have come out of nowhere are ineffective or unacceptable. They are quite effective and sometimes the only methods possible. But they cannot be the all-purpose means, if only because the current revolutionary restructuring has found the most diverse managerial and social situations in the village. And the use of a single criterion here for all of them will lead not to economic methods, but rather to "philological" ones when high-sounding phrases take the place of reasoned economic argument.

[Kotayayev] There have indeed been a great many "panaceas" introduced in the past—one of these, incidentally, being the integrated livestock enterprises you already mentioned.

[Ponomarev] What happened with these integrated enterprises provides a clear example, if I might say it this way, of the results of dogmatic thinking. First they raised it up to the sky as they do, elevated it to perfection, then when the faults of "shock introduction" began to develop, it all came crashing to the ground on top of them. As a result, the phrase "integrated enterprise" has almost become an indecent expression. Even those who make the managerial decisions are becoming afraid to use it. We have continued to consistently follow the charted course and develop the integrated enterprises. I send those who express doubts as to the effectiveness of these means off to the produce stores in Belgorod, Gubkin and Staryy Oskol—there, at the counters, is where one should look for the reasoned argument as to effective agriculture production, and not by sounding determinations here.

Or let us recall such concepts as specialization and concentration. Where will you hear these words today? Nowhere. They have disappeared completely from everyday use in the agricultural production sphere, from the scientific lexicon and, if you will permit me, from the newspapers. Again the question arises—why? What has happened? Has the erroneous nature and fallacy of these principles been proven? Not at all. It's as though no funeral was officially held but they don't exist any longer—they simply melted away without leaving a trace... But, you know, we have about a hundred integrated livestock enterprises operating in the oblast where intensive technology is being used to produce 70 percent of the meat, 99 percent of the eggs and 67 percent of the wool. During the years of specialization, meat production in the oblast increased 2.7-fold, milk—1.8-fold, and eggs—2.6-fold.

It is in the specialized enterprises where the highest labor productivity is reached, where production capacity is utilized most efficiently. Take beef production, for example. Each contract worker services over 300 head on the average and produces 60-70 tons of meat at a prime cost of 120-130 rubles. In the hog enterprises a single worker produces 160 tons of pork for more than 150,000 rubles per year. But in the progressive and best contract collectives—for 300,000-400,000. Let us also look at the social issues. Is it bad if a mother getting ready to retire on pension tries to see to it that her daughter takes her place?

[Kotayayev] It is the results that count, we must say. But doesn't it all work out in its own time? After all, about six years ago the oblast economy was in a state of crisis.

[Ponomarev] True, we had crisis and stagnation. Again, why? Because of that same dogmatism, but this time in production methods. It is well known how plans were drawn up—from what had been attained. Nobody was interested in what you had there, in what stage of growth your enterprise was. They grab hold of a base and an increment, then it's—bless you, go and implement. As a result, in order to deal with purchasing plans for grain, the special enterprises assessed you with backbreaking contributions contrary to common sense. The grain they handed in was bad—rye mixed with barley. And they purchased it at full price.

Then at some stage they drove the plans for meat purchases into a corner—they began delivering (just to hold their own and close up gaping holes in the plan) more and more lightweight cattle. It happened that no sooner would inexpensive and abundant meat start appearing on a heifer or piglet than the animal would be butchered. The economists are right—the only hassle-free way to combine quality with quantity is on paper. And now a crisis arose. You couldn't fulfill the plans, yet it was impossible not to fulfill them—they wouldn't issue local supply funds.

I went to the party central committee, explained the situation and requested help—not in resources or feed, but in patience. They believed me and agreed to maintain funds for the first two quarters independently of plan fulfillment. This is the breathing room we needed to allow us to break out of the vicious circle. It seems to me that a similarly complex situation has arisen with respect to the economy of the country as a whole—the mechanical overexertion of force caused by persistent striving to reach the incremental index figure in multi-billion ruble gross output no matter what the cost prevents any maneuvering in industry and disallows the ability to regroup forces and emphasize qualitative growth factors. It is for good reason that attention at the conference was devoted to the connection between management style and the economic mechanism.

[Kotayayev] Practical experience has long shown that such a connection exists—the input expenditure principle and strong-willed pressure are essentially two sides of the same coin. But simply ascertaining this is not sufficient to change the existing situation. Actions are necessary, including those on the level of rayon and oblast management. It is precisely here where, as conference delegates stressed, the necessary changes are not taking place. Party committees are in no hurry to abandon their notorious command methods of management.

[Ponomarev] Notorious indeed. Now that you've touched upon the most painful aspect at present—the efficiency factor and the rate at which words are turned into actions—let us continue to analyze the usual accusations. Why do the party committees “exert pressure” and “give orders”? It is not due to any defect in character or some innate conservatism. Administrative supports of one kind or another usually appear when other methods are not operating—and putting curses on the practice of “giving orders” will not change very much in this regard. We simply must insure that people fulfill those functions for which they are directly responsible.

[Kotayayev] And for which there is a “direct requirement,” generally speaking, if we are to proceed in the spirit of the conference. We already know the instrument with which to accomplish this—self-support management, efficient management techniques.

[Ponomarev] Exactly. But we still have to get away from economic romanticism and the penchant for slogans we have developed over many years, a naive faith in “the self-propagating idea.” You mention “self-support management.” This is all very clear to us. But are things so? Just take for example the aspect of getting assistance from above, criticized thousands of times. Must it be said that under conditions of self-support management this is absurd? And what if we examine the historical context as did the conference delegates, if we recall previous relations between industry and the village? It is not simply a matter of moral obligation here, but rather an acute economic and social need. To impose self-support management without having resolved even the most pressing issue of the village, is like shoving the oarsmen off a dilapidated boat into a big river wave. We must first enable the economic boat to acquire at least a minimal degree of seaworthiness.

[Kotayayev] Have you been able to accomplish this yet in Belgorod Oblast? And, if so, what was the cost to industry?

[Ponomarev] I will respond in the affirmative. Whereas in 1980, 195 of 296 farms operated at a loss, in the past two years there have not been any of these. With regard to investments, 12 million rubles were invested over the entire 10th five-year plan and 18 million over the 11th. Well, 120 million rubles has been invested in the last two years. And here let me point out that we often do not

“allocate from the heart,” which is frequently an advantageous placement of funds. In organizing the milk export center, for example (construction of milk units and refrigerators, conduit, pumps, etc.), somewhat more than 14 million rubles has been spent and 100 million rubles in additional income for high quality milk in the past four years has been received. The same thing applies to the sugar plants. Like almost everywhere, self-neglect resulted in an inadequate sugar yield and losses were multiplied. Tackling the problem and spending 47 million rubles on reconstruction, we began to take in 70 million rubles profit each year. It is this kind of result, incidentally, which leads to construction of storage facilities and refrigerators, to reconstruction of enterprises in the food and refining industries—in other words, we are again solving the problem of assistance from above but from another aspect, by enhancing the quality of ties between city and village.

[Kotayayev] If I have understood you correctly, Aleksey Filippovich, this is the economic foundation for restructuring the work style of party committees we discussed at the outset and which there is a need to accelerate? When this kind of cooperation and coordination is set up between industry and the village, is it not likely that the need for constraints outside the economic sphere, for petty micromanagement of this demanding effort, will disappear?

[Ponomarev] In principle we are presently trying to get away from constraints. We are trying to place village orders in the plants, associations and construction organizations within the framework of the Law on State Enterprises. We do not manage to do this, of course, without some resistance... Here the party conference provided some reference points. Territorial self-support management and enhancement of the role of the soviets of people's deputies will provide the foundation on which we will be able to build new relations between the urban and rural areas—although the time factor here worries me personally: are we not losing pace in the production of creative effort during the transition process from pressure to trust? Will we manage in the near future to appreciably restock store shelves with products and create a new gravitation belt in the country before reduction in the rural population reaches a critical limit?

[Kotayayev] When we look at the party official in perspective, we see that he does not get directly into economics. He cannot give orders or prohibit... Yet the responsibility remains. How can this be?

[Ponomarev] The acceleration of restructuring in this complicated period of transition creates additional problems. Let me repeat—they are problems, not dead ends. Restructuring is possible only in the process of movement. Having recommended a leasing contract, the party official should not sit by, awaiting results. He must actively work to create the conditions for its successful

implementation. He must foresee possible difficulties and the danger of formalism, and he must be able to avoid them. He must see trends and look at things in perspective.

[Kotyayev] You were a delegate to the conference. What changes resulted afterwards in your views? What near-term changes would you like to make in your activities?

[Ponomarev] As I said earlier—the rate at which changes are effected, especially in questions of social reconstruction of the village. I became further convinced of this when I spent some time in our region, down in Veydelevskiy Rayon. I was in the little village of Galushka which has no club, no school, no decent roads. How can this not weigh on our conscience? Right now we have to bring all our effort to bear here—but not by thoughtlessly piling things on. A key question deals with construction materials—basic efforts must therefore be expended here. Many construction industry enterprises are currently undergoing restructuring at an accelerated rate. Fifteen new plants are being built and they entail the participation of foreign firms. We will produce high-quality decorative construction materials and sanitation equipment. Everything in the village should be no worse than in the city—and perhaps better. This is what we are working towards.

9768

### **Grossu Chairs Conference on Reports-Election Campaign**

18000002 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 24 Aug 88 pp 1, 3

[ATEM report on conference of party leaders of the Communist Party of Moldavia held on 23 August to review the reports-and-election campaign: "Party-Wide Council"]

[Text] Matters concerned with the progress of the reports and election campaign in the republic's party organizations were reviewed at a conference on 23 August, attended by party gorkom and raykom first secretaries and members of the CPM Central Committee staff.

S. K. Grossu, first secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, chaired the conference and made the opening remarks.

V. I. Smirnov, second secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, delivered the official report.

The conference underscored the fact that reports-and-elections meetings are being conducted everywhere in the republic. As of 20 August, they had already taken place in 1,008 party groups and 160 trade union party organizations. The meetings reflected the considerable amount of work that has been done by party organizations to raise the degree of activity by the communists, to develop intra-party democracy, and to strengthen party

discipline. Attendance by communists at party group meetings was 87.7 percent and at trade union organization meetings was 93 percent. The course of discussions following the reports further attests to their heightened level of activity. A majority of those present at party group meetings and a third of those at the meetings of shop trade union organizations participated in the discussions.

A fundamental assessment of party group activity and of the secretaries of the shop trade union organizations is being given at many of the meetings. Eight organizations have been found to be doing unsatisfactory work, including the party group organizers of the Ulma Sovkhoz plant tractor brigade in Kutuzovskiy Rayon; the assembly section of the glandless pump plant at the Moldavidromash Scientific Production Association in Dnestrovskiy Rayon; and the secretary of the shop trade union organization at the Rus Restaurant of the Public Catering Association in Sovetskii Rayon.

Approximately five thousand proposals and critical comments have been made at the party meetings that have taken place, and many of these have already been implemented. It must also be recognized that every other speaker is either a worker or a kolkhoz member and a rank-and-file party member.

A characteristic feature of many meetings has been the businesslike manner in which they have been carried out, in keeping with the guidelines and requirements of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The discussion dealt not only with what has been achieved, but first and foremost with what is hampering efforts to exploit to the fullest all possibilities for implementing the innovative ideas of restructuring. This emphasis marked the meeting of the party group in the instrument-repair section of Shop No. 1 at the Signal Plant in Kishenev. The tone of the discussion was in keeping with the mandate given to the party group organizer: Develop a creative basis for working; raise the sense of responsibility and demandiness of one's self and one's comrades; see each communist as a political activist above everything else; and, in addition, have increased concern for the feelings of people and their day-to-day needs.

Many other party groups made a similarly responsible approach to their principal meetings. Sensible reports, which were not unduly wordy, served as the basis for keen discussion. Communists led the discussion in a manner that was substantive, open, and without constraint. There was a discernible desire not only to recount what had happened but to correlate it with the demands and tasks of restructuring. It is necessary for the party gorkoms and raykoms not only to follow this practice in the course of their reports-and-election meetings, but to sustain it in their daily operations, and to use the meetings as a tuning fork to set the general tone and temper of the collective party discourse.

Nevertheless, it was stated at the conference that certain party committees have been taking an oversimplified approach to the conduct of the reports-and-election campaign, clinging to outmoded fashions. Take what seems at first sight to be the easy question of establishing the schedule for the reports-and-election meetings. It is now becoming apparent that here and there reports and elections have been unduly delayed at the lower levels, with plans to complete them in the party groups by the middle or even by the end of September. Moreover, it is not being borne in mind that such a delay will complicate later stages of the political campaign and preparations for rayon and city conferences.

Often the reports of party group organizers and party secretaries still do not in themselves represent accounts, but merely consist of enumerations of passing matters. They have a general character that is not tied to any particular area or enterprise shop considered separately, and therefore might be delivered to any group.

At a number of meetings, as before, there is a failure to avoid the influence of the technocrats and to depart from the format of the production meeting. The participants "lock themselves into" production problems—how party groups are resolving bottlenecks. What kind of contributions communists are making to the overall results of the collective effort are spoken of seldom or not at all.

Of course, it is not possible to steer clear of current issues, particularly now, at a critical time, as preparations are made for preparing the national economy for work under conditions of winter, during the harvest and procuring of fodder. Still, it is very important to put the emphasis where it belongs. Above all, a report must characterize the effort of every communist from the standpoint of the contribution made to the restructuring. Only then can a genuine, businesslike discussion begin and the key problems of economic reform, the development of democratization, and glasnost be discussed in a spirit of party comradeship. Then it will become clear who is who and what is the potential of each communist as well as of the party organization or group as a whole, and how this potential is being exploited in the public interest. And then such criticism will acquire another dimension—extending not simply upwards but horizontally.

The party's reports-and-election meetings, it was noted at the conference, should focus attention upon matters concerned with solving housing problems and providing food and consumer goods for the population. It would be expedient to review these matters in terms of the degree of participation of the specific party group in carrying out the programs in question, because each labor collective has the obligation today to develop subsidiary agriculture and truck farming, as well as housing, for example, by assigning its own workers to youth house-building cooperatives, etc.

A cursory analysis of the first stage of the reports and elections yields the following conclusion. As the reports and speeches given at the meetings make clear, many party leaders face the question of sharing responsibilities with soviets and management leaders. What specifically should the party organizations be engaged in doing? We have grown accustomed to discussing such questions as "the progress of preparations...", "the introduction of measures...", and the work schedule for the sowing or the harvest, and we think that we have done a good deal without recognizing that the role of communists lies precisely in political activity. And today it is the most important of activity—encouraging active participation in the restructuring process and everywhere giving a priority to the renewal of life. Take, for example, the development of family and rental contracts. There have been instances in which a tender of swine, for example, has been included in a family contract, but this has met with opposition.

The interests of the matter force us to take a fresh look at ideological activity. It combines two inseparable functions: educational and explanatory work and constructive organizational activity. It is the latter, to my mind, that should be strengthened. Including the use of the mass media and propaganda together with our ideological resources as a whole—It is this that acquires special significance. The center of activity in the ideological sphere must be transferred to where the workers, the kolkhoz members, and the intelligenzia are engaged in their labors. Their voices, their opinions, and pronouncements must be given more continuous attention, consideration, and support. This matter is directly related to the democratization of public life.

Speaking of ideological work, mention must be made of the activities of the so-called informal associations. Their appearance is in and of itself only natural amid the process of democratizing public life. It is necessary for party organizations to enter into well-considered relations with these formations and to exert a wise and balanced influence upon situations created by them, including relations through the communists who join them. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to recognize attempts on the part of certain individuals in their ranks to sow discord between the nations and social suspiciousness as they clash with certain groups of workers. These facts oblige communists to assess the situation in the course of the reports and elections.

Unfortunately, at many of the reports-and-election meetings there has not been an in-depth consideration and businesslike discussion of ideological problems, which it is essential to focus attention on in connection with large-scale socio-economic tasks. Take, for example, such a task as the molding of a Marxist-Leninist worldview. It has been and continues to be the cornerstone or pivotal factor of all ideological work. Yet the old approach of slipping over the surface of things predominated, and speakers limited themselves to stating the fact that "all communists are studying," in the reports

and speeches of communists in the party group of the tractor brigade at the Znamya Kolkhoz in Teleneshskiy Rayon; the Investigation Section of the Rayon Internal Affairs Department in Leningrad; and the Department of Technical Services of the Computer Center in Tiraspol.

Little is being said at the meetings about the moral character of the party member. How, for example, are the members of the party groups and organizations fulfilling their parental obligations? The fact is that problems of interpersonal relations are not being touched upon. Communists should be motivated to nurturing, first of all in themselves, a broad social perspective upon ideology as a sphere of thought, of action, and of education.

The conference participants noted that the resolutions adopted at some meetings are diffuse and amorphous, in no way reflecting the means of implementation for the conditions at a particular party organization. Draft resolutions, prepared in advance without the participation of the communists, either "as a basis" or "as a whole" without businesslike discussion and without regard, as a rule, for the proposals and observations made at the meetings.

Today there is something else that must be borne in mind. The Law of State Enterprises (Associations) is now in effect, which provides for the election of managers and their accountability for their activities before general meetings (or conferences), and with the advice of the labor collective, on a regular and obligatory basis. In this connection a question arises concerning the commissions of the primary party organizations with regard to the control of administrative actions and providing direction to the development of production (Art. 5.629). Will not these commissions once again draw the party committees (buros) towards a technocratic style of operation? Will they not "bog them down" in production problems? Possibly, it is a good idea to create a single control organization to serve the commissions, people's control offices and groups, the Komsomol Searchlight, and other monitoring bodies.

Currently, at the initiative of the People's Control Committee, an experiment is being conducted at seven major industrial enterprises and agricultural collectives. In the course of it the activities of the party organization commissions and the control organs of other public bodies have been temporarily halted. A single labor collective control organ has been formed—a People's Control Committee headed by the party committee or buro deputy secretary.

This experiment is yielding positive results. It is therefore recommended that the reports-and-election meetings refrain from choosing commissions for monitoring administrative activities and devote themselves entirely to forming single control organs.

After the meetings, it would be appropriate for the party group organizer or the party organization secretary to describe to the labor collective how the reports-and-election meeting was conducted—the highlights, the motivational emphasis, and the long-term prospects.

The conference emphasized that the mechanism for forming in a democratic manner the membership of party election organs has still not been completely worked out locally at all levels. There are demagogues and Philistines, and unfortunately they are to be found even among the communists, who are exploiting glasnost and democracy, while basing their activities on the vested interests of local groups, and occasionally they are creating among certain activists and party workers a distorted public viewpoint. Party committees should continuously monitor this situation and take steps to prevent such negative phenomena.

Although reports and elections in the primary party organizations still lie ahead, active discussion among party and non-party members regarding who is qualified in terms of executive and political skills to work in elective offices is already under way. At virtually every meeting candidacies for office in higher-standing party committees or buros are being submitted. Worthy of attention in this connection is a proposal for the extensive preliminary public announcement of candidacies for office in party committees or buros so that the bodies elected may possess efficiency and creative capacity. Elections of alternates on a competitive basis should everywhere be standard practice; this will lend them a new quality.

The conference analyzed coverage of reports and elections by the mass media. It noted that in this respect for the present there are practically no in-depth political reports published or broadcast by radio or television. The proper emphasis is for the most part misplaced in reports of the meetings. At the same time, one can count on one's fingers the articles by party workers and rank-and-file communists giving their thoughts on the main meetings of the year, their opinions, and conclusions. To obtain coverage of reports and elections it is necessary to galvanize the efforts of the best journalists and get them to make a sustained effort, fully responsive and highly responsible, to find new and interesting forms of treatment, so that they may publicize comprehensively and in depth the state of affairs within the party organizations.

In the course of the reports-and-election process, and, above all, in planning the city and rayon party conferences, it is important to provide for joint actions by party committees and their press organs in arranging "roundtable discussions," "direct lines," and "discussion clubs." In sum, it is necessary to do everything that can be done so that rayon, city, and the high-circulation newspapers, along with radio and television stations, make a substantial contribution to the conduct

of the reports-and-election process, fostering glasnost and democracy while bolstering the healthy and positive tendencies within the party and society.

12889

**TaSSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Improving Health, Job Productivity of Women**  
18300312 Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA  
in Russian 14 Jun 88 pp 1,3

[Report on Eighth Session, Eleventh Convocation, of TaSSR Supreme Soviet in Dushanbe on 9 June 1988, by TaSSR Supreme Soviet Chairman G. Pallayev and Secretary of the Presidium of the TaSSR Supreme Soviet A. Kasymova: "Decree of the TaSSR Supreme Soviet: On Measures to Ensure Safeguarding Motherhood and Childhood, Improving Working and Domestic Conditions for Women, and Increasing their Activeness in Production and Social Life"]

[Text] The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet notes that in the course of the realization of the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 20th Tajik CP Congress, the Soviets of People's Deputies, the republic ministries and departments, and the Tajik Republic Women's Council together with trade-union and other social organizations are carrying out work for safeguarding motherhood and childhood, for establishing proper conditions for women in their work and domestic life, and for increasing their activeness in production and social activities. Special-purpose comprehensive programs have been worked out and are being implemented for significantly reducing the application of manual labor in the production sphere, for enlisting unoccupied labor resources for social production, for developing the production of consumer goods and the services sphere, and for providing every family with its own apartment or house by the year 2000. A "Rest and Health" Program is being implemented as well.

Developmental work is also being completed on a program for accelerating the social restructuring of the kishlaks, and for elevating the culture of everyday life for the republic's rural population.

As a result of work now under way, during the two years of the current five-year plan, by virtue of state capital investments, 20 percent more housing has been introduced than during the corresponding period in the 11th Five Year Plan; also, 66 percent more general-educational schools, 39 percent more preschool institutions, and 75 percent more hospitals, while the number of polyclinics has increased by a factor of 3.2. In 1987 there were 2,500 medical institutions serving the public, including 748 women's consultation offices, children's polyclinics and walk-in clinics. The number of beds for medical and midwife services for expectant women and newborn babies reached 5,800, which is a twofold increase in comparison with 1970. A family planning service has been established in the republic's health-care

system; it is playing an increasingly noteworthy role in the cause of protecting the health of the mother and her child. 46,800,000 rubles, which is 40 percent more than 1986, was spent for implementing branch plans on improving working conditions and safety, and sanitary-health improvement measures. The system of subsidiary branches of major industrial enterprises is being expanded for the purpose of attracting women to social production. The problems of establishing proper production conditions, improving socio-domestic services for working women, and protecting motherhood and childhood is under the scrutiny of almost 3,000 women's councils, comprised of over 31,000 activists.

At the same time the work being carried out in this sector comes far from measuring up to the scope and the critical nature of the problems which have accumulated, or to the tasks for accelerating the republic's socio-economic development.

There are instances of gross violation of existing legislation on protection of motherhood and childhood; and there are a great many complaints from the workers about unsatisfactory work by the health-care organs, and about the low level of organization for providing medical assistance to the republic's citizens. The number of physicians and sick beds per 10,000 people in the populace has not increased for the last three years, and amounts to 27 physicians and 104 sick beds per 10,000, which is lower than the average nationwide level. Infant mortality remains high; in 1987 it increased by 3.4 percent. In spite of the annual expansion of the system of children's pre-school institutions, in 1987 they were able to take in only 15.7 percent of the children for the republic as a whole, and in the rural areas, 4.4 percent. At the same time the state plan for the two years of the five-year plan for introducing sickbeds was fulfilled by 85 percent; for polyclinics, by 87 percent; and for pre-school institutions, by 84 percent. The plan for introducing socio-cultural-domestic projects has been allowed to go unfulfilled for the current year.

A lag has been noted in the republic in carrying out the assignments of the Comprehensive Program for Developing Production of Consumer Goods and the Services Sphere. The plans for the two years of the five-year plan for production of light-industry and non-food consumer goods have not been fulfilled, and paid services to the public for this period have fallen short of the plan by 14,000,000 rubles. The number of receiving stations for domestic services has been reduced; they are operating on two shifts, and on Saturdays and Sundays. About 63 percent of the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhoses have no domestic-services buildings or comprehensive receiving stations, while every third industrial enterprise and almost half of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses do not provide public catering facilities for their workers.

Production conditions for working women require fundamental improvement. The proportion of women employed at manual labor significantly exceeds the average nationwide indicators, especially in agriculture,



where it amounts to over 98 percent. There are instances of violation of laws regulating women's labor: In the past two years, 30 illegally-discharged women were restored to their jobs at enterprises of the ministries of light industry, trade and other branches in the republic, by the trade union organs alone; 70 responsible officials were subjected to administrative actions for violating the labor rights of women.

The republic's Soviets of People's Deputies are not becoming sufficiently involved in questions of professional orientation, training of skilled cadres, and finding jobs for them. The proportion of women to the total number of workers employed in the national economy remains low as before, and amounts to 38 percent. In the face of a significant amount of unemployed labor resources, the executive committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies, and the ministries and departments are not taking the necessary measures to accelerate the creation of additional workplaces. Nor are the capabilities for switching existing enterprises onto a two-shift work regime being utilized for these purposes. Forms of labor organization convenient for women—at home, on a part-time basis, as well as family and rental contracts in regions where zones of dry-farming and the gardening-viticulture complex are being opened—are not being implemented well. Organization for increasing the skills of women in production jobs is unsatisfactory. Among specialists with higher and secondary education, women amount to about 43 percent, which is lower than the average nationwide indicators by a factor of 1.5. Women's councils are introducing few proposals for promoting women to supervisory positions in soviet, trade-union, and management work.

Examining the protection of motherhood and childhood and the improvement of working and living conditions for women as the most important direction of the social policy of the party and the state; and declaring the enormous significance of increasing the labor and social activeness of women, and their role in the solution of problems of accelerating the republic's socio-economic development, the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

1. To recognize the necessity for Soviet and economic organs and social organizations in the republic for implementing effective measures aimed at carrying out the instructions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 20th Tajik CP Congress to create working and living conditions for women which will permit them to successfully combine motherhood with active participation in labor and social activity.

Soviets of People's Deputies are to constantly keep these questions at the center of attention; to strive for businesslike and constructive discussion of them at sessions and meetings of standing commissions and executive committees, in deputy groups, and at meetings of social and rural assemblies—for the purpose of disclosing existing reserves, overcoming serious shortcomings in the

cause of protecting motherhood and childhood, and for establishing proper working and living conditions for women; and are to ensure a comprehensive approach to the realization of these tasks, and closer interaction with economic organs, women's councils, trade-union, Kom-somol and other social organizations. They are to give regular hearings to reports by administrators of enterprises and organizations on the course of carrying out established tasks for introducing housing, schools, pre-school institutions, and health-care projects; for development of trade, public catering and domestic services to the public; and for expanding the system of cooperatives and individual labor activity; to increase production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods; to enlist for social production unutilized women's labor resources; and to take practical measures to resolve acute social problems.

2. The Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, TaSSR Gosplan, republic ministries and departments, executive committees of oblast, rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies are to:

—direct their organizational and mass-political work toward mobilization of the reserves which exist in the localities, and putting them all into practice for the purpose of accelerating economic and social development;

—strive to achieve effective use of capital investments directed toward construction of projects for socio-cultural purposes, and by 1990 bring the number of children enrolled in permanent pre-school institutions to 174,000, bring the number of beds in birthing clinics to 7,500, and bring the number of visits for women's consultation to 5,100 per shift.

While drawing up the Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the Republic for the 13th Five Year Plan and the Conceptions for the Economic and Social Development of the Tajik SSR for the Years 1991-2005, define the control figures in volumes which guarantee the fulfillment of the comprehensive programs planned for the republic, and significant improvement in working and domestic conditions for women.

3. Ministries and departments, executive committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies, together with the soviets of labor collectives, trade-union and other social organizations are to:

—work out concrete measures in 1988 for fundamental improvement of work directed toward establishing the necessary production and socio-domestic conditions for working women, for carrying out the requirements of the law with respect to forbidding the use of women's labor in manufacturing, professions and jobs with hard and dangerous working conditions, as indicated in the list approved by USSR Goskomtrud and the VTsSPS;



- accelerate the establishment of subsidiary branches and shops of major enterprises and independent manufacturing in areas where there is an abundance of labor;
- introduce a two-shift work regime in branches of the national economy and flexible schedules which permit women to work less than a full day or week;
- expand forms of working at home, and development of cooperative and individual labor activity;
- implement measures for improving the training and increasing the skills of workers and specialists from among women, and especially from the indigenous nationality;
- utilize more fully the existing capabilities for improving the working conditions for working women;
- construct housing, permanent children's pre-school institutions, schools, hospitals and polyclinics, comprehensive receiving stations for domestic services, and public catering enterprises, by means of combining the assets of enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the populace and other sources on a contractual basis;
- establish effective control over the enterprises and organizations for carrying out in full volume the branch comprehensive plans for improving working conditions and sanitary-health improvement measures;
- establish collective agreements which observe the legislation on labor for women and juveniles, on protecting motherhood and childhood.

4. The Tajik SSR State Agro-Industrial Committee is:

- to implement measures to reduce manual labor for women in agricultural production in order that by 1990 the level of complex mechanization of animal husbandry reaches 60 percent, and in cotton farming—for harvesting cotton—up to 34 percent;
- to significantly expand the use of biological methods and integrated systems for protecting the crops;
- to reduce the use of toxic chemicals; to strictly observe the work regime and the rules of job safety;

- to forbid pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers, as well as juveniles, to work at hard labor and at jobs which are dangerous for their health;
- to develop by every means family and rental contracts for the cultivation of unused lands;
- to expand everywhere the recruitment of housewives on contract for work on kolkhozes and sovkhozes;
- to attract consumers' cooperatives for production of cattle and poultry, vegetables, potatoes, greens and other types of agricultural products, on private subsidiary farms.

5. The Tajik SSR Ministry of Health is to guarantee unconditional fulfillment of the tasks established for the years 1987-1990 for construction and putting into operation maternity wards and children's institutions (departments); allocating accommodations for a construction of walk-in clinics in the rural areas, develop systems of primary links in rural health-care, and strengthen the material-technical base for maternity wards and pediatric treatment and preventive medicine facilities.

6. The Tajik Republic Women's Council and all women's councils in the republic, in close interaction with Soviets of People's Deputies, their standing commissions, ministries and departments, people's control authorities, trade-union, Komsomol and other social organizations, are to fundamentally restructure their work in the cause of safeguarding motherhood and childhood; to establish conditions for increasing the labor and social activeness of women, and their cultural level; to widely introduce new Soviet rites and rituals which enhance the role of women in the family and in society.

7. The Tajik SSR State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting, editors of republic and local newspapers, other mass information media, cultural organs and creative societies in the republic are to systematically illuminate the problems of safeguarding motherhood and childhood, indicate ways for resolving them, carry on purposeful propaganda for a healthy way of life, and promote increasing the labor and social activeness of women.

8. Control over fulfillment of this decree is vested in the Commission on Questions of Women's Work and Domestic Life, Safeguarding of Motherhood and Childhood, of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

09006

**Bukhara Obkom Fights for Influence Over Oblast Newspaper**

18300328 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
5 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Special Correspondents S. Volkov and M. Sadvakasov under the "Party Life" rubric: "The Protracted Conflict Between the Bukhara Party Obkom and the Oblast Newspaper"]

[Text] "In accordance with your official statement, I wish to inform you that the investigation conducted by the USSR Procuracy on the criminal case against former OBKhSS Chief A. Muzafarov and other UVD officials of the Bukhara Oblast Ispolkom has not established criminal ties with these persons. Moreover, the inquest is not in possession of any compromising materials on you."

The letter was signed by an official of the USSR Procuracy.

"The board of the Believing Jews Society confirms, that Bukhara resident Iskhakov, Abram Borisovich, does not come to our synagogue for prayers... He lives in the microrayon with his Korean wife. To this we affix our signatures." Below follow the signatures of the chairman and two members of the board of the society.

Information to the effect that nothing reprehensible whatsoever has been noted of Iskhakov was also provided by the Oblast Procuracy and certain other organizations and institutions. One can consider that it has been established beyond any doubt that he is not a criminal, nor a member of the Mafia, nor does he spy on behalf of Israeli intelligence, nor does he carry on Zionist propaganda.

Nor does Iskhakov's wife, Valentina Kapitonovna Em, possess a lesser arsenal of documents vindicating him and proving his innocence. The couple has several folios and satchels stuffed with such documents.

The couple is well known in Bukhara, and very often appear as co-authors. Em and Iskhakov have a great many journalistic successes to their credit, as their readers have noted. Their work has appeared in print more than once in the central newspapers, including PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, and they have penned a book which was published in Moscow. One cannot bring oneself to say that Iskhakov, who is deputy to a responsible secretary from the newspaper SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA, and Em, chief of the Letters Department, occupy strange posts.

But why has it become necessary to report on this in the pages of the republic newspaper? The reason is a weighty one: the couple have found themselves at the epicenter of a severe and extended conflict between the party obkom and the editors of SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA.

At the "upper echelons" of the oblast, they are trying to depict this unpleasant episode as a squabble between cliques on the editor's staff, in which the oblast is forced to intervene, like it or not, in order to cool the fevered brows of the newspapermen. They are piling, or so they say, one slander upon another. Commissions keep coming out to investigate them. But matters continue to seethe because, or so they say, Em and Iskhakov keep pouring oil on the fire. One commission departs and they summon another right then and there. Hence the conclusion: we must get rid of the troublemakers. And they've already tried.

We shall cite the resolution of the party obkom bureau dated 3 September 1986: "...Comrade A.B. Iskhakov should be removed from his position for his lack of vigilance and his publication of unverified materials; for his praise of people engaged in criminal activity, and for his political immaturity." No more, no less. There would have been enough to make mincemeat out of three journalists. It's fortunate that Iskhakov managed to collect documents vindicating him, otherwise...

Incidentally, no inquiry whatsoever would have helped him, had the authors of the above-mentioned documents not committed a small blunder. They, apparently, presumed that an associate at the press organ of the party obkom had to be a communist. But Iskhakov turned out to be a non-party man. So they were forced to search for the appropriate statute in the KZoT [Labor Code] for him.

All members of the editorial staff had to undergo attestation. It goes without saying that Iskhakov was unable to "slip through" this razor-sharp sieve. But they cut him up carelessly. And then it fell to Em's lot. She was attested arbitrarily. At about the same time a reprimand was passed down through the party line, imposed by the party gorkom, for allegedly creating an unhealthy moral-psychological climate in the editorial collective. Em could not stand the persecution, and submitted a letter of resignation to the newspaper—although she soon regretted her faint-heartedness, and withdrew the letter.

Iskhakov, naturally, was sacked in accordance with the KZoT, inasmuch as the attestation commission found him "professionally bankrupt." Iskhakov was forced to appeal to the USSR Procuracy. And even so, he would not have come back to the editorial staff, if the organizers of the attestation, most likely out of ignorance, had not grossly violated the procedure of administering the attestation. And this served as the basis for restoring Iskhakov to his position.

But why did the journalists fall into disfavor? When we were speaking with the associates at SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA, someone jokingly dropped the remark, "Because of Alik's character and his curiosity" (Iskhakov is known as Alik to his friends).

In every joke there's an element of truth, just as there is here. One time Iskhakov noticed something strange in the payment of an honorarium and, it goes without saying, he was unable to keep quiet. A commission was appointed to check whether honorarium funds were being spent properly. And it disclosed some disturbing facts. As it turned out, from 1983-1985 the editorial office had unjustifiably paid out more than 10,000 rubles. M. Maryasin, executive secretary at the newspaper, was especially upset, since he had written himself in as a co-author, thus sharing the honorarium.

Other people, who did not work on the editorial staff, also beat a path to this feeding trough. Among them were Deputy Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the party obkom, F. Tuyakov; his deputy, R. Reykher; B. Dzhumayev, an instructor on the press; Deputy First Secretary V. Salamov, and others.

All of these people are now working at different jobs. Some of them were punished. But others, such as Salamov for example—increased in stature: ensconced in a bigger easy chair in the party apparat, he gained an opportunity to put even more pressure on the editorial staff.

A. Kanushkin, the new editor of the newspaper, is a passionate and self-assured man; but at times he shows too much bias against people; and, having worked with Iskhakov for all of 19 days (What can you learn of a person in such a short time?!), without any qualms, hastily scribbled his signature to the order for dismissal. Apparently he fervently believed in the objectivity and propriety of the obkom officials. In just the same manner, he had no time to delve into all the subtleties of the situation taking shape around Em. On the other hand, he was decisive enough to administer justice and mete out punishment.

Much later, the editor looked into the whole story in depth. And then Kanushkin did not spare his self-esteem, and honestly admitted in front of a meeting of the collective, that he was wrong about Em and Iskhakov.

It goes without saying, that very day, this statement (or one might say—apology) was known to the party obkom. And this is understandable: the wife of the chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department at the party obkom, V. Salamova, works on the editorial staff.

Valentina Kapitonovna Em is a very inconvenient person. In no way could one ever suspect that she is prone to compromise. And by 1985 an unpleasant situation had come to pass on the editorial staff: they began to go slightly astray; they began to drink a little, some of them pretty heavily. What with these occupations, they barely managed to publish a newspaper, and sank so low (there's no other word for it), that several issues were published two days late!

And so Em tried to somehow stir up this depressing situation. Not by herself, of course, but together with the healthy element on the editorial staff. She spoke out sharply, critically at meetings, and sent signals to the party obkom on shortcomings in the work of the editorial staff; at the same time she spared no one's self esteem and paid no heed to ambitions. And then the case of the mishandling of honoraria came along. And it was only then that Valentina Kapitonovna understood why her desperate signals, including those addressed to the obkom first secretary, had for such a long time been shelved.

It is extremely hard to find any logic in the appointment of V. Salamov as an obkom department chief; it's just about like trying to figure out a crossword puzzle without the squares in which to write the letters. Therefore, let us permit ourselves the following proposition. At the party obkom they apparently realized that, if they made Vladimir Mamedovich a chief, they would automatically create a conflict situation. And that's just how it turned out! Right away a collective letter arrived from the editorial staff, addressed to Obkom First Secretary I. Dzhabbarov. The letter speaks in particular to the manner in which the new department chief began his duties: "The newspaper's editor, A. Kanushkin, was urgently summoned to the party obkom, along with his executive secretary V. Shurayev—he is secretary of the primary party organization and a communist; and I. Lazaryev, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. From the first, Salamov demanded that Em and Iskhakov be dismissed from the editorial staff—dismissed by any means."

So that's how it is! As it turned out, did Vladimir Mamedovich not forgive their disclosure? But one should not consider him, an experienced official on the apparat, to be a simpleton. Salamov knows full well what a department head can do, and what he must not do; in particular, one must not sack people on the editorial staff. It does not benefit one's rank, as they say. And Salamov would not have decided on such a thing if there had not been instructions "from above."

Party Obkom Secretary Yu. Kurochkin does not conceal his hostility toward Iskhakov and Em. He declared that they must be removed from the editorial staff. But you see, Yuriy Vasilyevich does not wish to reveal the reason for his hostility.

Em and Iskhakov are distinguished by their troublesome character. With the fervor worthy of the best, they were drawn into an extensive correspondence, in explanation of their relationships, to include those with their colleagues. They wrote without harking back to authorities, frequently running down officials on the party obkom and local organs of power in their publications. A list of such materials would be meaningless to a reader not living in Bukhara. And we do not have the capability to recount them; therefore we shall take only one as an example—Em's essay, "The Secrets of the Bukhara Ark."

In 1984, three priceless articles of Bukhara jewelers, unique items of their kind, were removed in gross violation of the laws and rules for transfer and shipment. The museum director was on vacation at that time, but that did not stop anyone. Representatives of a commission showed up there. They picked the lock of the director's safe. And they removed from it the keys from the strongbox and forced the museum officials to hand over the valuables. V. Tikhomirov, chief of the museum department of the UzSSR Ministry of Culture, that very day carried them off to Tashkent in an ordinary briefcase, and did not even take a guard.

Em inquired more than once where these exhibits were located. In Tashkent, they say. But they do not want to display them. Why should we? Incidentally, we will not go into further detail on when, how many and where these valuable articles were displayed. And by the way, at the obkom they consider the publication to be in error. You see, if that were true, then they should long ago have made an official evaluation, and should have made it public. We have recounted this essay purely in order to expose yet another force standing behind V. Salamov.

As the essay stated, there was a representative of the party obkom on the commission. Em treated this delicately, and did not give the name. And acted properly, it seems to us. In the final analysis, what was important was to return the valuables and to put a stop to the flow of articles out of Bukhara.

Unfortunately, newspapermen sometimes cannot remain in such a suspended state. What did it cost one of the authors to make the following revelation in the pages of SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA last April: "I trust the newspaper, since it is an organ of honesty and fairness; but those whom the journalists' pen has touched even once, are its enemies."

After such a critical and peremptory passage, which the journalist somehow allowed to pass through into print, it would seem that they would not risk naming specific names. But there was no getting around it—they had to cite the name S. Bakhranova, the party obkom secretary for ideology. And she was one of those who took part in removing the valuables.

And now a situation has come to pass reminiscent of an armed truce, when both sides are ready to put their artillery into use at any moment. And they do so! The newspaper, as already stated, exempts no one from criticism; it touches upon "forbidden" topics without the slightest doubt; and it names names and positions. And the chief of the propaganda department, virtually using a magnifying glass, searches out the "nits," that is, the minor errors and typos.

Thus it seems that he, and apparently several other obkom officials, understand the essence of party supervision of the press.

The newspaper does make mistakes; and, to put it bluntly, serious ones to boot. In other times it would have cost Kanushkin dearly. But the party obkom buro limited itself basically to oral "workovers," giving him a mild scolding. One of the reasons for the indulgences lies in the fact that for a long time the editorial staff had been without party supervision. Salamov openly avoids personal contact with the newspapermen, who do not hide their attitude toward him. Secretary for Ideology Bakhranova believes that visits to the editorial staff are totally useless. But perhaps the reason lies elsewhere?...

The newspapermen count on no help from Bakhranova, nor from Salamov. But it is badly needed. A completely improper attitude toward the press has taken shape in the oblast. It is all but considered a sign of good form not to notice or refute its critical articles. Kanushkin was forced to appeal to Party Obkom First Secretary Dzhabbarov in a letter. It was only then that the obkom examined this questions. And some of the city and rayon administrators and managers were scared. Formal replies began to arrive, but as before, the most serious articles appearing in the press were studiously ignored, or certain responsible officials tried to deny the obvious, and at the same time met with understanding at the party obkom. A great many personal and petty things are being brought into this important social matter, and clarification of attitudes is going on. Replying to a direct question about this, Bakhranova bluntly answered that she stands on her previous positions.

There are plenty of shortcomings in the vigilance of the editorial staff of SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA. One does not find clear-cut policies and directions in its pages. The topic of economics is poorly presented. It is hard to tell from its publications what the thoughts and concerns of the oblast and the party organization are. Basically, the journalists are "filling the eyes" of the readers by means of materials on social topics. Certain workers on the editorial staff, including the supervisors, are marked by ambition, and lack humility.

For Party Obkom First Secretary Dzhabbarov it was as if our words on the fact that he should become personally involved with the newspaper were a revelation. Likewise, he farmed out the task to the department head and to an obkom secretary. Well, what good can come of that! The obkom buro has not approved the editorial board of SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA and has no plans to do so. Not once has the subject of the creative output of the newspapermen come up as the topic of conversation at the buro or the secretariat. Not once has the party obkom made a thorough, comprehensive analysis of the work of the editorial staff, nor has it helped it to define the mainline directions of perestroyka.

The Bukhara party gorkom displays a singularly abnormal attitude, not having responded to a single one of the critical articles in the newspaper. Matters have come to such a pause that journalists are not allowed to work in the localities. The Kaganskiy Raykom has distinguished

itself here. Raykom First Secretary Z. Sharipov openly declared to SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA Correspondent A. Kudratov, that he would not allow him to go onto the farms. Correspondent M. Andreyeva was detained by militia officials, in spite of the fact that she displayed her official identification. She was held at the police department for an hour and a half.

The newspapermen sometimes get carried away, there's no other way to put it, by getting involved in explanations for the attitude of the comrades and the organizations. They themselves are not without faults. Maybe Iskhakov himself, and Em too, have quite a few. But this must be pointed out, and this must be proven—calmly, convincingly, and without shouting and pressure. Dissension and disruptions are shaking the collective. Orders for dismissals, transfers (Em, Iskhakov, Andreyeva, Kadyrova, Khadyeva, Salamova), or reinstatements are pouring forth, as from a horn of plenty. There

are official investigations and discussions at the trade union committee and at the editorial staff; there are continual tears and hurt feelings; and, as a result, letters to other authorities. Since departing we have already received several letters from Salamova, and there was a phone call from Khadyeva...

Yes, the relationship between the party obkom and the newspaper are clearly abnormal. The party committee does not know how to supervise the newspaper; and the journalists do not want to bow to pressure, to the command method of supervision, or to micromanagement—and they have fallen prey to ambition. The "illness" has become chronic. Judging from their mutual accusations and the relations among them, the obkom and the editorial staff will not be able to soberly and calmly deal with everything.

09006

**Involvement of Chernenko, Suslov in Journalistic Affairs Recounted**

18300415 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian  
No 7, Jul 88 pp 31-35

[Article by Pavel Yerofeyev, under the rubric "Near and Far": "And Experience, Son of Hard Mistakes"]

[Text] Let the line from Pushkin quoted in the title serve as the explanation for why I am writing. In February 1989 I will celebrate 50 years of work in journalism, and a few months later 50 years in the party. I begin these notes in the hope that the story of those years may in some way be instructive.

It was 1939. The regular Komsomol conference for Krasnoyarsk Kray was coming up. At that time I was working as first secretary of a Komsomol raykom and I headed the delegation from the mining region located not far from Shushenskoye, well-known as the place to which Vladimir Ilich was exiled. A surprise was waiting for me in Krasnoyarsk. I was summoned to the secretary of the party kraykom in charge of propaganda and told, in a tone that did not allow any objection:

"You are now going to be the editor of the newspaper KRASNOYARSKIY KOMSOMOLETS."

I tried to refuse, and said I had never even seen a journalist.

"You'll see plenty now. They are just like anybody else. We have some things going on in the Komsomol here. They will tell you about it. That's all. You can go."

That is how I became a journalist.

Temperatures were indeed hot in the Krasnoyarsk Komsomol. Just before this the plenum had removed I. Panachevnyy from his job as editor of KRASNOYARSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and expelled him from the Komsomol. It was because of his connection with A. Kosarev, former general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol, who had been arrested. A few days later Kulakov, first secretary of the party kraykom, returned from a business trip. An intelligent man, he quickly sized up things, swept aside the foolish charges against Panachevnyy, and sent him to work as head of the party department at the newspaper KRASNOYARSKIY RABOCHIY. Afterward I. Panachevnyy, a fine journalist, worked for many years as a PRAVDA correspondent in many parts of the country.

At this time the press sector of the party kraykom was headed by Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko. He was a sensitive man and a remarkable organizer. As a beginning editor I had fairly frequent occasions to seek his help. The editorial board would usually ask the people who were being criticized to answer to the newspaper. Even in our day when the significance of press criticism has grown immeasurably hollow answers are not

exposed: someone has been warned or humbled in the quiet of an office. But in those years the comrades in the leadership were completely above criticism and preferred "not to stoop" to responding to the newspaper, especially not a youth newspaper. Konstantin Ustinovich never refused us help in this, and no one was strong enough to ignore a telephone call from the party kraykom.

I had occasion to visit the grain procurements points in Achinskiy Rayon with Konstantin Ustinovich. As we know, prewar procurements were not simply difficult; they were torturous, and often tragic for kolkhoz chairmen and rayon executives. Some zealous, high-ranking officials would take an investigator and militia personnel with them when they went to procure grain, in order to settle accounts with "saboteurs." But Konstantin Ustinovich set an example of a different attitude toward this assignment. He would familiarize himself with the situation in the region and help them with advice. Our "goat" (that is what we call our rugged car, which was able to "jump" along impassable roads) was always surrounded by kolkhoz members. And the grain procurement went forward: I cannot say it was easy, but it was "according to justice," as people said.

I also met Chernenko a number of times after the war in Kishinev and in Moscow, when he worked in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee. We met not only officially, but also over tea in his office, as men from the same region. Only after Chernenko became a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee did he cease to be accessible to me.

I want to repeat that in my impression Chernenko remained a kind, sincere man, but in no way suitable to be a political leader of the party and country; for that, certainly, personal traits are not enough. Based on my personal impressions I can say that he was a good executive, but not an independent figure. Of course, I would not debase him to the role of "pencil sharpener for Leonid Ilich," although I share completely the opinion of Ales Adamovich that someone had a "critical need to prolong Brezhnev ways." The mystery of Chernenko's election to be General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee is still to be explained, and not for the sake of idle curiosity. The party and, indeed, the entire people have the right to know who held back restructuring and democratization for so long, and why.

After the war I returned to Krasnoyarsk. The return of KRASNOYARSKIY KOMSOMOLETS to print was being held up, and I was confirmed as deputy editor of KRASNOYARSKIY RABOCHIY. Then after completing the one-year school for newspapermen at the Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee I became editor of that newspaper.

How was the newspaper done in those years? We stayed in the editorial offices until 0300-0500 in the morning almost every day. That schedule was dictated by the arrival of the latest material from Moscow. We were especially afraid of misprints, in particular political ones. Even word splits at the end of the line were watched so that no one could imagine any ambiguity. We often had to pay for mistakes. There was a saying about the "fresh head," the duty official whose job it was to read the issue of the paper from the first letter to the last, and only after rest and a good sleep: "The sword will not cut down the guilty head, it will always get the 'fresh' one."

But all this was compensated for by enthusiasm, dedication to journalism, and a desire to write well about the everyday life, sometimes very hard but unquestionably heroic, of those people who are customarily called simple laborers.

There was not that much critical material in the newspaper at that time, if you do not count the stream of official criticism of kolkhoz and sovkhoz chairmen, directors of machine-tractor stations, and officials in charge of the various agricultural campaigns. It was printed from spring to fall and usually concentrated on two main aspects: slow planting and delay in turning in grain. The prodding criticism sometimes alternated with analytical articles. Most often they uncovered the causes of shortcomings in Krasnoyarsk combines. (However, as I learned recently from a certain central newspaper, even 30 years later Krasnoyarsk combine builders still are not responding to the criticism.)

I remember once when the newspaper had received a satirical article that exposed a crook from the Krasnoyarsk Trade Enterprise. The facts were checked and the conclusions were confirmed. But we were afraid to set it in print: the kraykom would find out (there were plenty of informers who would help) and the article might not see the light of day. We knew that the "hero" of the article had many patrons, including employees of the kraykom. The first secretary of the party kraykom at that time was A. B. Aristov, a stern, authoritative man and boss of the kray. If he were to prohibit publication, nothing more would be possible. We waited until he left Krasnoyarsk for a few days, and published the article. The reaction was swift and stormy: many letters of gratitude from readers and a strong dressing-down for criticizing a nomenklatura employee without special permission. At the kraykom they decided not to print a refutation of the article as the man who was criticized demanded. They did not respond to the publication; they let it go...

But the consequences were not long in coming. Very soon after this the buro of the kraykom decided to send me to study at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. During discussion of this matter someone who plainly had been hurt by the newspaper threw out the comment: "Maybe it would be better to teach him his lesson here?"

They did not even go through the formality of getting my consent. But it was apparently very clearly written on my face. I was unquestionably happy to have the opportunity to go to such a prestigious school, and set off for it in late 1950. For me this was in fact not punishment, but the fulfillment of a wish.

As we know, this practice of sending people who have made mistakes or appear unsuitable off to school or to more important work still has not been eliminated today.

My studies in the department of literature at the Academy of Social Sciences were coming to an end and I was preparing to become a philologist. But things turned out differently. N. A. Mikhaylov, secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU (at that time the city and oblast organizations were combined), who himself had once been editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, was looking for an editor for the newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. There were more than enough suitable candidates in Moscow, but he needed a graduate of our academy, a candidate of sciences (which was still impressive in those days). So in November 1953 I became editor of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

Other party and public obligations were added to my considerable responsibility for the capital newspaper. I was a member of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Moscow Soviet, and a deputy to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. I also received the greatest honor of my life when I was chosen to be a delegate to the 20th CPSU Congress.

At a meeting of the Moscow party aktiv soon after the 20th Congress V. P. Moskovskiy, head of the propaganda department of the CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, stopped me. The following conversation took place:

"I am glad that we met. A decision has been made to appoint you editor-in-chief of SOVETSKAYA Rossiya. Tomorrow morning I will take you to meet the collective."

"Yes," I said in confusion. "But tomorrow at MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA I have to..."

Moskovskiy did not let me finish. "That is not important. Kapitonov (who was first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Committee at that time) has given his consent. You do not work at MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA any more."

It was always done that way then!

I recall an incident from our experience in those years. The ideological commission of the CPSU Central Committee summoned us, a group of editors, and demanded that we explain why there were so many photographs in our newspapers. To the contemporary reader who cannot imagine a newspaper without photographs this will



seem a strange question. But even before the war the CPSU Central Committee had ordered that as few photographs as possible be run, in order to conserve newspaper space.

We decided to come out in defense of photographs in newspapers, to suggest that they be considered an important component in giving a picture of life in the country and that the earlier order be declared an anachronism.

M. A. Suslov chaired the meeting. He immediately attacked the newspapers which had large numbers of photographs, especially the ones that we represented. I objected, stating that 56 percent of the photographs in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA were pictures of leading workers of the five-year plan. We think, I said, that this is good, and that our fourth page is an information page which also cannot get by without photographs.

My statement was immediately interrupted. "You forget who you are talking with!" Suslov roared. "Carry out the order without discussion!"

That was the end of discussions. Formally speaking the punishment was minimal. I was warned. Also, however, it was clear that an example had been set for all the editorial crowd: Do not dare to have your own opinion!

P. N. Pospelov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, gave a kind of summary of this incident. Shaking his head in reproach, he said to me: "You walked bare-chested into machine gun fire."

An experienced apparatchik, he knew that Stalinist ways had not been eliminated, that they demanded absolutely: do not go against the grain!

I recall an important meeting at which P. A. Satyukov, who at that time was editor of PRAVDA, sharply criticized the USSR Ministry of Pulp and Paper Industry for the sector's peculiar kind of development—quite rapid according to reports and for winning bonuses, praise, and orders, but still never overcoming the critical paper shortage.

N. S. Khrushchev, who was chairing the meeting, interrupted Satyukov: "Do you think Minister Orlov has such an easy, soft job? We are ready to switch your places."

Pavel Alekseyevich found a good answer: "I am afraid that if we switched places we would be worse off. There would be no more paper, and PRAVDA would hardly be improved. We need other, fundamental measures to overcome the paper shortage!"

Unfortunately, they still have not been taken. And certainly the shortage of newspapers, journals, and books is felt even more sharply today that it was then!

In the late 1950's I took part in formation of the USSR Journalists Union. I was secretary of the organizing bureau.

V. P. Moskovskiy informed me that when the decision was being made to form the union Suslov warned that the journalists union was only being set up for international relations. Then Vasilii Petrovich Moskovskiy added with a smile, "They let the genie out of the bottle, and it is quite a handful. Now let's see them try to limit it to foreign relations only. It will spread across our country too!"

Vasilii Petrovich Moskovskiy was a wise man who did a great deal for the development of Soviet journalism. It indeed proved to be an interesting and important project. The USSR Journalists Union, an organization that had been desired for a long time, began growing rapidly and becoming stronger. Our journalists abroad were also doing a great deal of very hard work. It would have been more effective and our influence would have been stronger if the journalists had not been significantly held back by various prohibitions and stereotypes. They themselves were convinced that some of their reporting was true, while in some of it they repeated "directives" mechanically, fearing to digress from the recommended standards.

Evidence of the fact that the USSR Journalists Union had become a recognized creative organization was seen in the invitation of the American Association of Newspaper Editors to exchange delegations. Bitter fighting on "cold war" fronts was continuing. But new President John Kennedy, like many in the United States, was beginning to understand that the "icy standoff" of the two greatest powers was producing no dividends. Soviet delegations were invited to the United States, businessmen and political figures visited Moscow, and there were talks about a meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy. The Journalists Union sent 11 journalists from leading newspapers, journals, and news agencies on an important trip. It lasted almost a month. There were many discussions with journalists, public figures, and businessmen.

The program also included a tour of the White House. Our talk with Andy Hatcher, assistant White House press secretary, was dragging on. He kept looking at his watch, but under various pretexts refused to release our delegation. The phone rang. A few short answers. And then, setting the receiver down, Andy Hatcher turned to us: "The President has returned by helicopter from his vacation spot. He has a few minutes free. If you do not object, he will receive you."

B. S. Burkov, the head of our delegation, answered that the Soviet journalists would be glad to visit the President of the United States.

When we entered his office the President was standing by his desk. He greeted each of us with a smile. "I welcome your trip to the United States. We want good relations with the Soviet Union, whose people we respect."

Tall, well-built, sun-tanned, in an athletically cut gray suit. A tired, wrinkled face. He was 44 years old, the youngest president in U. S. history. He wanted to appear older and more substantial. His position required it, but his tireless energy and impulsive nature showed through.

"This is where I work," he said, indicating the small office with a broad gesture. "Theodore Roosevelt worked at this same desk."

"The 20th Century," Kennedy continued, "is difficult and complex. We have experienced a great deal. And this compels us to strengthen ties between peoples. I hope that our countries will arrive at mutual understanding. But there is a long path yet to be traveled."

He talked about the press's responsibility for the fate of peace.

"You should not attach too much significance to everything that is written in our newspapers," he said, and at this point inquired, "I hope that you have been greeted well in our country?"

Here we understood the reason for the unusual attention American journalists had given to their Soviet colleagues. Obviously a presidential order was in effect. "As you finish your tour of the White House, don't miss the two pictures by Ayvazovskiy in the next room. Russians in America..."

It was a short, but dignified and informative reception. But during the meetings with our American colleagues there were arguments. Whose press is freer, whose elections are more democratic. We, of course, said that ours were, while they stated that elections to the Soviets were one-horse races. They laughed at our poor harvests, and we responded that our kolkhozes and sovkhozes would soon overtake America. They said: you do not criticize your government. And we were surprised: what is there to criticize it for if it is a people's government and takes care of us? And to every other reproach we answered that these were growing pains, unusual and temporary shortcomings, and we would overcome them. There were toasts to peace and friendship and warm handshakes upon parting. But later the American press lashed out at us in earnest, calling us "simpletons abroad." And we did not let it pass. In many articles about the trip to America we hit hard at the "pernicious American press" and "decadent capitalism." We had gone there to strengthen friendship, but when we parted we began following the traditions of the day and painting the "image of the enemy" in black tones. How sincere were we in this? I do not know. I will confine myself to an old story which still continues to have some relevance. TASS

distributes material marked "urgent" to the newspapers: "As our correspondent in Paris reports, referring to the newspaper LE FIGARO, show is falling there, while in Moscow, on the third floor of the TASS building on Tverskoy Boulevard, a fire has broken out. Publication permitted only after 2300, if no refutation from France is received by that time."

The years passed; we now call that time the period of stagnation. But we marked it by the way in which the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress began to be dismantled. At meetings of newspaper and journal editors at the CPSU Central Committee bewildered questions were asked about digression from its principles. But there were no intelligible answers. They usually responded: yes, a step backwards has been taken in some places, but this is for tactical reasons so that later we can make, not two steps forward, but a powerful surge. That is enough looking backward. The past is like chains binding us, the ones who aspire to communism.

In general, the dismantling of the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress began while Khrushchev was still in power. It was Suslov who worked hardest to dethrone the ideas of the congress. He was called the "gray cardinal" in journalistic circles. That is a fairly disrespectful nickname for a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but you cannot take words out of history any more than out of a song.

A. Verbenko, deputy chairman of the board of Novosti Press Agency, wrote bluntly and openly about M. A. Suslov's unseemly role in the life of the party and the country. He wrote in an honest and courageous letter addressed to Suslov himself. Andrey Andreyevich was a veteran of the Great Patriotic War and the Victory Parade on Red Square. He had been a division commissar at the front and maintained his fighting character in peacetime as well. As we know, this was not the case with some others.

The occasion for the letter was a discussion with Suslov after Verbenko returned from an official trip through the countries of the Middle East.

"What conclusions have you brought back from your trip?" Suslov asked him. "In your opinion, how soon will events in the Middle East end in peace?"

"It is a lengthy process, Mikhail Andreyevich. It will go on for years."

Suslov was indignant and roared, "I am sorry I sent you at the head of the delegation. You are incompetent. The party considers that everything will end in 3 months, and you talk about years!"

"No, Mikhail Andreyevich, those who pass off what they want to be true as the truth are the ignorant ones."

Suslov broke off the conversation and ordered that Verbenko be removed from his post. Verbenko was very angry too. This was when he wrote the letter. In the very first lines Verbenko called Suslov a renegade who was digressing further and further from the Leninist course of the party proclaimed by the 20th Congress. He recalled that he himself had heard Suslov speak at a plenum of the Rostov party obkom, where Suslov stated that he could imagine no greater happiness than to be a loyal comrade-in-arms of Stalin. This was understandable, Verbenko wrote; many people made such statements then to promote their careers. But you, Mikhail Andreyevich, he went on, continue today to support Stalin's repression and the defenders of his cult.

Verbenko's friends, learning what he had done, predicted that Andrey Andreyevich would certainly be severely punished. But Suslov pretended that he did not receive the letter. S. P. Gavrilov, his assistant at the time, told Andrey Andreyevich that he put the letter on Suslov's desk and did not receive it back. Another proof that the letter reached its destination is the fact that there was no more talk about removing Verbenko from his job.

Many people learned about the content of Verbenko's letter 20 years later. I have reproduced the gist of it here from Andrey Andreyevich's words. He is today a personal pensioner of USSR rank, is fighting his war wounds, and participates actively in the work of the veterans council at the Novosti Press Agency.

There is much, much more that could be told, of course. Recalling those years you begin to wonder what it was that prevented us then from carrying through the work begun by the 20th Congress? Put briefly, it was the burden of the past. It proved too heavy. It weighed down our journalistic consciousness too, causing us to doubt things that were unquestionable and to retreat before force, because "it was necessary." Yes, we were too accustomed to obeying bureaucratic force, which assumed the right to speak on behalf of the highest interests. And it is difficult to say now whether the journalist acted out of fear or out of conscience when he trampled on the throat of his own song, his own thought, his own convictions. If we are able to overcome this in ourselves, restructuring will be irreversible. If we are not able to do so, anything is possible.

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**'Blank Spots' in 1930'S Soviet Demographic Statistics Noted**

*Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian*  
14 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by M. Tolts, candidate of economic sciences, demographer, under the rubric "Scientist's View": "Demographic 'Blank Spots' in Light of Glasnost"]

[Text] Perhaps, there is no other period in the history of the USSR, which would evoke such conflicting assessments of population dynamics from demographers and

historians, as the 1930's. A multitude of works devoted to this subject have been published abroad, and interest in it is not dying down, but obviously increasing. In spite of this, the authors of these works are no closer to agreement now than they were in the past: these issues are the subject of lively discussions. The majority of those who have written most recently about this subject agree upon only one thing—the complicated demographic problems of the 1930's will hardly, in the foreseeable future, become a subject of public discussion in the USSR.

But suppression of the tragic episodes in the nation's history is incompatible with the openness which has come to life in Soviet society. Today the 1932-33 famine, the collectivization of the peasants, and Stalin's repressions are widely discussed in our press. Foreign authors' works devoted to this subject, likewise, are no longer kept secret. While previously one could study the conclusions of a limited number of experts, and even then only with special permission in special library depositories, now a different situation exists. For instance, the journal VOPROSY ISTORII recently published a broad collection of works by Anglo-American authors reflecting their primary conclusions. The Soviet reader is now certain that the estimates of losses incurred during the tragic events of the 1930's differ appreciably (as much as several times) from one work to the next.

Of course, Soviet scholars—demographers B. Uralnis and Yu. Korchak-Chepurkovskiy in particular—have attempted to discover a way of researching these problems. The former attempted to determine the quantitative change in the population of the USSR at the very height of the famine—from 1 January to 1 April 1933. The latter estimated the excessive death rate during the period from 1927 to 1938. However, the figures which were published in the 1970's by these authors were not commented upon by them, on the contrary, the authors were forced under the circumstances of those years not to draw the readers' attention to them.

What causes the difficulties in researching the demographic processes of the 1930's? First of all, the futility of trying to obtain from the publications of that period a true representation of what was actually happening with the population. Keeping statistics during those years proved to be a difficult proposition since calculating the natural population movement—primarily in the rural areas—worsened. For instance in 1934, more than one-fourth of the total population of the USSR was not included in the census, and where the census was taken, the data which was collected was far from being complete. In the first place, the census only included data from the major population centers where living conditions were more favorable. In other words the agencies which compiled statistics were deprived of information which accurately reflected the situation.

And in the 1930's, even the agencies which compiled the statistics were subordinated to Gosplan. Since there were plan figures for population, the published figures

reflected the plan figures. The figures reflected a simple transfer of the favorable trends at the end of the 1920's to the hard times of the 1930's. But even these inflated estimates in the statistical reference books of that period come to an abrupt end at the beginning of 1933, the time of the great famine.

In early 1934, at the 17th Party Congress Stalin, claiming that the nation's population had increased, cited a figure of 168 million for the end of 1933. This was a gigantic lie. Its goal was to conceal the tragedy of the famine, despite the fact that according to M. Kurman's recollections, who was working at that time in a management position at the Central Bureau of National Economic Statistics, statisticians did not give Stalin that figure. That is why it did not appear in the statistical reference books which were published by them. And it was terror and not astonishment which this figure provoked among the experts. Naturally, they could not help but ask the question: what should the census of the population indicate?

The census was taken in January 1937, but prior to it 170 million was the only figure mentioned in reference to the nation's population, i.e., secretly admitting the decline in demographic indices. And this occurred despite the fact that Stalin continued to demagogically assert that the population was increasing at a rate of 3 million people annually. However the census indicated that there were 8 million people fewer than expected. That is why its results were declared "defective" and the census managers, acknowledged experts in their field, were charged with criminal incompetence and subjected to repression. The terror touched many statisticians, not only in the capital, but in the republics and oblasts as well. Denial of the census results and punishment of honest experts were a common occurrence during those years. Recently, the official organ of the State Committee for Statistics of the USSR, the journal VESTNIK STATISTIKI, wrote today when we review many of the conclusions and estimates of the 1930's, it can be stated with confidence that there were no "flagrant violations of the elementary principles of statistical science" in the taking of the 1937 census. To be exact the "defectiveness" of the census results during its own time substantiates this.

Denial of the results of the 1937 census led to a new census of the USSR's population being taken in 1939. But the published results of the 1939 census, upon which, by the way, many western estimates are based, leave serious doubts as to their veracity. In particular, the high rate of population growth in 1937-1938 supposedly corroborate the accuracy of the data in the 1939 census. But were all the deaths taken into account. First and foremost this refers to the prisoners, the number of which drastically increased during that period. That is to say that for this part of the 1930's as well, the thoroughness with which the natural movement of the population was calculated is suspect.

But there are other serious arguments as well for doubting the accuracy of the published data from the 1939 census. The checking of the control forms (all but 10 million) and adjusting the census results on the basis of the forms was not completed, according to official facts, until the end of March 1939. And the preliminary results of the census were not presented to the country's leadership until April. How can one forget that the number of inhabitants in the USSR, which was cited by Stalin as early as 10 March 1939 at the 18th Communist Party Congress, was 170 million (which just happens to be the total which was anticipated but not reached in 1937). This fact only strengthens the suspicion that the results of the census were adjusted to reflect a total which had been set and as it turns out even mentioned beforehand.

Thus, today researchers do not have at their disposal facts relating to 1930's statistics, which would merit absolute confidence. The way to solve this problem of filling in the "blank spots" is by working in the archives and critically analyzing the statistical materials which have been preserved. Only on this foundation, by using modern scientific methods, will an accurate reconstruction of the quantitative nature of the demographic situation during that period become possible.

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#### **A.P. Aleksandrov Recounts Soviet Development of Atomic Bomb**

18300439 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
23 Jul 88 p 3

[Interview of Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov by Kim Smirnov: "How We Made the Bomb"]

[Text] In the "Forest Ranger Shack" (as the physicists nicknamed the house in which Kurchatov lived right on the territory of the institute), I still remember the modest landscape painting. It was a gift of the author—Vannikov. Stillness. A path. A birch grove penetrated by the soft evening light, and three pine trees had lost their way in it.

"This is where they made the bomb?"

"Not, it was not made in the Urals. It was made at another place where there was an industrial reactor and a radiochemical enterprise producing plutonium, including for the first bomb."

I am talking with a close friend of Kurchatov, now 28 years later his successor in the post of director of the Institute of Atomic Energy, academician, thrice Hero of the Soviet Union, and in the recent past president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The conversation is about how work was begun 45 years ago in the USSR on practical use of atomic energy for defensive and peaceful purposes. Today we now can talk about some of the little-known pages of the Soviet Uranium Project.

I am talking with Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov.

[Question] Anatoliy Petrovich, how did research on the uranium problem come about in our country? How did involvement in it begin for you personally?

[Answer] In order to understand that this was not some flash in a vacuum (nothing happens from nothing!), we need a short excursus into history. We will have to recall the critical situation which emerged at the country's leading physics center—the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute (LPTI) of academician A.F. Ioffe in the early 1930's. The main field of the institute up to 1931—dielectric physics—was to change significantly. Its main part, thin-layer insulation, proved to be unrealizable, and work in this direction was halted. I.V. Kurchatov shifted his attention to ferroelectric physics. The laboratory of P.P. Kobeko concentrated on the properties of amorphous bodies. My laboratory was working on polymer physics. Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and his associates created new ferroelectric materials quite quickly and made a fundamental contribution to the development of ferroelectricity. A specific area was soon found for their use as acoustic wave generators. Materials of these classes are still being used in hydroacoustics. However, Igor Vasilyevich, urged on by academician Ioffe, put more and more work into a new field—nuclear physics.

At this time, neutrons and positrons were discovered in the West. It seemed that neutrons could "bombard" atomic nuclei much more effectively than the alpha-particles used earlier by Rutherford: the neutron did not have to be repelled from the atomic nucleus. In late 1932, Ioffe organized at the institute an atomic nucleus laboratory under his own direction. An excellent weekly seminar was formed for all who wished to attend. Kurchatov energetically developed the necessary equipment for this work and involved a number of other institutions in it—the Kharkov and Tomsk physico-technical institutes and the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute. The Physics and Radium institutes of the Academy of Sciences and others also worked in this direction. Already in 1933 Kurchatov headed the organizing committee of the first All-Union Conference on the Atomic Nucleus in Leningrad, in which the most prominent scientists of the world participated.

In the next 2-3 years, Soviet physicists I.V. Kurchatov, D.V. Skobeltsyn, A.I. Alikhanov, L.A. Artsimovich, K.D. Sinelnikov and others carried out a number of outstanding works which gain world fame. These were the discovery of nuclear isomerism, resonance processes, interaction of neutrons of different energies and substances. At the same time, academician Ioffe developed studies in his laboratory on semiconductor physics, and the work in the field of nuclear physics was turned completely over to Kurchatov. The first accelerators and the small cyclotron of the Radium Institute were created.

Although a significant number of scientists recognized the importance of the work in the field of nuclear physics, the leadership of the academy and of the USSR Council of People's Commissars believed that this work had no practical importance. Even at general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1936, the Physico-Technical Institute and A.F. Ioffe himself were subjected to harsh criticism for "breaking away from practical work," meaning namely nuclear research. For the results of Kobeko's and my laboratory were valued quite highly. We were able to develop a method for producing cold-resistant rubber from synthetic rubber, and this made it possible to make tires for aircraft and many other items for military equipment out of domestic "Lebedev" synthetic rubber. Methods for protecting ships from magnetic mines were developed in my laboratory. They later proved very useful during the war.

Less than a couple of years after the criticism for the "useless" nuclear physics, uranium fission with neutron capture was discovered. This immediately inspired hope for the possibility of a fission chain reaction and use of the enormous energy release both under explosive and controlled conditions.

Already in 1940, at a seminar at the Physico-Technical Institute we heard a report by Ya.B. Zeldovich and Yu.B. Khariton, who were the first in the world to make a correct assessment of the possibility of setting up a uranium fission chain reaction. In 1939-1940, Soviet works on nuclear physics comprised almost one-third of the world publications. It was clear to us that it was necessary to develop methods of enriching natural uranium with isotope 236 and to learn to produce neutron moderators with low absorption. Soviet physicists already held the opinion that the chain reaction could be regulated by absorption of the "delayed" neutrons.

[Question] Then this was virtually the idea of a reactor already?

[Answer] Of course. In Kurchatov's laboratory, his associate today, academician G.N. Flerov, and an associate of the Radium Institute, K.A. Petrzhak, discovered spontaneous uranium fission. Splitting of lithium nuclei was done at the Kharkov Physico-Technical Institute, I.V. Kurchatov, K.D. Sinelnikov and others almost simultaneously with work in the West.

During the prewar period, I had a heavy workload with protecting ships from magnetic mines. Although we had solved this problem in principle back in 1936, our developments, initially tested on the small ship "Dozornyy" of the Mine and Torpedo Institute, had to be used on all classes of vessels on the oceans, seas and rivers. Thus, in the Baltic we conducted work on torpedo boats, cruisers and battleships. We conducted tests in the Black Sea for the Governmental Commission in January 1941.

As far as I remember, in April of that year the Fleet Military Council approved accepting the "LPTI system" into the inventory and decided immediately to install in on ships. Zhdanov, present at the Military Council, told Fleet Commander in Chief Kuznetsov, who was showing some hesitation: "Do you want to enter the war without the equipment? We must do it immediately!" That was the first time I heard about war being a reality in the next few months. All of my laboratory (B.A. Gayev, V.R. Regel, P.G. Stepanov, D.V. Filippov, K.K. Shcherbo) and the naval officers attached to us (B.Ye. Godzevich and I.V. Klimov), with the aid of shipbuilders and shipbased teams, very efficiently began equipping the ships with protective systems. I am telling you all of this so it will be clear in what context nuclear research was in among other directions of the institute.

So, by the start of the war, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and I were laboratory heads at the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute of Abram Fedorovich Ioffe. We were bonded not only by friendship, but also by a deep interest in each other's work. That is why, when nuclear research was not regarded as defense research and protected, we agreed to connect his laboratory with demagnetizing ships.

Thus, in the fall of 1941, he and I ended up in Sevastopol. Kurchatov set up a test range for demagnetized ships and demagnetizing courses for officers. He also worked in Sevastopol after I was transferred to the Northern Fleet. In the winter of 1941-1942, Igor Vasilyevich arrived in Kazan, where the LPTI had been evacuated.

In September 1942, after flying to Kazan from Stalin-grad, I did not find Kurchatov. When he returned from Moscow, he said to me: "We will continue work on nuclear physics. There is information that the Americans and Germans are making atomic weapons." "How do we turn such a mess around during wartime?" "I have been told not to stand on ceremony and to make any requisitions and immediately begin to act."

Later he moved to Moscow. Soon physicists began to be summoned to him from the front and from various cities. The line even reached me.

Naturally, at that time I did not yet know either about G.N. Flerov's letter to Stalin (not detecting any reports in American physics journals about uranium fission and chain reactions, he came to the correct conclusion: the United States was making an atomic bomb) or that in the spring of 1942 a letter addressed to Stalin from S.V. Kaftanov, State Defense Committee (GKO) science representative, containing the same information pertaining to Germany was received. Proof was a notebook of a dead German officer. It contained calculations clearly related to the development of nuclear weapons.

I also did not know that three candidates were being considered for the post of director of our Uranium Project—A.F. Ioffe and two of his pupils, A.I. Alikhanov

and I.V. Kurchatov. And Igor Vasilyevich [Kurchatov] was not the first candidate. Here is how the senior assistant to the GKO science representative, Professor S.A. Balezin, who participated in resolving this issue, recalls this: "First, Kurchatov was summoned to Moscow simply to get acquainted with him before rejecting his candidacy. But he came in and everyone was struck by both his modesty and charm; he had a very good smile. And he had a thoroughness about him. I showed him the translation of the notes from the German officer's notebook. He read them for a bit. I did not say that the government's decision was already made. I only asked: If such work were to begin, would he take it upon himself to head it? He hesitated, smiled, stroked his beard—it was still quite short at that time—and said: 'Yes.'"

[Question] For the majority of our readers without access to atomic secrets, the sequences from the movie "Risk-II," showing the German physicist Klaus Fuchs who worked in the United States and of his own free will notified the USSR about the creation of the atomic bomb, were a revelation. It turns out, the stories about atomic espionage were engendered not only by a "witch hunt?" Was there or was there not such a thing?

[Answer] There was some. But overall it played a very insignificant role. Neither Kurchatov nor the others involved in the project relied on someone else's ideas—they searched for their own. I already said that by the time the discovery of the neutron and uranium fission had cleared up the way to practical mastering of nuclear energy, our research in this field was already at the level of the rest of the world. I.V. Kurchatov, A.I. Alikhanov, L.A. Artsimovich, and P.I. Lukirskiy were conducting research in their laboratories at the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute, and K.D. Sinelnikov was doing so at the Kharkov Physico-Technical Institute.

Incidentally, the scientists had other, more reliable sources of information than intelligence data. Paradoxical as it may seem, but perhaps the primary source was namely the very fact that the information was being classified. Knowing the latest work of a prominent foreign researcher before the curtain of secrecy came down and not finding his name in scientific publications (meaning that he had not changed his field of interests), it was not hard to determine that he was moving in the same direction and that this direction would be tested in secret atomic work.

Here is a specific situation. The first work Kurchatov assigned me was thermal diffusion isotope separation. There was nothing ingenious about this process. It had been reported from German publications at a physico-technical seminar back before the war. Apparently, this had become ingrained in Kurchatov's memory.

I objected: "After all, Artsimovich proposed other, more promising ways of separation at this same seminar." Igor Vasilyevich [Kurchatov] said that we would test different ways. I said: "But why do what is not necessary?"

"God knows what is necessary. In any case, we must also cover this path." "Well, there are great energy costs, it will be very expensive." "Right now, cost means nothing!"

Later we found out that the Americans were working in precisely the same direction. They had built a thermal diffusion plant, and it was working. But we conducted all the experiments, achieved separation, made a rather large plant at one of the Moscow power plants and...rejected this variant in favor of a better one.

There there was the problem of producing ultrapure graphite, over which V.V. Goncharov and others were struggling under the direct supervision of Kurchatov. Goncharov's memoirs contain a significant admission: "If the works of I.V. Kurchatov and his associates would have been published in a timely manner, the storage of latent energy during irradiation of graphite could have been called the 'Kurchatov effect.' In the United States, the American scientist Wigner is credited with this discovery."

In short, it was not a matter of pursuing atomic secrets but one of the inevitability of developing scientific and technical thought, which no secrecy can stop.

[Question] According to publications about the Uranium Project, one gets the feeling that all threads, both scientific and administrative, meet at Kurchatov. But, you see, there were also other management levels above him, at the top of which stood Beriya. Only Stalin was higher. Did these levels help or hinder the project?

[Answer] Well, you see, this is a very simplified picture of the administrative pyramid at that time. Stalin's word decided in general the fate of the project. One gesture by Beriya could have sent any of us into nonexistence. But it was still Kurchatov who was at the top of the pyramid. It was our good fortune that at that time he personified competence, responsibility and also authority. And perhaps this is the tragedy not everyone was aware of: What a wonderful, very sumptuous personality literally burned himself out and radiated without remains to save his country and his people.

Were there other scientists equal to him in strength, who combined not only various talents but also various dispositions and concentrated them on a single goal? No, at that time there were not, although the intellectual cream of the crop of Soviet science worked on the project, and many of these people significantly surpassed Kurchatov himself in their fields. This, by the way, is also a sign of real, great talent in science: not to be afraid of surrounding yourself with people who may also contradict you.

[Question] How did Kurchatov's relations with the authority above him take shape?

[Answer] Stalin and those around him were forced to believe and trust him. They simply had no other choice. As far as the specific leaders and generals who were above us at the top command levels are concerned, they can be divided into two categories.

There were those leaders, such as B.L. Vannikov, Ye.P. Slavskiy, A.P. Zavenyagin and M.G. Pervukhin, who, possessing a tremendous amount of organizational experience, naturally were starting from ground zero in the atomic problem. But they were not afraid of learning and quite rapidly became deeply absorbed in our affairs.

The second category—those who did not understand anything in the matter but all the time tried to demonstrate power, once it had been given to them. Many of them understood the problem on the following level: Will it detonate or not detonate? And, it seems, Beriya also understood it, although all information naturally flowed together to him.

If we talk about competence, it was not Beriya but Boris Lvovich Vannikov who worked directly with us. He was chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council for the Uranium Project under the USSR Council of People's Commissars. Kurchatov was his deputy. They were the ones who determined all routine decisions. Very major decisions, of course, went through the State Defense Committee, through Stalin, through Beriya.

When we at Kapitsa's institute were developing methods of producing deuterium, I sent to the Defense Committee a proposal to introduce our technology at one of the plants. So it would be further clear, I said that other ways had been tested in various places and that there had been an explosion of deuterium on a pilot-scale plant in one of the laboratories.

I received an invitation to a special committee meeting. The picture was this. There were several military men, Kurchatov, Vannikov, Pervukhin, Malyshev, Zhdanov, Makhnev (the general working on the uranium problem), and Meshik (responsible for procedures, later arrested in connection with the prosecution of Beriya). I was seated on one side of Beriya, Makhnev on the other side. He reported: "Here, Lavrentiy Pavlovich, Comrade Aleksandrov proposes building a plant for producing deuterium." Beriya acted as if he did not see me. He addressed only Makhnev: "Does Comrade Aleksandrov know that the pilot-scale exploded?" He replied: "Yes, he knows." "But Comrade Aleksandrov does not withdraw his signature?" "He does not." I was sitting right beside him—why not ask me! "Does Comrade Aleksandrov know that if the plant blows up, he will be sent to the ends of the earth?" I could not contain myself: "I represent myself." He turned to me: "You do not withdraw your signature?" "No, I do not." The plant was built. Thank goodness, up to now it has not yet blown up.



With people such as Beriia, all their awareness was confined to the bomb. I do not think they understood the multipurpose and fundamental nature of the research. As an example, in 1945 it was Beriia who imposed a ban on the idea of atomic ships: First the bomb, all else later. You see, back then we at the Institute of Physics Problems had begun designing an atomic plant for ship. This was long before the Americans made their "Nautilus."

Kurchatov considered the military applications of atomic energy to be forced and temporary. He linked all prospects with its peaceful use. After returning from the testing of the hydrogen bomb, he said to me: "Anatolius, this is monstrous! Heaven forbid if they use this against people. This must not be permitted!"

[Question] When did Stalin begin to understand the entire gravity of the atomic threat? After Potsdam?

[Answer] No, apparently it was much earlier. At the Potsdam Conference, when Truman told him about the atomic bomb testing, he just appeared as if he knew and understood nothing. But after returning from Berlin, I know that he summoned Igor Vasilyevich and pounced on him with accusations about why he was demanding so little for maximum acceleration of work. Kurchatov replied: "So much has been destroyed, so many people have died. The country is on starvation rations, there is not enough of anything." Stalin angrily said: "If a child does not cry, the mother does not understand what he needs. Ask for anything you like. You will not be turned down."

[Question] Anatoliy Petrovich, there were rumors that shortly after the war P.L. Kapitsa was removed from the institute because he had refused to work on the bomb. Is this true? Or was it just Beriia's attempt to destroy him?

[Answer] As I see it, Petr Leonidovich simply believed that if we were to follow the same path which the Americans were taking and which was clear to us in general terms, we never would surpass them. It was absolutely necessary for us to select our own path. Then we would have preferable chances in this race. Just how they sorted it out upstairs with Kurchatov, I do not know. But it is not true that he opposed the Uranium Project for some moral reasons. For example, the basic technological idea for the plant which we were to work on within the framework of the project at the Institute of Physics Problems belonged namely to Kapitsa. Regarding Beriia's desire to destroy him—it is possible. They were terribly incompatible people.

[Question] There is a story that Beriia expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that Kurchatov was hiding geneticists "under his wing." Supposedly, Igor Vasilyevich responded: "It is clearer to me who is needed for the work. If it is clearer to you, then make the bomb yourself."

[Answer] No, that did not happen (something similar happened with me, but in a different connection; I will tell you later). But there were quite a few among the physicists who were seriously concerned about the situation with genetics. I would name at least three: Igor Yevgenyevich Tamm, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, and I. What were our reasons? First of all, we believed that it was simply unwise to press science.

In addition, we also had a practical interest in genetics. We were building reactors, plants for refining radioactive material, and mines for mining ore. And we expected recommendation for radiation protection from the geneticists. We set up our own radiobiological department. It was headed by Viktor Yulianovich Gavrilov, an experienced specialist on atomic weapons. Working in the department were both young people and prominent scientists—R. Khesin, F. Shapiro and others. They all were irreconcilable enemies of Lysenko.

We also did not conceal our attitude towards him. Nevertheless, we tried to make it so our radiobiological department did not get involved in direct battles with Lysenko because they could simply break up the department. Then we would have been without their hands and minds in a matter extremely important for us.

[Question] Still, was not Kurchatov reproached for the fact that you were giving shelter to enemies of Lysenko under the wing of the Uranium Project?

[Answer] More than that. They tried to shut down the most modern directions in physics as well. Here they were searching for some false science. The attacks began back before the war.

At one of the prewar meetings in Leningrad, atomic physics was violently attacked, and from disgusting positions. I remember Mitkevich's address. He was a good power engineer, by the way. And how did he fit into this matter? Totally incomprehensible! Then Ya.I. Frenkel said: "You have the same senseless way of posing the question as the argument about what color is a meridian—red or green." To which Mitkevich replied: "My meridian is red, I do not know what color yours is. Maybe it is green."

Soon after the war, in 1946 it seems, they summoned me to the Party Central Committee and struck up a conversation about what is quantum theory, the theory of relativity—all this nonsense. Some group, not very understandable to me, had been assembled. Two officials from the Moscow State University were trying particularly hard.

But I told them very simply: "The atomic bomb itself demonstrates such a transformation of substance and energy, which follows from these new theories and not from any other. Therefore, if you reject them, you must also reject the bomb. Go ahead. Reject quantum mechanics and make the bomb yourselves, as you like."

I returned. I told the story to Kurchatov. He burst out laughing and said: "Don't worry." Indeed, they did not bother us any more in this regard. But the story went around that the physicists had strayed away from their Lysenko atomic bomb.

Indeed, a Lysenko was not found among the physicists. More correctly, their Lysenkos did not have time to develop and gain strength. The situation was very dangerous. However, there turned out to be few people among the physicists who would build their careers on this. By the time the Uranium Project came around, Kurchatov already possessed an enormous amount of prestige and influence over the levers of power. But he was a perfectly decent person. The Lysenko clique in all variations disgusted him.

[Question] It is known what an emotional tragedy Hiroshima turned out to be for some of the physicists who made the American bomb. Is it possible that the same doubts disturbed our scientists?

[Answer] Not in the least. There were doubts, of course. We are all human! But still the American scientists and our scientists faced different moral problems. The result of their work was Hiroshima. Our bomb did not kill anyone, but prevented a large-scale atomic conflagration.

In essence, Churchill's speech at Fulton already was a call for nuclear war against us. Then a plan for such a war was developed and approved by the U.S. president. The date for an atomic attack on the USSR was set for 1957. It was planned to detonate a total of 333 atomic bombs on the territory of our country and destroy about 300 cities.

Scientists have always been in favor of international cooperation, for without it science reaches a deadlock. But one still must remember that 333 atomic bombs against the USSR in American strategic plans at that time was also a real fact which you cannot erase from history. The feeling of the threat was almost physical: All our country's borders were encircled by American military bases, about 100 of them, and every aircraft launched from them could carry an atomic bomb.

During those years, the American magazine LOOK wrote that isotope separation would take the Soviets about 20 years. But at that time, here where you are now located, we already had an experimental section of factory-made machinery which separated isotopes perfectly well. I.K. Kikoin was working on this. So they were sorely mistaken.

Domestic uranium was needed for plutonium. There was much uranium, much more than was mined in the individual antiquated prewar mines. And here the ideas of V.I. Vernadskiy on the role of radioactivity in the development of the planetary system, including the earth, and on geology of uranium were of great service to

the country. Vladimir Ivanovich himself and his pupils, academicians A.P. Vinogradov and V.G. Khlopin, director of the Radium Institute, were working on this aspect of the project. They brought out the first batches of our uranium ore on mules, right in sacks!

V.V. Goncharov, as I already said, was producing ultrapure graphite—and he had to produce it 1000 times purer than what we had at that time. We did not even have methods for measuring such purity. We also developed them. A.A. Bochvar, A.P. Vinogradov and V.G. Khlopin were producing metallic uranium from ore. And this technology also was perfected.

On 25 December 1946, the first Soviet atomic reactor "F-1" ("Physics-1") was started up. The fact that we had managed to do this showed that we would later master all technology. Soon a small amount of plutonium was produced—micrograms.

[Question] Kurchatov's brother started this?

[Answer] Yes, Boris. Strictly speaking, he did not begin but finished this. He separated it. Later he developed all the radiochemistry for this. When the "F-1" was being built, a large reactor was simultaneously being built in the Urals which could already produce plutonium for weapons. The industrial reactor was ready just after "F-1" had just began operation. Incidentally, they also began building a radiochemical enterprise, in which plutonium was to be separated from uranium irradiated in the reactor, long before plutonium itself was in our hands.

Igor Vasilyevich, naturally at an awful risk to himself, went so far as to build the largest plants without yet having the final technological solutions and products, at a time when a significant part of the experiments had to be done using micrograms, not even test tubes. Large special equipment which had never been used before was made for these micrograms. We did not have anything like it at all.

When the industrial reactor was built in the Urals, Kurchatov transferred me there. The director of the combine there was Ye.P. Slavskiy (he was also USSR deputy minister of nonferrous metallurgy). He was a totally unselfish person! The first amounts of the Ural plutonium went precisely for making the first atomic bomb. But only the materials which had to be used to make it were developed there. True, some of the parts for the first bomb were also made there. Later, the production facility was moved to a completely different place.

Well, we know the rest. On 29 August 1949, the first atomic explosion took place at a test range. The most fantastic time which American specialists had figured for it was beat by 5 years. In 1954, which the Americans wrote about as the year of the Soviet atomic bomb, we already had the world's first atomic power plant in operation.

**Georgian Historians Reevaluate 1921-1923  
'National-Deviationists' Question**  
*18300417 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian*  
26 Jun 88 pp 3-4

[Article by Georgiy Zhvaniya, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "In the Name of Truth; On the Question of the 'National-Deviationists.'" First three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] Recently the Institute of Party History of the Georgian CP Central Committee held a discussion on certain current questions in the activity of the Georgian Communist Party during the period of formation of the Transcaucasus Federation and of the USSR. The discussion was opened with an introductory address by the institute director, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor D. G. Sturua. Speeches were presented by Party History Sector Chief, Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor G. K. Zhvaniya and by a senior scientific associate at the institute, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor L. M. Toidze.

The discussion participants dealt in great detail with the question of how the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo and the Zakkraykom christened a number of the foremost Georgian party and state leaders as "national-deviationists." This fact had grave consequences. For several decades this heavy accusation hung over not only the former leadership of the Georgian CP Communist party at that time, but also the entire republic party organization.

Studies conducted in recent years have allowed us to take a new look at many aspects of this history. The article presented below tells about this.

About 67 years ago, i.e., in the first months of Soviet rule in Georgia, the term "national-deviationist" appeared in the party documents and on the pages of the press. This name was applied to the leading nucleus of the Georgian CP Central Committee at that time. It included the foremost leaders of the party and the Soviet state: B. Mdivani, F. Makharadze, S. Kavtaradze, K. Tsintsadze, M. Okudzhava, and many others.

How could it have happened that the people who together with the other revolutionaries of the Caucasus bore on their shoulders the main weight of the struggle first against czarism and the bourgeoisie, and then against Menshevik supremacy, the people who spared no effort in fighting for the consolidation of Soviet rule in Georgia and for the strengthening of friendship between the peoples of the Transcaucasus, suddenly became "national-deviationists?" What was the reason for such a sharp political appraisal, and what did they do to deserve such a strict sentence?

These questions arose repeatedly before Georgian historians, but they received no answer, since the official point of view prevailed, and it had sentenced the "national-deviationists" once and for all to the pillory.

In the unkind memory of Beriia's book, "On the Question of the History of Bolshevik Organizations in the Transcaucasus," it was stated that "national-deviationism represented aggressive chauvinism which reflected the great-power bourgeois nationalism of the Georgian Mensheviks and National-Democrats."

The "national-deviationists" were also characterized in the same vein in the short course entitled "History of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)," which stated that they were "real great-power chauvinists who waged a great-power policy in regard to the national minorities." They were accused of "speaking out against the strengthening of friendship of Transcaucasian peoples." The "national-deviationists" were characterized in the same expressions in the "Outlines of History of Communist Organizations of the Transcaucasus," published in 1971, in the "History of the CPSU" edited by B. Ponomarev, and in the "Outlines of History of the Georgian Communist Party." Such was the force of the dogmatism and political situation which reigned for a long time in our social science.

Today, when we are seriously concerned with restoring the real historical truth about our past, with eliminating the "gaps," distortions and intentional falsification of the facts, the time has come to get to the bottom of the state of affairs with the question of "national-deviationism."

The political accusation of "national-deviationism" emerged in the course of the conflict which arose between the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo and the Georgian CP Central Committee over the economic unification of the Transcaucasian republics.

Immediately after the victory of Soviet rule in the Transcaucasus, the task arose of unifying efforts and bringing about a close interaction between the republics of this area, as well as strengthening the bonds of friendship and fraternal cooperation between them.

We might add that the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo viewed the economic unification of the republics as a direct practical matter, subject to immediate implementation. The decision was made to unify the railroads and foreign trade organs, to establish a single monetary denomination, etc.

As for the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee, it did not object against the need for implementing economic unification and the other measures associated with it. However, it presented the proposal to implement these measures not by the directive order or

by methods of administrative pressure, but in a well thought-out manner, without unnecessary haste, and with the support of the party organizations and the broad mass of workers.

However, the Kavburo, ignoring the opinion of the Georgian CP Central Committee, continued the direction which it had begun without first conducting a thorough examination to see that the prerequisites necessary for economic unification of the Transcaucasian republics were present, without considering the opinions of the Central Committees of the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian Communist Parties, without any preliminary enlightenment work among the masses, and without involvement of the party organizations into this matter. It was therefore no accident that many of the measures which the Kavburo planned to implement were not realized. Specifically, the unified railway and Vneshtorg agencies which were created were left hanging in mid-air, the decision on transferring currency funds over to Vneshtorg remained unfulfilled, etc.

The Kavburo believed the main reason for lack of implementation of these measures was "the rather strong opposition on the part of certain comrades in Georgia and Azerbaijan." Therefore, the Kavburo immediately took decisive measures against the main "guilty parties," and especially against the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee. The Kavburo Plenum was held early in July of 1921. I. V. Stalin participated in it, representing the RCP(b) Central Committee. G. K. Ordzhonikidze presented a speech on the political situation in the Transcaucasian republics. The Plenum resolution accused the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee of "deviating in the direction of nationalism." This deviation was manifested in the resolution of the questions on the Venshtorg and on the territorial delineation of the republics, as well as on the elimination of tariffs and control points.

Thus, the term "national-deviationism" was put into circulation, and the groundwork was laid for the political persecution of the "dissenters," which for many of them later ended in physical reprisals.

In our opinion, the Kavburo leadership needed the accusation of "national-deviationism" in order to justify the errors which it had allowed during the struggle for economic unification of the Transcaucasian republics.

What were these errors, in our opinion? First of all, the Kavburo began to artificially force their measures without considering the degree of the workers' readiness for them. Voluntary participation was often replaced by forcefulness and directive measures. Sometimes the Kavburo presented such tasks whose fulfillment was doomed to failure. As a result, there were cases when the Kavburo itself rescinded its successfully adopted decisions.

The second reason which caused opposition on the part of the Georgian CP Central Committee was the fact that the Kavburo often blatantly ignored the opinion of the Georgian CP Central Committee and often rudely interfered in its affairs.

The third and even more important reason was the fact that certain Kavburo leaders definitely ignored important Leninist directives regarding the fact in the implementation of national policy "it is necessary to exercise particular care in regard to national sentiments," that "we must be very careful, patient, and conciliatory," that "between the nations there must be a bond which is based on full trust and recognition of fraternal unity."

These are the main reasons which doomed to failure many of the hastily made Kavburo decisions aimed at economic unification of the Transcaucasian republics. Ordzhonikidze himself did not deny this fact. "It is evident, of course, that we too were guilty," he said at the first Transcaucasus Congress of Communist Organizations.

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After it became clear that the economic unification of the Transcaucasian republics would not be achieved, the Kavburo rescinded its decision on this question. At its plenum, which was held on 2 November 1921, it adopted the resolution to create the Federation of Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia. The Plenum resolution stated: "Based on the fact that the isolated existence of the Transcaucasian republics would make them powerless in the face of the capitalist countries, that a close political and economic union will serve as a firm guarantee against any incursions on them by counterrevolutionary forces and will strengthen Soviet rule on the Near East border, and will also increase and strengthen the economic might of these republics and lay a firm foundation for fraternal solidarity of the working masses of the Transcaucasus, the Kavburo has resolved to create the Federation of Transcaucasian Republics, uniting the military, economic, financial and foreign policy, and creating a unified agency—the Union Soviet. The Federation, however, does not mean the elimination of the independence of the existing republics."

This Kavburo decision was made without preliminary coordination with the Georgian CP Central Committee and without any preliminary campaign.

On 8 November S. Ordzhonikidze sent the adopted resolution to the RCP(b) Central Committee.

The Kavburo resolution about the creation of the Transcaucasian Federation was reviewed at the meeting of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo on 17 November 1921. However, the need for federation of the republics of Transcaucasia was not justified convincingly enough. Therefore, the Politburo wrote in its decision: "Send the following telegram to the Kavburo: 'Inform us immediately what specifically you have resolved on the question of creating a Transcaucasian

federation, and what is the relationship of the Transcaucasian Federations Union Soviet with the RSFSR? The Central Committee will draw its conclusion upon receipt of these materials from you.”

The Kavburo also exhibited improper haste in that it resolved this question without coordination with the Central Committees of the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Georgian Communist Parties, and without prior discussion in the party organizations. It did not perform any work on explaining this little-understood question to the general masses. Therefore, it is no accident that there were serious differences between the Kavburo and the Georgian CP Central Committee on the question of creating a federation.

However, this did not mean that the Georgian people, the republic party organization and their management organ—the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee—were against friendship with the Azerbaijani, Armenian and any other Soviet people. On the contrary, they cooperated in every way possible with the expansion and intensification of fraternal friendship between the peoples of our great country.

The Kavburo membership at that time, as well as certain members of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo, intentionally distorted and aggravated in every way possible the position of the leading nucleus of the Georgian CP Central Committee, which did not coincide with the opinion of the Kavburo on the questions of the Transcaucasian Federation and on the methods of its creation. They accused the “national-deviationists” of supposedly speaking out against strengthening the friendship of the peoples of Transcaucasia, of acting like real great-power chauvinists in relation to the other nationalities in Georgia, and even demanding the deportation of all non-Georgians from Tbilisi. They affirmed that at the insistence of the national-deviationists, a law was issued according to which a Georgian woman who married a non-Georgian would lose her Georgian citizenship, etc., etc.

Unfortunately, this unbelievably false accusation, which was fabricated under conditions of sharp polemics back in 1921, is repeated even today in some works almost without any changes. Does this not confirm the conclusion made by the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee regarding the fact that the illumination of certain current problems in the historical-party literature “remains at the level of the 30’s-40’s?”

An analysis of the existing documents and archive materials gives us the full right to affirm without any exaggeration that almost all the accusations levelled against the so-called “national-deviationists” were principally untrue and artificially exaggerated.

Lenin believed the federation of the Transcaucasian republics to be in principle absolutely correct and unconditionally subject to implementation, but premature in

the sense of immediate practical realization, i.e., requiring a certain period of time for discussion, propaganda and explanation among the masses. Lenin demanded from the Central Committees of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan Communist Parties that they present the question of federation for broad discussion by the party, the workers and peasant masses, and that they energetically conduct propaganda in favor of the federation.

This is specifically what the Georgian CP Central Committee also demanded. This is why when Lenin’s project on the question of formation of a federation of Transcaucasian republics was adopted with some corrections at the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo meeting on 29 November, the Georgian CP Central Committee Presidium unanimously stated at its meeting: “To be considered as a steadfast principle.”

It is notable that at this meeting, 5 of the 8 members present were the so-called “national-deviationists”: B. Mdivani, S. Kavtaradze, M. Okudzhava, L. Dumbadze, and K. Tsintsadze.

The Georgian CP Central Committee continued to steadfastly fulfill the adopted decision regarding the Transcaucasus federation.

If we characterize on the whole the differences of opinion between the Kavburo and the Georgian CP Central Committee on the question of the Transcaucasus federation, we must stress that it never bore an ideological character, but rather dealt only with the forms and methods of implementation of these ideas. We believe it would be correct to say that this difference of opinion, most likely, was the fruit of the ambitions and stubbornness of both parties. Possibly, if the Kavburo, and then the Zakk-raykom, had shown more political flexibility in their interrelations with the republic CP Central Committees from the very beginning, and had not forced the issue, acting in the command-administrative methods characteristic for the period of the civil war, then this unhealthy phenomenon with its most undesirable consequences would probably not have found its realization.

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The second question around which disagreement arose between the RCP(b) Central Committee and the Zakk-raykom on one hand and the Georgian CP Central Committee on the other was the question of the principles of state unification of the Soviet republics. To determine the specific means of uniting the Soviet republics into a single state, a commission was created consisting of I. V. Stalin, V. V. Kuybyshev, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, A. F. Myasnikov, G. I. Petrovskiy, B. G. Mdivani, and others.

The commission approved the project prepared by Stalin which came to be called the "plan for autonomization." It provided for the state unification of the republics within the framework of the RSFSR on an autonomous basis.

Soon the project on "autonomization" was sent for discussion to the Central Committees of the union republic communist parties. The Georgian CP Central Committee Plenum, having discussed Stalin's theses on 15 September 1922, resolved that: "The unification in the form of autonomization of the independent republics as proposed on the basis of the theses of Comrade Stalin must be considered premature. We consider the unification of economic efforts and general policy to be necessary, but with retention of all the attributes of independence."

There were 31 votes cast in favor of the resolution of the Georgian CP Central Committee, and 7 in favor of the plan of autonomization. Specifically, these 7 votes were cast by Ordzhonikidze, Yenukidze, Gogoberidze, Kirov, Sokolnikov, Kakhiani, and Eliava, with Tskhakaya abstaining.

The next day, 16 September, the Zakkraykom adopted a decision in which it obligated the Georgian CP Central Committee not to inform the republic of the above-mentioned resolution, and moreover, to conduct work among the masses in the spirit of Stalin's plan. This meant that the Zakkraykom in fact annulled the decision of the Georgian CP Central Committee Plenum dated 15 September. This exacerbated the conflict situation and their mutual relations even more.

Soon some of the Zakkraykom leaders, defending the project of "autonomization," began accusing the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee of rejecting the friendship of the Georgian people with the Russian people and with Soviet Russia.

Moreover, aside from the Georgian party organization, the Belorussian party organization also spoke out against the project of "autonomization." The same tendency was observed also in the Ukraine, even though the Ukrainian CP Central Committee did not review this project.

Nevertheless, on 22-23 September the commission of the RCP(b) Central Committee Orgburo adopted the project of "autonomization," rejecting in a special point the resolution of the Georgian CP Central Committee, as well as the proposal by G. I. Petrovskiy to expand the discussion of the adopted decisions to the party gubkom buro.

On 25 September, all the materials of the commission meeting, as well as the resolutions of the Georgian, Azerbaijan, and Armenian CP Central Committees, were sent to Lenin in Gorky. At the same time, without awaiting instructions from Lenin and without reviewing

this question in the Politburo, the RCP(b) Central Committee secretariat sent copies of the resolution to all members and candidate members of the RCP(b) Central Committee.

What was Lenin's attitude toward the project of "autonomization?" V. I. Lenin and the party rejected this project.

Here is the first of many documents by V. I. Lenin on this question: On 26 September Vladimir Ilyich submitted a written report to the members of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo stating that he had talked with Stalin regarding the resolution compiled by the commission about the entry of independent republics into the RSFSR (referring to the project of "autonomization"—G. Zh.). Lenin also reported the following to the Politburo members: "Tomorrow I will see Mdivani (a Georgian communist suspected of 'independence')." Putting the word "independence" in quotation marks was no accident. The fact was that Lenin did not consider the stand taken by officials of the Georgian CP Central Committee against "autonomization" to be an effort to isolate Georgia from Soviet Russia or from other peoples.

Furthermore, in touching upon the question of creation of the USSR as the "arch-important question," Lenin wrote: "Stalin has a slight tendency to be hasty... It is important that we not give food to the 'independents,' that we not destroy their independence, and that we create... a federation of republics with equal rights."

By the words "not destroy their independence," V. I. Lenin referred to the outline of the resolution "On the Interrelations of the RSFSR with the Independent Republics," which in fact excluded the independent existence of republics. It is specifically for this reason that the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee spoke out against "autonomization." This was one of the reasons why they were dubbed "national-deviationists."

The aforementioned letter by Lenin contained a number of significant remarks and proposals for the project of "autonomization." V. I. Lenin in fact presented a principally different project for unifying the Soviet republics. "This is my preliminary project. I will augment and change in on the basis of conversations with Mdivani and other comrades." These were the final words of the letter to the Politburo members.

And, in reality, the next day, 27 September, Lenin met with B. Mdivani, and on 29 September—with M. Okudzhava, L. Dumbadze and K. Tsintsadze. In both cases the main topic of their conversation was the question of unification of the Soviet republics.

After the conversation with Mdivani and other members of the Georgian CP Central Committee, V. I. Lenin felt it necessary to introduce new additions into the project

for unification of the Soviet republics, which was to be discussed on 6 October at the RCP(b) Central Committee Plenum. However, since V. I. Lenin could not be present at the Plenum due to his state of health, he wrote a note to L. B. Kamenev. This note was short, consisting of only 9 lines. However, it presented a major, principally important question, which retains its leading significance even to the present day.

The first paragraph of Lenin's note is as follows: "A struggle not for life, but for death has been announced to Great Russian chauvinism. As soon as they rid themselves of this bad tooth, we will eat it with the healthy teeth."

These lines, we believe, contain nothing quizzical. As we know, V. I. Lenin struggled without any compromise against great-power chauvinism, as well as local nationalism. And the decisive comment on this matter on the day of the Plenum meeting was no accident. In the project of "autonomization" Lenin saw the phenomenon of a recurrence of great-power chauvinism.

Even more important is the second and last paragraph of Lenin's note, in which he most decisively poses the question of including the following directive into the outline of the resolution on formation of the USSR: "We must **absolutely** insist that the **chairmanship** of the union TsIK be held in order of rotation by a Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc. **Absolutely!**"

These lines give a clear understanding of the importance which V. I. Lenin ascribed to the guarantees of ensuring equal rights and independence of the Soviet republics.

The RCP(b) Central Committee Plenum approved Lenin's idea of the creation of the USSR. Even Budu Mdivani, who had been named as the leader of the so-called "national-deviationism" voted for Lenin's project at the Plenum without any constraint.

Thus, Lenin's principle struggle against the "plan of autonomization" performed an historic deed. This is why we say that Lenin is the soul of creation of the USSR.

On the third day after the Plenum, 8 October, B. Mdivani sent a letter to S. Kavtaradze in Tbilisi, in which he wrote: "At first (without Lenin), we were attacked mercilessly and scoffed. Then, after Lenin intervened, after our meeting with him and detailed information, the matter turned in the direction of communist reason... A voluntary union was adopted on the question of interrelations, based on the principles of equal rights. As a result, the stifling atmosphere against us has cleared. On the contrary, at the Central Committee Plenum it was the great-power supporters who were subjected to attack—that is what Bukharin, Zinovyev, Kamenev, and others said. The project, of course, belongs to Lenin, but it is introduced in the name of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and others, who immediately changed the front. The

debates showed that a certain portion of the Central Committee directly rejects the existence of the national question and is wholly infected with the great-power tendencies. However, this portion has received such a rebuff that it will not soon again have the courage to come out of the hole which Lenin chased it into (we find out about his sentiments from his letter, which was read aloud at the end of the meeting, after the resolution of the question). See that you don't lose the letter. I was barely able to talk Kamenev out of it... Yes, the atmosphere has cleared a bit, but it may thicken again at any time..."

That is what happened in the future.

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Through the formation of the USSR the party took a serious forward step in developing the theory and practical application of its national policy.

The genial project of Lenin, ratified by the RCP(b) Central Committee Plenum, was unanimously approved by the Georgian CP Central Committee and adopted "as a steadfast guideline." At the same time, the question of giving Georgia the opportunity of direct entry into the USSR on par with the Ukraine and Belorussia was presented. We believe this position of the Georgian CP Central Committee has nothing which contradicts the principles of the party's national policy. Under conditions where new and more well developed forms of mutual relations of the Soviet republics have found their real personification, the existence of the Transcaucasus federation was not really necessary, particularly since this additional barrier limited to a certain degree the rights of the Transcaucasian republics as compared with the Ukraine and Belorussia.

Nevertheless, on 17 October the RCP(b) Central Committee Plenum rejected the decision of the Georgian CP Central Committee on the direct entry of Georgia into the USSR, and once again stressed the need for its entering the union through the Transcaucasus federation. A series of statements which were inadmissible in tone followed from S. Ordzhonikidze in opposition to the Georgian CP Central Committee and the old workers. He often permitted cursing addressed at individual leaders, and threatened them with repressions. He called the chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars, i.e., the first Soviet government of the republic, S. Kavtaradze, a "good-for-nothing chairman," L. Dumbadze—"a fool and provocateur," and Budu Mdivani—"a speculator and dukhan keeper." Ordzhonikidze turned to ChK Chairman K. Okudzhava with the threats: "I will arrest you," "I will execute you."

Georgian CP Central Committee Secretary M. Orakhelashvili, at one of the official meetings called the Georgian party organizations "an organization of riff-raff."



At the meeting of the Zakkraykom plenum on 20 October 1922, Ordzhonikidze officially announced that "the top level of the party is chauvinist and represents a decay which should be removed."

B. Lominadze, who later became the Georgian CP Central Committee secretary, also did not spare any colors in discrediting the management of the Georgian CP Central Committee. He called them "national-communists who have switched over to the side of the Mensheviks, objectively defending the position of the petty bourgeoisie."

The words in quotation marks are presented from the materials of the RCP(b) Central Committee commission.

As a result of all this, the relations between the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee and the Zakkraykom became even more tense. On 20 October the management of the Georgian CP Central Committee sent a telegram to V. I. Lenin, in which they told of the persecution to which they were subjected by the Zakkraykom, and especially by Ordzhonikidze.

"The hopeless position which has been created here, in Georgia," they said, "forces us to disturb you. We ask that you convey the following to comrade Lenin. We are convinced that his and your absolute decision will put an end to that anarchy and ruin which is today taking on a catastrophic character. There is no limit to Ordzhonikidze's tyranny. Extensive meetings have begun in the union republic on the question of the RCP(b) Central Committee resolution. On 19 October a meeting of comrade officials was held, convened by the Tbilisi committee bureau. At this meeting, the Georgian CP Central Committee greeted the resolution of the RCP(b) Central Committee, and expressed the desire to petition the RCP(b) Central Committee to review the point regarding the entry of the Transcaucasus federation into the Union in the sense of expanding the Directive on the Ukraine and Belorussia to Georgia and Azerbaijan due to peculiar political conditions. This evoked the most inadmissible statements by Ordzhonikidze against the Georgian CP Central Committee and the old workers, with the use of foul street language and threats of merciless repressions. "Today, on 20 October, the Zakkraykom headed by Ordzhonikidze, has already embarked upon wreaking havoc, starting with the Georgian CP Central Committee. The authoritative Comrade Okudzhava has been removed from the post of Central Committee secretary and expelled from the Presidium. Everyone else is threatened with the same fate, according to the public announcement of Ordzhonikidze."

"We have been placed in a position," states the letter, "when we are no longer able to bear the responsibility. Therefore, finding no other way out, we have decided to announce this tomorrow, the 21st, at the Georgian CP Central Committee Plenum."

And in reality, on 21 October the Plenum of the Georgian CP Central Committee was held. The members of the Zakkraykom and a representative from the RCP(b) Central Committee—Rykov—participated in its work. The Plenum accepted the Presidium proposal regarding the composition of powers due to divergence of its line with the line of the Zakkraykom.

Thus, the main nucleus of leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee was forced to retire on 22 October 1922. This, of course, was an extreme step. However, the Zakkraykom, not even trying to regulate the conflict, immediately, the very same day, made the decision to accept the resignations, and on 26 October the RCP(b) Central Committee Orgburo approved the resignations and the new make-up of the Georgian CP Central Committee.

On the day of their resignation, 22 October, the Georgian CP Central Committee received a telegram from Lenin in response to the note wired to him on 20 October. It stated: "I am surprised by the inappropriate tone of the note sent by direct wire, signed by Tsintsadze and others and forwarded to me for some reason by Bukharin, and not by one of the Central Committee secretaries. I was convinced that all the differences of opinion had been exhausted by the Central Committee Plenum resolutions with my indirect participation and with the direct participation of Mdivani. Therefore, I decisively condemn the abusive language against Ordzhonikidze and insist that your conflict be submitted in an orderly and loyal tone for resolution by the RCP(b) Central Committee Secretariat, to whom I am forwarding your report by telegram."

Unfortunately, from the text of Lenin's telegram some historians conclude that Lenin was condemning the principally incorrect position held by Budu Mdivani and his proponents on the national question. This absolutely does not correspond to reality. Lenin voiced a protest only in regard to the fact that the wired note had contained "abusive language against Ordzhonikidze."

At the same time, it is evident from Lenin's telegram that he was not fully informed about the tense relations between the Zakkraykom and the Georgian CP Central Committee. This is clearly indicated by the concerned attention which Lenin exhibited in the following months toward the so-called "national-deviationists."

In connection with Lenin's telegram, on 25 October the Georgian CP Central Committee leadership which had submitted its resignations sent a letter to Stalin to be forwarded to Vladimir Ilyich. The letter expressed sincere regret at the grief imposed on Lenin by the sharp tone of the telegram, and explained that the situation which had become too intense had driven them to this. The letter stressed that the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee agrees "fully" with the 6 October resolution of the RCP(b) Central Committee, which is reflected in the "unanimous adoption of the 21 October

resolution of the Georgian CP Central Committee Plenum." Furthermore, the letter states: "We have introduced an insignificant correction—to ask the RCP(b) Central Committee to review the question of the republic's entry into the Union not through the Transcaucasus federation, which still does not have its own Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom, but separately... The Zakkraykom has discerned a disruption of party discipline in this petition, and has issued a reprimand."

Further, the letter speaks of the reasons which caused conflict between the Zakkraykom and the Georgian CP Central Committee. "Undoubtedly, the interactions between the Zakkraykom and the Georgian CP Central Committee," the letter states, "have become 'extremely' exacerbated on the basis of total distrust on the part of the Zakkraykom and discreditation of the authority and the intolerably insulting attitude toward almost the entire membership of the Georgian CP Central Committee, which in all its activity has tried to maintain in the local complex situation the line indicated by the RCP Central Committee and by you. This was interpreted by the Zakkraykom as a clear deviation away from communism toward chauvenism and even Menshevism."

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After the resignation of the Georgian CP Central Committee, the struggle against its former members took on an even more acute and coarse character.

The Zakkraykom, and Ordzhonikidze and Orakhelashvili personally, sent many accusatory letters to Lenin at the RCP(b) Central Committee. Particularly characteristic in this regard was the letter by Ordzhonikidze addressed to Lenin and mailed on 27 October. Ordzhonikidze's letter states that, according to his "deep conviction, this group of comrades (referring to the membership of the Georgian CP Central Committee members who had resigned—G. Zh.) has most definitely fallen under the influence of the Georgian nationalist intelligentsia," that "their departure will only enliven the party and help to establish true good neighborly relations with the Armenians and Azerbaijanis." In the opinion of Ordzhonikidze, "their policy, had it triumphed, would have led to total bankruptcy of Soviet rule in the Transcaucasus. Without a national peace it is impossible to take even a single step forward. The policy of Mdivani-Makharadze, however, is the policy of militant Georgian nationalism."

Further, Ordzhonikidze writes that "their retirement is not bad. It is a tempest in a teapot. Don't worry. There will not be any uprisings on this account. There will be a little fuss in the party, but it will not be bad. They will make some noise, shout a while, and then quiet down. They are beaten in Tbilisi. The comrades have been sent off to the province. We will do everything." At the end of the letter, Ordzhonikidze proposes: "We will have to remove Makharadze, Kavtaradze, and Mdivani from here. They are good for nothing."

This letter clearly reflects the subjectivist character of the Zakkaykom's struggle against the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee, which it terms "national-deviationist." On 9 November Ordzhonikidze reported to the RCP Central Committee on the need for recalling Makharadze, Tsintsadze and Kavtaradze, since they were engaged in the organization of their own faction.

Soon the new membership of the Georgian CP Central Committee, created after the resignation of the old membership, joined in the struggle against the so-called "national-deviationists." The new Georgian CP Central Committee members and the Zakkraykom prohibited any discussion of questions of the latter events, but themselves began furious agitation against the proponents of the old Central Committee, accompanied by threats and repressions. An intolerable situation was created in the Georgian party organizations, which threatened disintegration and disorganization.

On 14 November 1922 the Georgian CP Central Committee Plenum held a special discussion of the question of the officials who had resigned. The resolution stated: "The Central Committee concludes that most of those who have resigned, having left official work, embarked upon the path of irreconcilable contradiction to the work of the new Central Committee membership, which is aimed at implementing the directives of the RCP(b) Central Committee."

The resolution noted: "The Zakkraykom is asked to exile all the leaders of this anti-party work, which are disintegrating the local party organizations. The Plenum resolution dated 18 November was sent to the RCP(b) Central Committee.

According to Stalin's directive, this document was sent to all members of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo and Orgburo.

In response to the decision of the Georgian CP Central Committee Plenum of 14 November, Makharadze Mdivani and others sent a letter to the RCP Central Committee, which stated: "The new Georgian Central Committee and the Zakkraykom, under the flag of party discipline and in the name of the RCP Central Committee, is conducting merciless reprisals and merciless suppression of entire organizations as well as individual party members. By threat of exile and even exclusion from the party, they terrorized all organizations so that at the Congress those persons would be promoted who would raise their hands for them." They asked the RCP(b) Central Committee to appoint a commission to investigate the matter.

On 25 November 1922 the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo appointed a commission to urgently review the statement submitted by the old membership of the Georgian CP Central Committee who had resigned, and to work out measures for normalizing relations within

the Georgian Communist Party. The commission included F. Dzerzhinskiy, L. Sosnovskiy and D. Manu-  
lskiy, who came to Tbilisi at the end of November.

V. I. Lenin was extremely interested in the results of work of the RCP(b) Central Committee commission. On the day the commission members returned to Moscow, 12 December, he had a long talk with its chairman, Dzerzhinskiy. From this conversation, Lenin concluded that the commission was unable to handle the assigned task. Here is what he wrote about this meeting at the end of December in his letter "On the question of the nationalities or on 'autonomization.'" "I only had time to speak with Comrade Dzerzhinskiy, who had come from the Caucasus and told me about the status of this question in Georgia. From what Comrade Dzerzhinskiy, who headed the commission sent by the Central Committee to 'investigate' the Georgian incident, had said, I could draw only the greatest apprehension. If the matter has come down to Ordzhonikidze's resorting to the use of physical force, which Comrade Dzerzhinskiy told me about, one can imagine the quagmire which we find ourselves in. Evidently, this entire notion of 'autonomization' was basically incorrect and untimely."

Furthermore, Lenin wrote: "I am also afraid that Comrade Dzerzhinskiy, who went to the Caucasus to investigate the matter of the 'crimes' of these 'social-nationalists,' also distinguished himself there only by his truly Russian sentiment... and that the impartiality of his entire commission is characterized quite heavily by the 'hand' of Ordzhonikidze. I believe that no provocation, and not even any insult, can justify this Russian intervention, and that Comrade Dzerzhinskiy is irrevocably guilty of taking this intervention too lightly."

And furthermore. "We must punish Comrade Ordzhonikidze in an exemplary manner..., as well as uncover and re-investigate all the materials of Dzerzhinskiy's commission on the subject of correcting the huge number of inaccuracies and prejudicial judgments which are undoubtedly present there. Of course, Stalin and Dzerzhinskiy should be held politically responsible for this entire truly Great Russian-nationalistic campaign.

And here is one more important excerpt from Lenin's letter. "I believe," wrote Lenin, "that in this case, in relation to the Georgian nation we have a typical example case where strict caution, preventive measures, and stability are required on our part for a truly proletarian attitude toward the matter. The Georgian who has a careless attitude toward this aspect of the matter, who carelessly throws about accusations of 'social-nationalism' (while he himself is not only the real and true 'social-nationalist,' but also a crude Great Russian snob), that Georgian, in essence, undermines the interests of proletarian class solidarity, because nothing hinders the development and unity of proletarian class solidarity as much as national injustice. The 'offended' nationals are not sensitive to anything more than they are to the sense

of equality, to the disruption of this equality, even though it be through carelessness, even though as a joke, to the disruption of this unity by their comrade proletarians."

V. I. Lenin later systematically demanded information on the actions of the RCP(b) Politburo commission. It was specifically this information which led to the doubts he developed about the honesty of the commission. Therefore, at his initiative a special commission was created to study the "Georgian question." Its membership included N. P. Gorbunov, L. A. Fotiyeva, and M. I. Glyasser.

Already on 24 January 1923 V. I. Lenin called Soviet of People's Commissars Secretary L. A. Fotiyev, who was a member of this commission, and directed him to request from F. E. Dzerzhinskiy or I. V. Stalin the materials of the Central Committee Politburo commission investigating the conflict between the Zakkraykom and a group of Georgian CP(b) Central Committee members, to study them in detail together with M. I. Glyasser and N. P. Gorbunov, and to report their findings to him. Lenin told Fotiyeva that he needed these data to prepare for the 12th Party Congress.

The next day, 25 January, V. I. Lenin asked L. A. Fotiyeva if the materials of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo commission on the "Georgian question" had been received. Fotiyeva told Lenin that it was impossible to request them from Dzerzhinskiy as yet, since he would return from Tbilisi only on Saturday, 27 January.

At the direction of Lenin, on 27 January Fotiyeva asked Dzerzhinskiy about the materials of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo commission on the "Georgian question." She learned from Dzerzhinskiy that Stalin had all the materials.

That same day, at the direction of Lenin, N. P. Gorbunov, L. A. Fotiyeva and M. I. Glyasser turned to the RCP(b) Central Committee secretariat, to I. V. Stalin, with a written request to give the order to issue all the materials of the Central Committee Politburo commission on the "Georgian question" to them for a certain time so that they could conduct a detailed study.

On 29 January, Stalin phoned Fotiyeva to tell her that he could not give out the materials without Politburo approval. Stalin's response was relayed to Lenin the same day. In a conversation with Fotiyeva on this subject, he said that he would fight to see that the materials were given. On 30 January Lenin summoned Fotiyeva and again touched upon the "Georgian question," saying, as Fotiyeva wrote: "These, after all, are not newspapers. That means I can read them even now."

On 1 February the Politburo meeting of the RCP(b) Central Committee reviewed the "announcement" of L. A. Fotiyeva, M. I. Glyasser and N. P. Gorbunov with the request to issue the materials of the commission on the "Georgian question" to them for study, at the request of Lenin. The decision was made to "issue the materials," but the question of reporting the results of their study to Lenin was put off until Prof. O. Forster could draw a conclusion as to Vladimir Ilyich's state of health. That evening Fotiyeva reported to Lenin on the Politburo decision to hand over to the Soviet of People's Commissars secretariat the materials of the commission on the "Georgian question." Lenin instructed Fotiyeva on what to look for in reviewing these materials, what questions to seek out answers to in studying them, and how to use them in general.

Lenin was primarily interested in: "1) Why the old Georgian CP Central Committee was accused of deviationism. 2) What they were charged with as a violation of party discipline. 3) Why the Zakkraykom was accused of suppressing the Georgian CP Central Committee. 4) The physical methods of suppression ('Biomekhanika'). 5) The line of the Central Committee (referring to the RCP(b)—G. Zh.) in the absence of Vladimir Ilyich and under Vladimir Ilyich. 6) The attitude of the commission. Had it reviewed only the accusations against the Georgian CP Central Committee, or against the Zakkraykom as well? Did it review the case of biomechanics?"

Lenin told Fotiyeva: "If I had my freedom (at first he paused, and then again repeated, laughing: if he were free), then I would easily do all this myself."

Already on 3 February Lenin summoned Fotiyeva and asked her whether she had looked through the materials. Here is how Fotiyeva describes this meeting with Lenin: "I answered that I had only looked at them superficially, and that there turned out to be not as many as we had thought. He asked whether this question had been presented at the Politburo. I answered that I didn't have the right to speak about this. He asked: 'You are forbidden to speak specifically and especially about this?' No, in general I don't have the right to speak of current matters. 'That means this is a current matter?' I didn't understand that I had made a misstep. I repeated that I didn't have the right to speak. He said: 'I know of this matter from Dzerzhinskiy, prior to my illness. Has the commission given a report to the Politburo?' Yes, it has. The Politburo in general confirmed its decision, as I recall. He said: 'Well, I think that you will make your decision in about 3 weeks, and then I will address a letter to you.'"

In 2 days, on 5 February, Lenin asked Glyasser whether they had begun examining the materials of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo commission on the "Georgian question," and when they planned to finish this work. On 7 February Lenin again asked Fotiyeva

what the state of affairs was on studying the materials of the Politburo commission on the "Georgian question," and when this work would be completed.

On 14 February Lenin spoke with Fotiyeva and asked her, as evidenced by her diary entry, to hurry with the fulfillment of all his assignments, and "in greatest detail on the question which worries him the most of all, i.e., the 'Georgian question.'" He gave certain instructions. Fotiyeva recorded the following: "Instructions of Vladimir Ilyich: hint to Solts (A. A. Solts—member of the RCP(b) Central Control Commission Presidium—G. Zh.) that he (V. I. Lenin—G. Zh.) is siding with the injured party. Let one of the injured party know that he is on their side."

Three moments: 1. They cannot fight. 2. They have to make concessions. 3. They cannot compare a large state with a small one.

Did Stalin know? Why did he not react?

The name "deviationists" given for a tendency toward chauvinism and Menshevism proves this same tendency in great-power proponents.

On 16 February, at Lenin's instruction, commission members Gorbunov, Fotiyeva and Glyasser asked in a letter addressed to RCP(b) Central Control Commission member A. A. Solts that he hand over to them all materials concerning the Georgian conflict, those obtained from the Georgian Control Commission as well as others being held at the Central Control Commission.

On 22 February, again at Lenin's instruction, Gorbunov, Fotiyeva and Glyasser sent a letter addressed to the Zakkraykom first secretary with a request to prepare a written explanation of the "Georgian question" for Lenin.

Already on 3 March Lenin received the reporting memorandum and conclusion of Fotiyeva, Glyasser and Gorbunov on the materials of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo commission on the "Georgian question."

Based on comprehensive analysis, the commission concluded in its report that almost all the accusations levelled by the RCP(b) Central Committee Kavburo, and later by the Zakkraykom and the RCP(b) Central Committee commission against the Georgian CP Central Committee were unsubstantiated. In the conclusion of the Sovnarkom commission, calling the leadership of the Georgian CP Central Committee national-deviationists, "was... tendentious." The commission report presents the question: "Isn't it great power deviationism that the line conducted by the old membership of the Georgian Central Committee was pronounced as a nationalistic deviation in the Georgian party, and isn't the very slogan 'deviationists' and its emergence tendentious?"

The commission materials give a positive and at the same time well reasoned answer to this question.

Thus, Lenin's supposition about the need to "inquire further or re-investigate all the materials of Dzerzhinskiy's commission" was justified.

On 5 March Lenin summoned Volodicheva and dictated to her a letter to Trotsky regarding the forthcoming discussion of the "Georgian question" at the RCP(b) Central Committee Plenum, asking that she relay the letter by telephone and report the answer back to him as soon as possible.

The letter stated: "I would ask to take up the defense of the Georgian matter at the party Central Committee. The matter is currently 'under investigation' by Stalin and Dzerzhinskiy, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Quite the contrary. If you would agree to take up its defense, then I could rest easy. If for some reason you do not agree, then return the entire matter to me. I will consider it an indication of your disagreement."

This letter from Lenin was read over the phone to Trotsky that same day. Trotsky, referring to his illness, responded that he could not take on such a responsibility.

Having received a negative response from Trotsky, V. I. Lenin dictated a letter on 6 March to comrades P. G. Mdivani, F. Ye. Makharadze and others. Copies were sent to Trotsky and Kamenev.

The letter stated: "Dear Comrades. I am following your case with all my soul. I am indignant at Ordzhonikidze's rudeness and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinskiy. I am preparing notes and a speech for you. Respectfully, Lenin."

Unfortunately, this was the last document, the last words of the great leader. He was unable to prepare a letter and a speech on the "Georgian question."

However, these last two letters of V. I. Lenin, and his extreme interest in the materials of the RCP(b) Central Committee Politburo commission on the "Georgian question," as well as his untiring attention and concern for the "suspect" Georgian communists, is a clear example of that specific attention which V. I. Lenin gave to the proper implementation of party national policy and to the protection of the rights of the national republics.

On 7 March 1923, having learned of Lenin's letter of 6 March marked "top secret," Stalin sent a letter to Ordzhonikidze, in which he said: "Dear Sergo! I have learned from comrade Kamenev that Ilyich is sending comrades Makharadze and others a letter in which he expresses his solidarity (boldface ours—G. Zh.) with the deviationists and condemns you, comrade Dzerzhinskiy, and me. Evidently, the goal is to influence the will of the Georgian Communist Party Congress in favor of the

deviationists. I need hardly mention the fact that the deviationists, receiving this letter, will use it in full measure against the Zakkraykom, and especially against you and comrade Myasnikov. Here is my advice: 1. Put no pressure on the Zakkraykom regarding the will of the majority of the Georgian Communist Party; let this will, finally, manifest itself fully, regardless of what it may be; 2. Achieve a compromise, but such a compromise which may be implemented without a harsh effect on most of the Georgian official workers, i.e., a natural, voluntary compromise."

The concerned attitude of V. I. Lenin toward the group called the national-deviationists undoubtedly determined the shift toward a better attitude toward them by the RCP(b) Central Committee.

This is clearly indicated by the resolution of the RCP(b) Central Committee on the make-up of the Georgian CP Central Committee and the Zakkraykom. The resolution pointed out that the RCP Central Committee proceeds from the fact that the Georgian Central Committee cannot be viable without the inclusion of the old Georgian practical Marxists who managed such foreign affairs as military-naval, economic, and the Georgian Central Committee. Moreover, the RCP Central Committee believes that the old practical Marxist Kavtaradze would be more useful in the Georgian Central Committee than certain young communists. Based on this, the RCP Central Committee resolves: ...to introduce Eliav, Toroshelidze, Tsintsadze, Konstantin, and Kavtaradze as members of the Georgian Central Committee, obliging the Kavburo to transfer an appropriate number of young party members from the status of Georgian Central Committee members to Central Committee candidate members; to structure the Presidium of the Georgian Central Committee Secretariat in such a way that most of the memberships would be held by the old party Bolsheviks, and that a 5-year term would be maintained; ...to leave the question of the Georgian Sovnarkom chairman in its present state until the return of Mdivani from Geneva.

Furthermore, this resolution indicated: "The kray committee must be staffed based on the pre-February tenure of the candidates. Narimanov, Kirov, Krylov, Mdivani, Orakhelashvili, Myasnikov, Lukashin, Kadyrli or some other Muslim with tenure, and Ordzhonikidze should be appointed, making 9 in all."

However, the struggle against them soon again exceeded all boundaries at the 12th Party Congress. At several of the Congress meetings the unequal battle continued between Ordzhonikidze, Yenukidze, Orakhelashvili, and Eliava on one hand, and Makharadze, Mdivani and Kavtaradze on the other. Moreover, Ordzhonikidze included all the Transcaucasian delegates to the Congress—23 people—in the battle against Mdivani, Makharadze and Kavtaradze. "They returned lifeless from the Congress." That is how S. Ordzhonikidze characterized the condition of the so-called "national-deviationists."

The fate of those who had been marked with the ominous brand of "national-deviationist" took a tragic turn. They were subjected to repressions for a number of years. Thus, already in 1927 B. Mdivani and S. Kavtaradze were arrested and exiled first to Chelyabinsk, and then to Vyatka. They were freed in the early 30's, only to be arrested again in 1936-1937. By this time the "national-deviationists" were again accused of more serious crimes. In the same book, Beria wrote: "In the period of 1927-1935, national-deviationism... grew into the mercenary secret service of fascism. It turned into an unprincipled and immoral band of spies, saboteurs, diversionists, intelligence agents and murderers, into a brazen band of sworn enemies of the working class." Just think, dear reader, what a set of bizarre labels this is. Yet in

those times they sounded quite ordinary. In 1937 B. Mdivani, M. Okudzhava, M. Toroshelidze and certain others were executed. Still earlier, in 1930, K. Tsintsadze died in a camp.

One of the primary reasons why the matter of the "national-deviationists" arose, we believe, is that Lenin, unfortunately, was unable to participate in the work of the 12th RCP(b) Congress. Possibly then many of the contradictions would have been resolved, and the necessary solutions to the emerging problems would have been found.

12322

**Bssr Education Official on Belorussian Language Instruction**

18000098 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian  
No 39, 24-30 Sep 88 p 7

["BSSR Education Official on Belorussian Language Instruction"; under the rubric: "Press-Panorama"]

[Text] The BSSR first deputy minister of national education wrote in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA BELO-RUSSIA that practically all the schools that teach Belorussian are found in rural areas; these schools have decreased in number by 2.5 times from 1953 to 1988. Consequently, the BSSR Ministry of Education issued a

special order which set down measures to be taken to improve teaching of the Belorussian language.

In 1987 an additional 8 schools were opened which offer intensive courses of instruction in the Belorussian language and literature. This year there will be a total of 37 such schools in the republic. From 1989 on the study of Belorussian will become mandatory, starting with the second grade, in all schools using the Russian language (presently Belorussian is being taught as a subject starting with the third grade).

From 1985 to 1987 alone, 22 instructional and methodological textbooks on the Belorussian language and literature were prepared and published.



**Procuracy Officials Review Observance of Law on State Borders**

18000014 Moscow *SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST* in Russian No 7, Jul 88 (signed to press 4 Jul 88) pp 11-13

[Article by L. Konovalov and G. Vazhenin: "Observing the Law on State Borders of the USSR"]

[Text] More than five years have passed since the Law on State Borders of the USSR came into effect. The USSR Procuracy has made a check of compliance with the law in the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian republics, in the Karelian ASSR, and in Amur Oblast. Compliance was checked in the first place with respect to administrative detention of citizens by border troops, decisions to institute criminal proceedings for illegal transit of USSR borders, and fulfillment of the requirements of articles 38 and 39 of the Law on State Borders of the USSR. The check indicated that adequate measures for the strict and unvarying observance of the requirements of the Law have not been carried out in all localities, and not only by the border troops but by other concerned institutions, organizations, and departments. In particular, the internal affairs organs and transport organizations have been allowing improper drawing-up of documents for permission to enter and reside in the border zone.

In accordance with Article 39 of the Law, the rules of law for complying with state border security regulations, border procedures, and admission at state border transit points are obligatory for all state agencies, public organizations, officials, and private citizens. The article clearly states the requirements for complying with established procedures together with requirements for carrying out explanatory legal, ideological, and political work to educate citizens in a spirit of heightened political vigilance, support for organization and order in the border zone (belt), as well as in places where the border guards are conducting operations in defense of the USSR frontier. These measures, however, have not been fully carried out.

Explanatory work by state agencies and the political departments of the border troops among the local populace is frequently carried out on an irregular basis, and as a result a large number of violations of border regulations by local inhabitants in populated areas near the borders are permitted. The procurators of the republics, krais, and oblasts have paid less attention to this important area of activity, conducting checks unsystematically and only with reference to a limited number of questions, concerned with the legality of taking into custody those who cross the border illegally and border rules of procedure, whereas the area of supervision by the procurator's office has significantly broadened.

Let us take, for example, the practice of administrative detention. The opinion has been formed that it is used only with reference to physical persons, whereas Article

28 of the Law specifies 11 basic duties of the border troops, six of which may be carried out with the use of administrative detention, and not only as applied to physical persons, but to Soviet and foreign non-military vessels, and to articles and materials.

In the judicial literature itself, as well as in departmental regulations, administrative detention is looked upon as applying to physical persons exclusively. In the political and legal commentaries to the Law on State Borders of the USSR, procedural matters pertaining to personal custody are not fully disclosed and the detention of Soviet and foreign vessels and of articles and materials is in general not dealt with at all.

This lack of analysis of administrative detention in the professional literature, and particularly the absence of clear normative definitions, has not only had a negative influence on the activities of the border troops, but it has precluded supervision by the procurator's office of procedures for the administrative detention of articles and materials at frontier transit points.

**Administrative detention of physical persons**, in the system of interdiction employed by the border troops, occupies a prominent position inasmuch as it reflects one of the basic designated activities of the border troops—not to allow illegal crossings of the USSR frontier. Moreover, the term administrative detention of physical persons refers to administrative and procedural measures for the use of constraint by the state to prevent violations of the border, of border regulations or entry procedures at state frontier transit points, consisting of temporary deprivation of the freedom of the violators.

**Administrative detention of Soviet and foreign non-military ships**, like detention of physical persons, constitutes an administrative and procedural measure for state compulsion to prevent violations of state boundaries and pertinent regulations, regulations regarding the economic zones, and border procedural regulations, consisting of temporary deprivation of the freedom of the violators. The term violators refers to physical persons responsible for violations of established laws by a ship. Insofar as it may refer to the administrative detention of articles and materials in transit across a state boundary, it is not related to the detention of physical persons in whose possession or at whose instructions these materials (or articles) are found.

**Administrative detention of articles and materials** is used to interdict the import into the USSR or prevent the export from the USSR of audio-visual products as well as other articles and materials. It consists of the temporary limitation of rights of the property-owner with respect to the use or disposition of articles for the purpose of checking the presence or absence of information contained in them which could cause harm to the political and economic interests of the country, to state security,

public order, and the health and morality of the population. Although administrative detention of physical persons and of Soviet and foreign non-military ships is regulated under the Law, unfortunately, the detention of articles and materials is still not fully dealt with.

In accordance with Article 33 of Fundamental Legislation on Administrative Offenses, the period of administrative detention is counted from the moment of delivery of the violators for the purposes of record-keeping. In the Fundamental Legislation as in the Law on the State Borders of the USSR, delivery as a measure of administrative constraint is not provided for. In the RSFSR Code of Administrative Offenses, the status of delivery is assigned to an independent article which is not included in the chapter governing the practice of administrative detention. This article, however, does not specify delivery of violators of border regulations as an independent measure. Inasmuch as delivery as a means of administrative suppression of unlawful activities on the part of those who cross the border and violate border regulations are not subject to regulatory standards, border detachment headquarters do not always take the necessary measures to deliver violators without delay to border troop subunits. There are cases in the records of administrative detention when the detention period is counted not from the moment of delivery of the violator to the border outpost (commandant's office), but from the moment of delivery to the border detachment. This increases without justification the period of administrative detention.

Administrative detention—that is, as carried out in accordance with judicial procedure—is to be distinguished from physical detention, which expresses itself in the actual limitation of the freedom of violator of the frontier or of border regulations and the delivery of the person detained by a border detail or other persons to the border troop subunit. To avoid confusing these concepts it is therefore expedient to call such an action "delivery." By its nature delivery may constitute an administrative act or a social act, if, for example, it is carried out by the inhabitants of a border zone.

Detention as an administrative act of the judicial system, however, may be carried out only by specially authorized officials of the border troops.

The practice of detaining violators of border regulations shows that a significant number of offenders are not prosecuted; this is due to an absence of proper coordination between the actions of internal affairs organs and the border troops. A more innovative approach to this matter has been taken in border areas of the Far East. The procurator's offices in Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast, in joint cooperation with their respective internal affairs administrations, have prepared and put into practice a new kind of protocol, which makes it possible to combine in a single judicial document two different kinds of administrative constraints—interdiction and the imposition of penalties. In addition, a system of

coordination between the internal affairs organs and the border troops was set up, backed by the establishment of standard operating procedures, with respect to the use of administrative constraint in dealing with passport and border regulation violators. This made it possible to reduce the amount of judicial documentation by almost three times and insure the inevitability of punishment. The work done by the border troops, procurator's offices, and internal affairs organs in the Far East is undoubtedly worthy of commendation. In our view this experience should be extended to other regions of the country.

In accordance with existing legislation, administrative detention is applicable to persons who have committed administrative offenses. Such a statement, however, in our view, does not fully reveal the essence of administrative detention. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Fundamental Legislation, the term administrative offenses is to be used only with reference to actions for which administrative responsibility has been specified. Accordingly, the border troops, it would seem to us, do not have the right to resort to administrative detention for a breach of regulations, say, at border transit points, inasmuch as such an act as violation of border regulations (with the exception, of course, of violating importation laws or residence requirements in a border zone) does not constitute an administrative offense.

The contradiction here lies in the fact that, on the one hand, in Article 33 of the Fundamental Legislation, the legislation points to an essential connection between administrative detention and the commission of an administrative offense; whereas, on the other hand, in Article 241 of the RSFSR Code of Administrative Violations, the border troops are accorded the right to exercise administrative detention in dealing with violations of regulations at state border entry points or of border violations which, according to Article 7 of the Fundamental Legislation (Article 10 of the RSFSR Code), do not constitute administrative offenses.

In this connection it would be expedient to set limits on administratively punished offenses and those violations of the border regulations, for example, for which administrative responsibility is not provided for by legislation. In the latter case the objective of administrative detention is to rectify the offenses committed.

The type of purpose that administrative detention is designed for affects certain aspects of the grounds and procedures followed for its implementation. The grounds for detention of physical persons are illegal crossing of the state border, of border regulations, or of theregulations for border transit points. If detention is used in the case of Soviet or foreign non-military ships, such instances, as well as violations of state borders and border procedures, may constitute violations of state border regulations and thus violations of the rules of navigation and stopovers in economic zones. The

grounds for detaining ships in economic zones are violations of rules of the fishing industry, of scientific research, and the unlawful discharge of contaminating substances.

With respect to administrative detention of articles and materials, it should be noted that this problem has not been worked out theoretically. In practice this procedure is identified in every respect with seizure. The close connection between administrative detention and seizure is occasioned by the common grounds for administrative interdiction. This does not, however, rule out their differences.

In practice a critical need arises to classify the type of contents of articles and materials. Seizures may be made only after determining which materials may inflict damage to the interests of the state or, in other words, which materials are prohibited for import into the USSR or export from the USSR.

Especially critical is the question of establishing criteria for judging which materials are capable of doing harm to the state of morality. Results of studying this problem indicate the impossibility of establishing criteria for morality from an aesthetic interpretation of the term morality on the basis of which, in the process of administrative detention, it would be scientifically justified to establish those articles and materials that are not suitable

for import into the USSR or export from the USSR. The criteria for evaluating materials (films, photographs, and so on) can, in our view, be devised only in terms of aesthetic values—that is, on the basis of the kind of influence exerted, aesthetics, and moral values.

It is a known fact that if the material does not reveal features that are “ugly” in terms of artistic principles, then it cannot cause harm to morality. Accordingly, if in the course of administrative detention—for example, of audio-visual products—it is established that the materials exhibit negative traits, such as “ugly,” “base,” or “dreadful,” then it will become necessary to classify them among those which can to some degree do injury to morality and therefore are subject to seizure. From this it follows that persons who make such judgments (the border guards) should be in possession of at least a modicum of understanding with respect to matters of aesthetics.

In addition, it is expedient to stipulate in the departmental regulations for border troops the proper grounds, procedures, and periods for administrative detention of articles and materials and to establish a written protocol for the administrative detention of materials.

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12889

**Pamyat Organization Defended, Attacked by Readers**

18000668 *Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 28 Aug 88 p 3

[Article by Special Correspondent I. Siderov, under the "Reflections on Letters" rubric: "Where is Pamyat Trying to Take Us?"]

[Text] In this survey I would like to shatter a legend.

It lies in the few letters, extremely critical in tone if not worse, in defense of the "Russian National Patriotic Front, Pamyat," which have arrived at the editor's desk following the newspaper's publication of a selection entitled "What is Going on in Rumyantsevskiy Sad?" (23 August).

One such letter—altogether typical—I will quote in its entirety:

"Only a madman could believe in any kind of glasnost and democracy. Proof of this lies in the deliberate distortion of the opinions and positions of the readers of *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*. In the article, 'What is Going on in Rumyantsevskiy Sad?' they cite only those letters containing hostility and slander toward the Pamyat NPF [National Patriotic Front]. These are the letters of the enemies of Pamyat and of windbags who carry on all sorts of nonsense for hours, 'Keeping Watch Over the World.' Incidentally, if the latter were allowed to tag along at Pamyat meetings, they would now be writing in its defense. But that is not the main thing. *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* has written a great deal about glasnost and democracy. Why then has it not printed any letters from supporters of Pamyat? That's a pretty low-down trick on the part of the newspaper, to beat up on and slander someone whose mouth is gagged and who is bound hand and foot. In conclusion, I demand an end to the ban on the Pamyat NPF holding meetings and gatherings. I am a native Leningrader and a Russian; and I find it painful that in my own native city, where my forefathers lived and died, I have the very same rights as an emigrant to America; but any Tatar or Uzbek who arrives immediately becomes royalty."

Loktyushchenkov, Anatoliy Fedorovich Electrician, TZhKh-4, Vyborgskiy Rayon

It is altogether clear and plain that the letter is an insulting one, in my view, for people of non-Russian nationality (I ask your forgiveness for being obliged to quote); for, where is it stated that "true patriots" cannot have their opinion published? In other words, watch out; in other words, truth is on their side!

No, we are not worried. And the publication of Loktyushchenkov's letter itself testifies to that fact. But why, in that case, Anatoliy Fedorovich himself might well ask, were there no such epistles in the preceding selection of letters from Leningradites? The reason is simple: at that

time the editors did not have **ONE SINGLE LETTER** in support of the Pamyat NPF. Why it turned out that way, I really don't know—but perhaps the reason is the call from the leaders of Pamyat to appeal exclusively to Moscow, to the highest organs of power, inasmuch as "It's useless to write to the Leningrad press..." And so the supporters of Pamyat have no one to complain to...

But we are publishing the letters from the supporters of Pamyat, not at all in order to formally observe the rules of democracy and to mollify those unsatisfied with the "suppression of glasnost"—although I am sure that any social group that does not conflict with the Constitution has a right to appear in print. I want to cite the statements of the "front's" defenders because in and of themselves, they provide a rather good impression of the views of these people, and their orientation. I believe that in many respects these letters describe Pamyat far more convincingly than journalistic observations.

And so...

"I am upset by the obstacles which the authorities have placed in the way of the Pamyat patriotic association, and in the way of the patriots who want to go to the meetings. I see the renaissance of Russia only in the development of the Pamyat movement. Its last two meetings were broken up under various pretexts. This is nothing other than a continuation of genocide with respect to the Russian people... Time is of the essence! We can sound the death knell for Russia if we waste it. I don't need any Zionist internationalism... From the moment you receive this letter, you also bear moral responsibility for the fate of Russia." Bykova, Ye. V.

The very same formula, in another letter: "I look upon the refusal to register the Pamyat NPF and the denial of permission to hold meetings as acts of continuing genocide against the Russian people. The heroic Russian people, the saviors of mankind, deserve the best portion of their Motherland. I demand justice." Trosnov, P.V.

We open the Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary and read: "Genocide...one of the most serious crimes against humanity; destruction of certain groups of the populace for their racial, national, ethnic, or religious attributes; also, deliberately establishing living conditions intended for complete or partial physical destruction of these groups; or, measures to prevent childbearing in their midst..." Is it really true that in the opinion of P.V. Trosnov of the Vasileostrovskiy Rayispolkom that by forbidding, on legal grounds, meetings in Rumyantsevskiy Sad, we support the idea of "destruction of certain groups of the populace"? Or are we attempting to "prevent childbearing" among the members of the Pamyat NTF?

Incidentally, there is nothing suprising in the fact that the authors of the two letters write about "genocide with respect to the Russians," since they have cast aside both logic and all sense of proportion. This hysterical thinking

is drummed into their heads by the leaders at every Pamyat meeting; and alas, some people, who are not inclined to look in the Encyclopedic Dictionary, have seized upon it. Just as, by the way, they have seized upon other ideas:

"We demand that Pamyat, the sole patriotic unofficial association, have the right to exist. Why have they lost their microphone and rostrum? For this is an alarm; it is a bell, calling all patriots to do battle with cosmopolitanism, with anti-patriotic tendencies alien to our nation, and with the moral breakdown of society... Has the ideological struggle indeed ended? Have the hundreds of different subversive, anti-Soviet centers in the West truly been disbanded?

"It is no secret that the numerous anti-Soviet special services, experienced ideological diversionists at the Voices abroad, have on the whole been staffed in recent times with lampoonists, who have emigrated from the USSR to the West in search of the Promised Land, in order to destroy our system from those shores. Pamyat speaks of this openly. The ideological struggle has not ceased for a single hour; it has only taken on new forms: invasion from within, corrupting our youth by means of implanting profane music and 'sexual culture' in the schools; by propagating amorality, by theater and ballet which borders on pornography; by wild outbursts of Russophobia; and by debasing the dignity of Russian women, our wives and mothers, in theatrical presentations. We must have complete and trustworthy information... on what percentage of Jews there are in creative societies of composers, artists and the like...

"Why is the creativity of Marc Chagall foisted upon us as that of a spiritual mentor? Can Belorussia not exist without a Marc Chagall Museum in Vitebsk?... Pamyat reminds us about all of this." Semyonova, G.D., propagandist.

The same motif that we came to know so well in the years of Stalin's terror (and especially the latter years) is heard in the epistle from the "propagandist-patriot": there are enemies all about; the struggle with them has not ended, not for an hour; down with cosmopolitanism; for some reason there are a lot of Jews around... And here G. Semyonova declares, that "The goals of the Pamyat NPF are noble ones: preserving and saving Russia's historic and cultural monuments and the environment in which we live; and the struggle with drunkenness and alcoholism..." But forgive me, how does one combine protecting and "saving cultural monuments" with the demand to liquidate the Marc Chagall Museum? And if the question is one of the struggle with drunkenness and alcoholism, then what does that have to do with "pornography in the ballet?" And how does one find "noble goals" and "spirituality" in a stream of nationalistic outpourings?

In this survey of letters I shall not, by the way, deny space in the newspaper to the readers—the overwhelming

majority—who have spoken out critically, with conviction, with respect to Pamyat. I would note that about 80 percent of the responses received by the editors categorically condemn the activity of the "front":

Leningrad, which withstood the blockade, must not be opened to Nazis! We discussed the newspaper publications with the entire class. Several people laughed, but the rest were angered and upset. Hiding behind the militants, this human refuse is provoking national dissension!... Who is behind the "black hundred," of which up to now we have known only from our school books?" Rimma Nikolayeva, 9th-Grader.

"Why this is simply shameful! How can there be such people among us?! This is out-and-out fascism! I was born in Leningrad; I've lived my entire life in my native city, and never—not while I was in school, nor during the war—have we divided people up into different nationalities. We were all Soviet people, and we were united. I am a Russian, but I was married to a Jew. He passed through the entire war, from the Battle of Kursk, to Berlin; he had many medals, was a communist and an excellent person, a family man. Well, must I really compare him with this riff-raff?" G. Nikolayeva, CPSU member since 1946.

"We read the selection of letters in yesterday's paper, entitled 'What is Going On in Rumyantsevskiy Sad?' and my hair literally stood on end from what that counter-revolutionary nationalistic organization permits itself to do, with impunity!... And they are bringing children along to that mob scene—Just what are they learning there? I am afraid that soon one will hear on the streets of our heroic city shouts of... (out of considerations of elementary politeness I will not quote the author's formulation—I.S.). And this in our own city! Democracy and glasnost should not be the servants of unbridled nationalism and anti-semitism. This is a shameful phenomenon both for Leningrad and Leningradites." M.B. Zheleznyak, CPSU member since 1940.

I have deliberately refrained from softening the expressions used by the agitated Leningradites in their letters. And let the leaders of Pamyat, who demand glasnost, not take offense: in accordance with this principle, they must hear out the opinions of the people, whose great alarm forces them not to mince words. The people who write are of various nationalities, with varied experiences in life:

"Having read in the newspaper about someone from the Pamyat group expressing approval and praise (!!!) for the pre-revolutionary 'Russian National Union,' I cannot help but respond. Pamyat ought to remember that this was Russia's shame at that time. I say this as an eyewitness. I was 7 years old then, but I've remembered this all my long life (I'm 90). My family was of the nobility and the intelligentsia; we lived in Kiev. The year was 1905, and there was skirmishing in the streets; and there were rumors of a pogrom. Suddenly, a knock on the door, and an angry shout—'Open up! Are there any Yids here?' My

God-fearing aunt, shaking and weeping, goes to meet the thugs, holding in her trembling hands an icon and an icon lamp. 'We are all Orthodox here...' lisps Aunt Adelya, making the sign of the cross; and the armed men fulminated. But in the back rooms of our apartment, there were two Jewish mothers, trembling with deathly fear, in total silence..." Nataliya Pavlovna Alekseyeva-Gorbunova, an artist.

"It is good that you have reacted to the activity of the Pamyat society. But at the same time I am surprised that you waited so long. And if it were not for the letters from the readers, would you have found a place for materials about Pamyat? Why are you lagging behind the train of events?" M. Zolotonosov.

"Does it make sense to have such a faction in our city, a city of three revolutions? And do real Russian people permit themselves to slander and encroach upon the rights of other nationalities? From time immemorial, Russians have been protecting the oppressed. There are examples enough in our own times. As concerns the talk about protection of nature and cultural monuments, that is a lie, a cover-up for the dark deeds of this organization. I call upon all workers in the city on the Neva to give a decisive rebuff to those unbridled elements." Pechinkov, Aleksandr Anatolevich, a worker for 33 years.

I will conclude this survey with a letter which contains an altogether sensible proposal:

"While I am not a member of Pamyat, I nevertheless believe that you ought to give Pamyat itself a chance to speak in the pages of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, albeit with editorial commentary. But you should stipulate that Pamyat must provide only verified facts on the activities of Zionists in our country, and that it will bear legal responsibility for the truth and documentary validity of these facts. And if Pamyat refuses to promulgate its program and the facts in its possession, then let the Leningradites know of this. I am convinced that in this situation many people will forsake them. Only such a method of resistance—glasnost—is worthy of our times and our city." Kirsanov, Boris Vladimirovich, an artist.

Meditating about Boris Vladimirovich's letter, I came to the conclusion that he is correct. In order to make a proper judgment, one must have exhaustive, exact information. Leningradites have the right to "firsthand" information about the ideological baggage of Pamyat, and the goals of its activity—and then, I am certain that the huge majority will come to the proper, well-grounded conclusion. And so the editors appealed to the leadership of Pamyat. What came of this we shall relate in the next article about the "front."

### Academician Advocates Radical Political Reform in Nationalities Policy

18110065 Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian  
29 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by V. Shynkaruk, academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: "Our Greatest Asset: Safeguard Brotherhood and Friendship Among the Nations of the USSR Like the Apple of One's Eye" under the rubric "Political Culture Club"]

[Text] The importance of improving interethnic relations in our country is one of the cardinal issues regarding the policy of restructuring. This has prompted the 19th All-Union Conference to work out a program of political strategies.

Some of the greatest accomplishments of socialism that we have been called upon to preserve and prompt worldwide were highlighted in a speech by Mikhail Gorbachev with reference to an adopted special resolution on "Promoting Interethnic Relations." The achievements include the union of equal nations and ethnic groups, the affirmation of fraternity and friendship among them, and the guarantee of future progress in this country through mutual cooperation. Having successfully withstood the severe historical trials of the past, this union will continue to be a decisive factor in the future development of all nations.

However, in addition to listing the achievements for finding solutions to nationality problems in the USSR, the conference also pointed out errors, mistakes, and shortcomings in the realization of the nationalities policy during certain stages of Soviet history. The dynamism evident in the initial stages of the formation of the multi-national Soviet state has been substantially lost and undermined due to the departure from Leninist principles of nationality policy and to the violation of legal procedures during the emergence of the cult of personality and the period of ideological and intellectual stagnation. In theory, in terms of a practical policy, the successful accomplishments in solving the nationalities problem reflected absolutism and were regarded as such that they would automatically determine or ensure the final solution to all nationality problems. During that time, a number of crucial issues which emerged as a direct result of the developmental process of nations and peoples were not resolved, resulting in public disapproval often to the point of conflict. Nationalistic egotism and conceit became more prevalent as did parasitical tendencies and parochialism. These negative phenomena were ignored for a long time, forced to the inside, and not properly assessed by the party. The policies of restructuring, democratization, and glasnost, as emphasized in the resolution, have shed light on these phenomena and created the necessary conditions for their eradication by democratic methods.

The events at Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas in Armenia and Azerbaijan have revealed a concentrated expression of these negative tendencies and phenomena. Indeed, the entire Soviet population and all our peoples are responding to this situation with feelings of anxiety and remorse.

The meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet to resolve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh between the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR has taken on tremendous importance in the practical realm of politics, since it is related to the resolution of a specific conflict and to the general realization of the 19th Party Conference directives on interethnic relations.

Reasons for the emergence of this acute interethnic conflict were analyzed at the meeting, and the negative tendencies manifested during the period of stagnation became readily apparent. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been reset by a host of problems that have plagued workers in both republics for quite some time. There are substantial deficits in the area of socioeconomic development; ecological problems have intensified; cadre policy has been greatly neglected; ideological spheres have been disregarded. There has been a decrease in interethnic education and principles of social morality have been grossly violated. Furthermore, there are serious miscalculations in the nationality policy. The heart of the matter lies in the fact that the increase in education, development of national cultures, elevating the standard of self-awareness among nations, that is, the major accomplishment of socialism are in sharp contrast to the inexpedient and outdated forms and methods of interethnic policy, which creates conflicting situations and demands a thorough revolutionary restructuring of these modes and procedures.

We should note that the departure from Leninist principles of nationality policy, their deformation by Stalinism, and the stagnating ideologies within the theoretical plan were based, first of all, on the mechanistic, anti-dialectical phenomena concerned primarily with the "automatic building" of socialism, along with the appropriate objective laws essential for working out solutions to socioeconomic and national problems. Second, these ideologies were predicated on the utopian idea of lack of perspective among nations and their "predestination" toward assimilation or on the conditions of international proletarian dictatorship, as Stalin has asserted, or during the past 60 years when the former generation had hoped to build socialism and live within its structure. In Stalin's works, there was little political content in his conception of "socialist nations": the subject of bourgeois nations was the bourgeoisie and that of socialist nations concerned the "proletariat." Stalin believed that when the proletariat completes its historical mission and builds an international social alliance, when socialist nations exhaust their social function, assimilation will occur.

Contrary to Lenin, who believed that national distinctions would be maintained for quite some time (even in

the event of a worldwide socialist victory), Stalin looked at national assimilation as the "second stage of worldwide proletarian dictatorship."

During the period of "rapid communist development," the search for "visible signs of communist growth" naturally extended into the area of national relations, where the actual process of internationalization and the centralized bureaucratic ignorance of the demands and needs of national republics and autonomies (and neglect of their interests) were perceived as the visible outgrowth of communist national assimilation. From the standpoint of this approach, the nationalities question was regarded historically as something negative (and in a greater sense something that lacked perspective); whereas the interethnic question was treated as non-national, that is, something that transcended the national problem and failed to reveal or pay tribute to the universal public fund of national achievements.

In the context of nationalities, not much attention had been given to the idea of national self-awareness (which quite often was identified with nationalism). The entire subject revolved around two things: "national forms" within a culture and national relations stemming in essence from the roots of socioeconomic relations. Inside the bureaucratic consciousness, both ethnic and interethnic issues were generally reduced to the relationship between regional and central movements. At any rate, interethnic and general-state bureaucratic motives were delineated within the framework of rigid departmental interests, whereas ethnic motives were identified with regionalism and parochialism. In practice, the metaphysical deformation of ethnic and interethnic dialectics clearly served the interests of administrative-managerial bureaucrats in finding the "solution" to the nationalities question. It also served their interests in an ideological sense, that is, it was viewed as a binding element in the ideology of stagnation.

This ideology was further propagated (outside of people's activities) by the automatic operation of socialist laws and solutions to the problems of interethnic relations. It was assumed that the process of internationalizing our society was being done objectively, with a positive orientation and in the proper perspective. No one thought it necessary to accelerate, suspend, or interfere with the process. However, it was inevitable that we should have to challenge those who were opposed to the idea of internationalization in the context of the nationalities question. Furthermore, we disregarded the fact that the process of internationalization, like all vital processes, is antiethetic in the dialectical sense—possessing both positive and negative elements. Likewise, we failed to realize that in the context of the scientific-technical revolution (with reference to the ever-increasing convergence of the various spheres of life and activities, assimilable encroachments of bureaucratic elements, and tendencies of administrative systems) we should have defended the nationalities policy at both the public and judicial levels, without which there could be

no development of national self-awareness or ethnic culture. This metaphysical orientation concerning the process of internationalization allowed bureaucrats the opportunity to promote their ideas of assimilation more objectively.

The decisions of the 19th All-Union Conference have been directed toward these deformations and favor the implementation of Lenin's approach in finding solutions to the nationalities problem. The decisions stress that the solution of volatile issues surrounding interethnic relations is intrinsically linked to socioeconomic aspects of restructuring, democratization, abolishing wage leveling, and promoting social equality in the spheres of interethnic relations, as well as ethnic relations, taking into account their specific ethnic and general state interests.

The following is a list of important ideas that found support at the conference: granting more rights to unions and autonomous republics, allowing for more independence and responsibility in the area of economics, promoting social and cultural development and supporting the idea of environmental protection. It is most important to take a stand against centralized, bureaucratic deviations and to refute the rigid dictates of departmental interests. One will not find a more savage, heartless, and ultimately more dangerous enemy of Leninist principles of ethnic policy and of the ascendancy of equality and humanism in interethnic relations than the foe of centralized, departmental bureaucratism and its "younger brothers"—bureaucrats who rigidly sacrifice national interests in favor of regional interests.

Radical reform within the political system will play a major role in the democratization of nationality policy. The most important of these reforms is to elevate the role of the Council of People's Deputies, above all (USSR Supreme Soviet) Council of Nationalities and its existing commissions, and even the government of the USSR. This means that permanent commissions dealing with the problem of national relations must be formed within the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of Union and Autonomous Republics, and municipal councils. In May of this year, the UkSSR Supreme Soviet convened for a special 7th Session here in the Ukraine and formed the "Commission To Handle the Affairs of Patriotic and International Education and Interethnic Relations." The Commission is made up of deputies and representatives of diverse ethnic backgrounds who live in various territorial regions throughout Ukraine. One of the Commission's primary functions is to carefully and systematically monitor existing socioeconomic, cultural, and legal problems in the context of interethnic relations, particularly in oblasts with a predominantly strong ethnic population, such as the Transcarpathian, Crimean, Odessa, and Chernigov oblasts, etc. It is also the Commission's task to instill the principles of internationalism among the various ethnic groups and appropriate organizations and establishments in all regions so that every individual, regardless of his nationality, is guaranteed equal rights throughout

the entire Ukrainian republic. Most of the attention is to be directed toward those areas where one is likely to find a more or less large percentage of foreigners: Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Tatars, Greeks, Moldavians, etc.

Last year, the UkSSR Communist Party Central Committee in its resolution concerning the methods of achieving the country's goals initiated at the 27th Party Congress and the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum in the area of ethnic relations on the strengthening of national and patriotic education and guaranteeing auxiliary groups more basic socio-cultural rights, advised appropriate departments to offer more training to public education cadres in regions of strong ethnic diversity, to develop permanent cultural educational programs, to encourage the study of national languages to publish literature, to form ethnographic, artistic collectives, to guarantee that the film industry will produce films in the national languages, to promote tours and concerts (with the aim of redistributing national groups), and finally to see to it that progressive, ethnic traditions and customs are cultivated. The decisions of the 19th Party Conference demand even more attention to these issues: "We must make sure that all ethnic groups that live outside of their indigenous area or that may not even have a homeland are given equal opportunity to fulfill their national cultural needs, especially in the areas of education, intergration, and public creative works. We must see to it that centers of national culture are given top priority, that mass media is made available to the public, and that people's spiritual needs are met."

As we all know, in implementing the decisions of the 19th Party Conference, the UkSSR Communist Party Central Committee recently examined the work being done by the Ukrainian CP Transcarpathian obkom in achieving the goals of the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in the area of interethnic relations and international-patriotic public education. Having noticed significant advances in the area of international education and being satisfied that people in the Transcarpathian Oblast (which is of multinational ethnic diversity) are fulfilling their national-cultural needs, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee critically analyzed the status of human rights and advised the party obkom, oblast party organizations, and appropriate republican departments to eliminate existing deficiencies and implement more concrete, operative methods toward the restructuring of all the ideological-political work being carried out in accordance with the demands of the 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. In addition, it was suggested at the conference (taking into account the diverse multi-national population) that special emphasis be given to the interpretation of Lenin's standards, the CPSU principles of national policy, the idea of fraternity among the peoples of the USSR, the process of internationalization in all spheres of social life, value and



respect for education, culture, language, and the history of all the nations and peoples of the USSR, and their unique personal contributions to society.

Party committees and ideological cadres are urged to study the various processes and tendencies existing in the sphere of national relations, to make a more realistic assessment of the situation in the spirit of glasnost and in accordance with principles, and then promptly to resolve volatile issues of interethnic concern. At the conference, it was noted that there is a tremendous need to be on guard against the possible occurrence of nationalistic nihilism and ethnic repression and to prevent from emerging centers of subversive activity which could easily fan the flames of national strife among the people.

A socialist spiritual culture, having developed as a multi-national and as an intensely international culture, will play a significant role in the affirmation of internationalism, brotherhood, and friendship among all the nations and peoples of the USSR. Culture finds its expression in the spiritual life of the people, in their moral values and ideals, and as the subject of religious desires and aspirations, and of its sacred objects: the most precious expression of cultural symbols being that of the image of Motherland—the object of patriotic sentiments. National self-identity is not simply an awareness of one's national independence; it is the expression of national patriotism, which includes national pride and honor. It is intrinsically sensitive: the emotional impetus can be either positive or negative and can manifest itself as either joy or sorrow. That is why Lenin so often advised his fellow communists to be on guard against national improprieties, that is, against any type of activity that might harm national sentiments and suppress national pride. However, national sentiment, like all multi-faceted phenomena, is antipodal. On the one hand, it can elevate a person and inspire him to deeds of heroism and patriotism; but under certain circumstances, it can dull the senses and acquire a nationalistic form, especially in terms of mass psychology. This final surge of national sentiment in situations involving nationality conflict quite often prevails in reactionary circles, for example, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. As Gorbachev noted in his speech at the Supreme Soviet session, the incident at Nagorno-Karabakh was used by anti-restructuring forces as an opportunity to incite nationalistic fervor, which lead to the development of national forms that would be used to suppress a larger number of complex issues.

A person's spiritual life—his ideals and public sentiment—is developed through an appreciation of the various subdivisions of cultural elements manifested in society. Socialist culture, in the context of multi-national and interethnic unity, has the potential of formulating the spiritual life for every Soviet citizen in the spirit of national and interethnic unity—national sentiment and feelings of worth; compassion for other people; and solidarity among all workers throughout the world.

hence, as was noted in the 19th Party Conference resolution, socialist culture "...must remain a decisive factor in the ideological and moral consolidation of our society."

One of the expressions of national and interethnic unity in the context of a socialist, multi-national culture is national-Russian bilingualism, which has been voluntarily adopted by the Soviet people not only as a means of communication between nations, but also as a way of initiating the exchange of higher cultural values and achievements, and finally, as a means of ensuring the mutual development of all ethnic cultures. The departure from Leninist principles of nationality policy during the years of the personality cult and the period of stagnation and bureaucratic tendencies within the administrative-managerial departmental system effected considerable deformations in the development of language culture by underevaluating and restricting the circle of languages and by impoverishing and impeding the development of Russian. As was already noted, there were signs of utopian manifestations on the lack of historical perspective (degeneration) of nations. The 27th Party Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference have guaranteed the return to Leninist principles of language policy.

As noted in the party's resolution: "We must see that every possible condition be provided to ensure that national-Russian bilingualism continues to develop harmoniously and naturally, without formalism, taking into account the specific features of every region. More concern must be shown for the active functioning of national languages in various spheres of state, public, and cultural life. We should encourage the study of national languages, especially by citizens of other nationalities who live in that particular republic, and above all, by children and young people. This should in no way obstruct the democratic principle of free choice in the area of language learning."

Last year, the UkSSR Communist Party Central Committee in the above-mentioned resolution suggested methods to be used for the development of language culture in our nation. Specific emphasis was given to the idea of enhancing the standard of educational training among teachers of both Ukrainian and Russian languages and literature, to expand the network of schools and classes of instruction in the Ukrainian language. The UkSSR Central Committee also emphasized the need to improve language culture within the activities of departmental organs and faithfully to adhere to the principles of bilingualism in state business affairs and in the mass media, etc.

The question of international language culture development has also been stressed in a resolution adopted by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee of the Transcarpathian Oblast Party Organization. The resolution specifically emphasizes the importance of

consistently reinforcing the principles of national-Russian bilingualism and showing more concern for the active functioning of the Ukrainian language and other ethnic languages in the various spheres of public and cultural life, as well as incorporating supplementary educational objectives to improve the standard of language instruction (for Russian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, and Moldavian), especially in rural schools, and finally, in implementing optional methods of national language instruction among students and adults.

In connection with this, I would like to focus attention on another matter.

Our country encompasses over 100 different peoples and nationalities. Some have no territorial autonomy, and considering the ever-increasing demographic mobility, redistribution and the "displacement" of various ethnic minority groups these people are deprived of their ethnic culture. Some see nothing negative in this; on the contrary they see the positive. However, why do we make entries in our "Red Book," why do we try in every conceivable way (even legally) to protect those species of plants and animals which are threatened by extinction? Because we want to preserve our biogenetic resources. Do people feel that preserving cultural ethnicity is less important? All peoples and nations contribute their unique and extraordinary ethno-cultural wealth to this vast reservoir of ethnic diversity. For example, in the context of this logical plan of cultural development, we lack knowledge of the Etruscan, Mayan languages, etc.

If we are to implement the Conference decision on "Forming Centers of National Culture," with reference to ethnic minority groups, perhaps it is time we think about giving these cultural centers top priority status and some form of "national-cultural autonomy." A suggested restructuring method which dealt with the nationalities question in Austria-Hungary has been "Austro-Marxism." Although criticized in the writings of Stalin, this approach (with the appropriate modifications) makes good sense in the historical context of a multinational, socialist country intent on preserving and cultivating the ethno-culture of national minority groups which have been subsumed by larger ethnic groups. With regard to our own nation, we must study the problem to decide which forms to use for preserving and developing the ethno-culture of the Boko and Lemko inhabitants.

The Soviet intelligentsia will play a major role in the development of a socialist, spiritual culture and in the affirmation of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalization. Furthermore, the entire humanistic spirit of socialist national relations will depend to a large extent on public readiness and the degree of understanding of basic personal and social interests. Cultural enthusiasts have the sole responsibility for monitoring activities to see that patriotism is not superseded by nationalism and that interethnic strife and dissension do not surface among the nations. As noted in the Conference decisions, it is the public duty of every Soviet

citizen to resist any monstrous deviations and to eradicate those elements which create deformations. Any type of activity that divides nations and peoples or any attempt to infringe on the national rights of citizens must be seen as a moral offense, which runs contrary to the interests of the Soviet state.

These important, heart-stirring resolutions on the restructuring of international relations on an All-Union scale have been exclusively adopted in our country as well. Everything now depends on the convergence of words and deeds and putting the adopted resolutions into practice in the social sphere. Experience has shown us that this is a problem of paramount importance. There are social forces operating right now that are perfectly capable of bringing these adopted resolutions to naught or else of substantially modifying them to this present state of affairs: traditional, customary methods of nationality policies. It is imperative that each of us—the entire party and non-party community, and above all, party leaders of various ranks—be totally committed to the task of implementing those decisions in the sphere of nationality relations, in the area of international cultural integration, and in the practice of language and that we all be on guard against those who may resist these processes.

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**History, Achievements of Kurds in Soviet Armenia**  
18300024 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian 12 Jul 88  
p 2

[Article by A. Altunyan: "One Family—One Fate: Our Soviet Way of Life"]

[Text] "You know, of course, that Rockwell Kent called Armenia the land of miracles," a friend of our editors, the old machine operator and rural correspondent, the winner of the Prize imeni M. Ulyanova, Mame Guloyan, addressed me. "But, probably, you do not know that the greatest miracle is the enormous achievements which we, the Kurds, have attained in Soviet Armenia. You only compare," Mame convinced me, "a nomad cattle-breeder and a doctor of science and professor, a downtrodden, oppressed Kurdish woman, who could have been sold for 50 sheep, and a People's Artist of the republic and a people's deputy. This is the kind of leap that the Kurds have made in social and cultural development. Write about this. You promise?"

I promised.

Not long ago, I happened to meet a certain Swedish specialist on the Kurds. "You know," he confessed in our discussion, "not in a single country, and the Kurds live in our country as well, have such favorable conditions been created for their social and cultural development as I have seen in your republic. It is simply a miracle."

**And I thought: I have to carry out the promise I gave to my friend Mame Guloyan.**

Guseyn Dzhndoyan in Alagyaz, which is in Aragatskiy Rayon, even in the nearest villages is known to one and all. As they told me, there is nothing surprising in this. You see, almost every second person here studied in the local secondary school, where Guseyn Akhmadovich has taught history for almost half a century. Among his former Kurdish students are physicians and agronomists, livestock specialists and engineers, teachers, scientists, writers. . . . In talking with me, the old teacher names almost all of them by name. Then he continues:

"Who could have thought that the Kurds will attain such successes? And do you know thanks to what this became possible? . . . It was the year 1921. The first year of Soviet Armenia. The young republic, ruined by the Civil War, exhausted by epidemics and hunger, at the price of unbelievable efforts, healed the wounds and solved the numerous problems. These tasks were complicated still more by the fact that about a fourth of a million refugees accumulated in the republic.

The difficulties of the first months of Soviet Armenia were discussed by Sergo Ordzhonikidze in his speech at a ceremonial session of the Baku Soviet. "We know how difficult it is to build Soviet power. Even more difficult, a million times more difficult is it to build this power there, in exhausted and worn-out Armenia, which was almost transformed into a republic of refugees. We know that our young comrades will have to overcome a mass of difficulties. But let them honestly walk along the path to the excellent system of socialism, along the path not strewn with roses, and let them know that our energy and all our efforts will be given to help them."

We know that the Communist Party and the government of Soviet Armenia, supported by the disinterested assistance of the Russian and other peoples of our country, were able to lead the republic out of the difficult situation. But even then the government thought not only about daily bread.

#### Reference

April 1921. The ArSSR People's Commissariat for Education commissioned the composition of the first Kurdish alphabet.

July 1921. The great expert on the Kurdish language, the Kurdologist, educator and writer, Akop Kazaryan (Lazo) presented the Kurdish alphabet composed by him on the basis of the Armenian script and the textbook for the Kurdish schools "Shams" (Sontse).

October 1921. Thanks to the endeavors of Serik Davtyan, the textbook "Shams" was published in Echmiadzin. During the same year, the Kurdish textbook for adults "Krasnaya zvezda" was published.

Guseyn Akhmadovich lapsed into silence for a moment, as if experiencing anew the events of that remote revolutionary time, many of which he remembers himself, and about others he knows from stories told by his father.

"And why don't you ask who taught the Kurds how to read and write?" He turned to me, and continued: "The Armenians. And this is how it was..." Simultaneously with the creation of the Kurdish alphabet and textbooks, a great deal of work was done in regard to the training of teachers for Kurdish schools. In August 1921, teacher training courses, directed by Akop Kazaryan, are opened in Ashtarakskiy Rayon. In spite of the fact that the students in the courses were mainly representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia, the instruction was conducted in the Kurdish language. Graduation took place in October. The courses were completed by Aram Muradyan, Tagun, and Nshan Rshtuni, Sogomon Sarkisyan, Sokrat, Mkrtchyan, Yerem Ayvazyan, the first Kurdish teacher, Alikhan Shaginov, and others. All of them were sent to work in Kurdish schools of the rayons of the republic. In 1921 alone, 267 pupils sat behind school desks in five Kurdish schools. "Don't let these figures strike you as small," the old teacher interrupted his story. "You see, at that time a little more than 8,000 Kurds lived in Armenia. But the concern about them was great. . . ."

The first Kurdish alphabet with Armenian transcription played an invaluable role in the enterprise of educating the Kurdish population of the republic. However, the Kurdish literature and textbooks published on the basis of this alphabet did not find a wide circle of readers outside the borders of Armenia. A new alphabet was needed, one common not only to all Kurds of the Soviet Union, but also for the multi-million Kurdish people abroad.

#### Reference

8 June 1928. By resolution of the Armenian CP(b) Central Committee, a committee for the development and dissemination of the Kurdish alphabet, consisting of A. Mravyan, A. Shamilov, Sh. Teymurov, and others is organized in the ArSSR Central Executive Committee.

The end of 1928. A. Shamilov and I. Marogulov complete the development of a new Kurdish alphabet.

7 March 1929. The collegium of the ArSSR People's Commissariat of Education approves a detailed plan for the dissemination of the new Kurdish alphabet.

1929-1932. A. Shamilov, I. Marogulov, and R. Drampyan publish the "Samouchitel kurdsogo yazyka" [Kurdish Self-Taught], composed by them on the basis of the new Kurdish alphabet, the Kurdish language textbooks "Svet"

[Light/World], "Krasnyy truzhenik" [The Red Toiler], "Udarnyy kolkhoz" [The Shock Kolkhoz], and "K novoi zhizni" [Toward the New Life] for various levels of instruction.

1931. On the instructions of the republic People's Commissariat of Education, Professor A. Khachatryan composes and publishes during the following year the "Kurds kaya grammatika" [Kurdish Grammar].

1935. The joint work of A. Khachatryan and Adzhiye Dzhidi, "Grammatika kurds kogo yazyka dlya srednykh shkol" [Grammar of the Kurdish Language for Secondary Schools], was published. During the same year, "Grammatika kurds kogo yazyka dlya nachalnykh shkol" [Grammar of the Kurdish Language for Elementary Schools] was published, which was compiled by Saak Movsesyan.

Along with this, in order to satisfy the demand of the Transcaucasian Kurds for skilled teaching personnel, in August 1930 the People's Commissariat of Education of Armenia raised the question of the opening of a Transcaucasian Kurdish Pedagogical Tekhnikum. The Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic complied with this proposal and adopted a decree on the opening of the Transcaucasian Kurdish Pedagogical Institute with a 4-year long term of instruction as of 1 January 1931 in Yerevan.

And in the new educational institution Arab Shamilov was the first director, and Armenians constituted the basic backbone of the pedagogical collective (10 out of 12). Among them were V. Petoyan, holder of the Order of Lenin, Honored Teacher of the Republic, who for many years was also the director of the tekhnikum; S. Gasparyan, Honored Artist of the Republic; Professor P. Voskerchyan; the experienced pedagogues G. Gasparyan, G. Markaryan, I. Galoyan, and others. They taught not only the Kurds living in Armenia, but also those who came from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the republics of Central Asia.

"All the problems connected with the education of Kurds were solved long ago," says Guseyn Akhmadovich. "Today there is no Kurdish village in Armenia which does not have its own school. There is not a VUZ in the country in which a Kurdish young man or young woman could not enroll. My children all have diplomas. . . ."

The Dzhidoyan couple has eight children now. One of the sons, Tital, was graduated from the faculty of law. At present he is the chief of a department of the Office of Investigation of the ArSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, a lieutenant-colonel of the militia and a candidate of law. His brother Dzhamal has two diplomas: one as an engineer-mechanic and one as an economist. Dzhalil is a graduate of an institute of the national economy and works in the Control and Inspection Administration of an Aymak cooperative. Khalil was graduated from the

Armenian Agricultural Institute last year and works as chief mechanic in a native sovkhoz. Nigyar has a diploma from the Yerevan Medical Tekhnikum. She is a nurse in of a republic first-aid hospital. Susik was graduated from a 10-year secondary school and works in a street-car and trolleybus administration, being a member of the Yerevan Party Gorkom. Sise is a graduate of the Higher Party School. Sna is the second secretary of the Aragatskiy Party Raykom. Satal, the son of the Dzhndoyanovs who died in an automobile accident, also had a higher education. He was graduated from the Kurdish Division of the Faculty of Oriental Studies of Yerevan University. He was the second secretary of the Aragatskiy Komsomol Raykom and worked in the organs of the USSR KGB. Today the older ones of the 30 grandchildren and great-grandsons of the Dzhndoyanovs are also studying in the republic VUZes: Dzhamal—in a veterinary institute for livestock, Zina—in a medical institute. Still another grandson—Temu—is a graduate of an agricultural institute.

"I understand," Guseyn Akhmadovich smiles, "you don't surprise an Armenian with education. But, believe, for any Kurd this is great pride. . . ."

The creation of the Kurdish alphabet and the liquidation of literacy were conducive to the creation of the Kurdish newspaper RYVA TAZA (NOVYY PUT) in the republic. Its first issue came out on 25 March 1930.

**Miro Asadovich Mstoyan, the editor of the newspaper RYVA TAZA, relates:**

"The publication of the newspaper became an important event not only in the political and cultural life of the Kurdish population of Armenia, but of the entire Kurdish people. You see, this was the first, and for the time being the only, newspaper in the world regularly published in the Kurdish language. It is unnecessary to state that it appeared by decision of the government of the republic. I want to emphasize something else. Representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia took an active part in the creation and printing of the newspaper. Among them I want to note in particular the first two editors—the writer Grach Kochar and the literary critic, Professor Arutyun Mkrtchyan. The first imposers, makers-up, and printers were also Armenian specialists.

About what did the paper in those distant years write? Its tasks were set forth in the salutary address of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers published in the first issue of the newspaper. From the very beginning, it was called upon to organize the Kurdish workers and to accustom them to active socialist construction. The newspaper printed the decrees of the party and the government, materials about the development of industry and agriculture, illuminated questions of culture, literature and international education, raised the masses for the struggle for a

new life and against old patriarchal customs. It played an enormous role in the accustoming the Kurdish workers to socialist construction. These tasks the newspaper fulfills even today.

**Miro Asadovich, allow me to put to you several questions as deputy chairman of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet. What, in your view, is the most important achievement of the republic's Kurdish population?**

There are quite a lot of such achievements and it is difficult to single out one thing. "You see, everything that we have today was achieved during the years of Soviet power. But the main thing, perhaps, besides complete literacy, one should consider the fact that the Kurds have fully gone over to a settled life: They have their settlements and they engage in agriculture, the greater part of them poured into the republic's working class. In my view, these are very important circumstances, which have been conducive to the social and cultural development of our people.

Today the Kurdish villages do not differ in any way from the Armenian ones. These are modern settlements with modern conveniences, which have everything for normal life and work. Permit me to cite excerpts from a letter by a group of Kurds from the village of Shamiram of Ashtarakskiy Rayon. It was signed by the engineer Kyarame Bagdo, the pensioner Amare Agit, and 14 other rural inhabitants. This is what they write:

**"270 Kurdish families live in our village. All of them have built for themselves 2-story homes, they live in easy circumstances: They have their own automobiles, they keep a large number of cattle and sheep and goats in their personal household. Several dozens of Kurds from Shamiram have received a higher education. In the rural school the Kurdish language is taught, they have their own club, a library, a sports ground, and stores are operating.**

**"The inhabitants of the village have never experienced a prejudiced attitude on the part of the local leadership. The only Kurdish village in the rayon is always in the purview of the party and soviet leaders. Thanks to their concern, an irrigation system has been built in our village, water-supply has been installed, and the supply of food and industrial goods has been organized."**

In the letter there is only an incomplete picture of the present-day Kurdish village, but even it sufficiently eloquently indicates the present situation of the Kurds in Armenia. This is the main thing about which you ask."

**Miro Asadovich, tell us, please, about the participation of the Kurds in the socio-political life of the republic. You are surely not the only representative of your people who holds such an honored post?**

No, of course. Today hundreds of Kurds head local Soviets and are deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet, rural, settlement and city Soviets, manage enterprises, farms, and scientific institutions, and involved in many public organizations.

Here I would like to note especially that this phenomenon did not begin now. Already at the dawn of Soviet power in Armenia, the Communist Party and the government of the young republic devoted enormous attention to the cultivation and training of Kurdish cadres. Thus, on 3 June 1924, the Presidium of the Armenian CP(b) Central Committee specifically discussed the question of the work among Kurds. The solution of the Central Committee, among other things, stipulated such a measure as the promotion of Kurdish activists to responsible posts. By this time, several among the Kurds had been promoted to party and soviet work. Thus, for example, the well-known Kurdish public figure Arab Shamilov was appointed instructor of the Armenian CP Central Committee for work among the national minorities, and the Kurdish woman Nure Polatova was an instructor of the women's department of Central Committee. Among the first deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the first Convocation the Kurd Nado Makhmudov, who was then the first secretary of the Aparanskii Party Raykom. And the people elected the milkmaid Spoa Shabo and the then secretary of the Alagyazskiy Party Raykom, Samand Siabandov, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, to the ArSSR Supreme Soviet of the first convocation.

#### Reference

14 May 1936. The collegium of the national minorities of the Armenian CP(b) Central Committee examines the question of cadres of the lower aktiv and recognizes as necessary the organization of courses for their retraining.

1936. On the initiative of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the government, a soviet and party school for Kurds is organized on the basis of the Transcaucasian Kurdish Pedagogical Tekhnikum imeni A. Mravyan.

16 October 1937. By decree of the Central Executive Committee of Armenia, inter-rayon courses for the retraining of representatives and secretaries of Soviets from national minorities are opened, including in Yerevan—for the retraining of Kurdish cadres.

"The measures carried through by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government of the republic," M. Mstoyan relates, "were conducive to the awakening of the class consciousness of the Kurdish peasants and facilitated their transition to a settled life. "From that time on, the growth of the political and public activity of the Kurds of Armenia does not stop."

Miro Asadovich, in the conclusion of our talk, briefly about the transition to a settled way of life, without which, as you have said, such rapid development of the republic's Kurdish population would be impossible, especially during a rather short period.

"This process did not always proceed evenly. But in this question, too, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government of Soviet Armenia showed the requisite understanding and flexibility in all stages of the solution of this really important problem. It is sufficient to recall only one fact. In spite of the fact that the Kurds constituted a little more than 1 percent of the population of the republic, the government, in the distribution of the resettlement fund, allotted for their needs proportionately more means. During 1926-1927, for example, the Kurds were allotted 5 percent of this fund. After a year—6, and in 1929 already 20 percent. Moreover, the poor farms were exempted from the agricultural tax, and their number exceeded 3,300. The Kurdish peasant was given assistance with seeds, draught animals, and agricultural tools, and houses and separate villages were built for them."

#### Reference

1923-1924. For the transition to a settled way of life, the government of Armenia allotted three villages to the Kurds.

1928. The Kurdish nomads are given five more villages and a credit of 40,000 rubles for the construction of housing. The number of Kurdish villages reached 15 with 6,105 desyatinas of land.

1928-1929. For former Kurdish nomads, the government of the republic built three villages (Sorik, Sabunchi, and Kalashbek).

"I would like to underscore," Miro Asadovich finished his discussion, "that the enormous achievements of the Kurdish population of our republic is the result of the steadfast realization of the Leninist nationality policy of the party and the government of Soviet Armenia. Such outstanding figures in the Communist Party and the Soviet state as Al. Myasnikyan, A. Ioannisyan, A. Khandzhyan, A. Karinyan, S. Spapionyan (Lukashin), S. Ter-Gabrielyan, A. Mravyan, A. Yegiazaryan, and others directly occupied themselves with the questions of the socio-economic development of the Kurds and work among them. All-round fraternal assistance and concern about the economic and cultural development of the national minorities of the republic, including the Kurds, were manifested on the part of the Armenian people in all stages of socialist construction. This concern is felt even today."

One of the striking manifestations of the growth of the cultural level of the Kurds of Soviet Armenia, without a doubt, is the creation of a literature in their native language.

Karlene Chchani, the chairman of the section of Kurdish writers of the Union of Writers of Armenia, relates:

"The oral national creativeness of our people has always been extremely rich and many-sided. And it would seem that, with the creation of the Kurdish alphabet, the first national literary works should have appeared from the pen of the Kurds themselves. However, no matter how paradoxical, our studies show that Armenian writers should be considered the first Soviet Kurdish writers—the author of the first Kurdish alphabet, Akop Kazaryan (Lazo). It was he who not only composed the first Kurdish textbook 'Shams,' but also included in it original stories and poems—the first models of Kurdish children's fiction.

"Nevertheless, the Armenian and Kurdish specialists in literature, historians and writers date the origin of Kurdish Soviet literature to the year 1930, when the first Kurdish writers and poets—Arab Shamilov, Adzhiye Dzhndi, Amine Abdal, Dzhasime Dzhalil, Vazire Nadir, Dzhardoye Gendzho, Atare Sharo, Kachakhe Murad, and others entered the literary world of Soviet Armenia and at the top of their voice announced their presence.

"Kurdish literature began to develop with new force in the postwar period. New Kurdish writers appeared—Mikayel Rashid, Nado Makhmudov, Miroye Asad, Aliye Abdurakhman, Saide Ibo, Vasire Asho, Amarike Sardar, Smoye Shamo, Feriko Usub, Agite Shamsi, Askyare Boik, Charkyaze Rash, Tosune Rashid, Babaye Kyalash, Sima Samand, Alikhane Mame, and others. This galaxy of Kurdish writers, developing the traditions established by their precursors, stands strongly in realistic positions and through their works promotes the upbringing of the Kurdish workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and the friendship of peoples and helps them to build a socialist society."

Charkyaze Rash, a poet and candidate of philology, enters the conversation:

"In order to understand the present-day phenomenon of Kurdish Soviet literature," he says, "one must know and estimate at its true worth the services of the Armenian people in the matter of the spiritual and economic development of the national minorities of the republic. These services become all the more significant when you involuntarily pose the question about the fate of the Kurds of the former Kurdish Uyezd. Every people, including the Armenian people, has its own morality of blood. And I, as a Kurdish poet, thank my fate that the formation of my spiritual-intellectual 'structure,' my consciousness, and the ways of my attitudes took place in Soviet Armenia. I am forever the grateful son of this geographically small, but in truth great land."

## Reference

29 February 1932. The Presidium of the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee, having examined the question of the work among the national minorities, charged the State Publishing House of Armenia to expand the publication of literature in the languages of these peoples. Moreover, taking into consideration the presence of cadres and the publishing base, the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee recognized the necessity of concentrating the publication of Kurdish literature for Transcaucasia in the Armenian SSR.

During the prewar years, 148 titles of books and pamphlets in the Kurdish language were published in Armenia.

The development of Soviet Kurdology, whose founder is the outstanding Armenian scholar and Academician I. Orbeli, also dates to the 1930's. Such great Armenian scholars as G. Acharyan, G. Sevak, A. Khachtryan, A. Garibyan, K. Melik-Ogandzhanyan, A. Ganalanyan, and many others are also engaged, together with the Kurdish intelligentsia being born, in the study of the questions of the history, the language, and the oral national creativity and ethnography of the Kurdish people.

In 1931 the republic People's Commissariat of Education organized a specifically Kurdological expedition, which consisted of Professor A. Khachatryan, A. Dzhdni, Dzh. Gndzho, and the composer Kaka Zakaryan. Through their efforts, rich folklore and linguistic material were collected, and 170 work, love and dance songs and stories were recorded. Such work was also carried out in the subsequent years, as the result of which the first book on Kurdish folklore, as well as a collection of the music of Kurdish folk songs, collected and arranged by K. Zakaryan, were published in 1936. An important event in the cultural life of the republic and its Kurdish population was the publication of the first Armenian-Kurdish dictionary and Armenian-Kurdish terminological dictionary, which were of considerable assistance in the formation of the Kurdish literary language.

## Reference

1932. By decision of the republic government, a Kurdish linguistic section was created in the Museum of Material Culture of Armenia.

1934. In the sector of oriental studies of the Armenian Branch of the Academy of Sciences a Kurdish linguistics department is opened.

9 July 1934. The first All-Union Conference on Kurdology, convened at the initiative of the Armenian CP Central Committee, begins its work in Yerevan.

1988. 25 doctors and candidates of science—representatives of the Kurds in Armenia—make their contribution to the development of various fields of science.

In the cultural development of the republic's Kurdish population a period began when the necessity for a national theater arose. For this reason, the Council of People's Commissars of Armenia, in September 1937, decides to create a Kurdish State Travelling Theater. It is created on the basis of existing amateur drama circles.

The chief producer of the Yerevan State Theater of Pantomime, Arsen Poladov, relates:

"This was an important event in the life of our people. The theater acquainted the Kurds with the best examples of the plays of Soviet writers, the songs of Armenian and Kurdish authors, conducted a great deal of educational work among the Kurds of Armenia, Georgia and Central Asia.

"Constant assistance during the formative period of the Kurdish theater was provided by the collective of the Armenian Dramatic Theater imeni G. Sundukyan, from where also came the first director of the Kurdish theater, the Honored Artist of the Republic, M. Dzhanan.

"The theater stimulated Armenian writers to turn to the best examples of Kurdish folklore and rearranged them into songs. Among the songs which were performed on the stage of the Kurdish theater are 'Mame i Zine' by S. Taronts, 'Kar i Kuluk' and 'Khache i Siaband' by S. Ginosyan, and others."

The only State Kurdish Theater in the world played an invaluable part in the cultural development and spiritual enrichment of the Kurdish population of Transcaucasia and was an indispensable means of ideological-political education of the masses of workers.

"Yerevan khabar dda"—with these words, which mean "This Is Yerevan Speaking," the announcer of the Armenian Radio and one of the founders of this program, Kyaram Sayad, daily for almost a quarter of a century already, begins the hour-and-a-half-long Kurdish program.

"Every time," K. Sayad says, "when I pronounce these words, I wish that they would be heard by the Kurds there, abroad, as well. That they would hear their folk melodies, that they would find out how we live in Armenia. Just think. In Turkey alone there live 12 million Turks, whose existence the government does not want to acknowledge. They call them mountain Turks, and they oppress them severely. Even to speak in their native language is considered to be a serious crime, which is punished by imprisonment. The same attitude is found also toward the Turks in Iran and in other countries.

"But how we live here—you already know. Is it worthwhile to add anything to this?"

I believe that it is worthwhile. A short information.

In 1922, 8,650 Kurds lived in Armenia. Today—more than 60,000.

—A. Altunyan

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**First Secretary Pogosyan, Others on NKAO Situation**

18300402 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian  
16 Jul 88 p 2

[Excerpts from roundtable discussion with Nagorno-Karabakh Party Obkom First Secretary Genrikh Andreyevich Pogosyan, party obkom Second Secretary Boris Aleksandrovich Malkov and weaver Amaliya Vagarshakovna Agadzhanian: "Restructuring and Democratization—The Behest of the Times"]

[Text] *The newspaper SOVETSKIY KARABAKH No 161 of this year published a discussion of the newspaper's editor, M.Ye. Ovanesyan, and the honored artist of the Soviet Union Zh.V. Galstyan with the delegates to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference—first secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Party Obkom G.A. Pogosyan, party obkom Second Secretary B.A. Malkov, wool combine weaver A.V. Agadzhanian and others.*

*Interesting issues that elaborate on the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast were touched on in the course of the discussion.*

*Today we publish excerpts from that discussion.*

[Question] Boris Aleksandrovich, now on the most topical theme for our oblast. Why did such a question as the national one not receive "full voice" at the All-Union Party Conference?

[B. Malkov] Permit me to disagree with the fact that this question did not receive "full voice." It was widely sounded both in the report and in the speeches of the delegates, especially in the speeches of comrades Arutyunyan and Vezirov. The All-Union Party Conference adopted six resolutions, including on relations among nations. It would thus be incorrect to say that this issue did not receive due consideration at the party conference. It is another matter that, perhaps, we would have liked questions concerning individual regions, including, say, our own oblast, to have been sounded in more concrete form. That did not happen. And, it seems, that was correct. As it seems to me, had the conference entered onto the path of considering individual regional issues, most probably other issues very important to the country would have been left aside. The discussion of such questions lies ahead, and in particular at the Plenum on Relations Among Nations, the necessity for which was discussed at the party conference.

[Question] But it is also difficult not to agree with the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh today is a "hot spot" in the Soviet Union and is at the center of universal attention. Proceeding from this, couldn't this issue have been at least touched on in the course of the conference?

[B. Malkov] To say that Nagorno-Karabakh was not discussed at the conference at all is incorrect. I have already cited the names of two delegates who mentioned the words "Nagorno-Karabakh" and spoke of the events in our oblast.

[G. Pogosyan] If you are asking why the issue was not touched on in the report of M.S. Gorbachev, I will try to answer. By the way, this is a question I put directly to Mikhail Sergeyevich in a personal conversation. His answer contained the thought that if the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh had been touched on in the report, it would have been done in emotional tones in a certain sense. And emotions in politics are unseemly. That is probably why he did not touch on the problem of the NKAO in his report. After all, it is impossible to speak of Nagorno-Karabakh and not also say that the workers of the region were striking during the days of the conference. What the reaction would have been in the hall is as yet unknown. But in any case, it could hardly have been positive.

[Question] Genrikh Andreyevich, since you have been included in the discussion, please answer this question. Why did you not take the floor at the conference?

[G. Pogosyan] Some 271 people signed up to speak in the debates at the conference. Out of those, 67 spoke. For some time, the conference went off into unplanned speeches. Comrade Yeltsin insisted on speaking. Then Comrade Ligachev and the Moscow and Sverdlovsk comrades spoke. Aside from that, evidently, the circumstance was taken into account that a series of meetings with eminent party and state leaders was also planned for us. Possibly all of this sheds light to a certain extent on why neither I nor Amaliya Agadzhanian were given the floor.

[Question] Why didn't you take part in the press conference organized for Soviet and foreign journalists? Were you really ill or were you trying to put it off somehow?

[G. Pogosyan] I really had been ill since that morning, but I felt better by the start of the press conference. By the way, no one told me anything about the press conference either in the morning or later.

[Question] Your opinion on the Beketov program "Four Days in Nagorno-Karabakh" that was shown on central television.

[A. Agadzhanian] Having found out that Beketov intended to meet with the workers of our combine, I was genuinely glad, since I hoped, with the aid of central television, to relate everything that was bothering us. But



unfortunately, my words, as well as the answers of my friends, were cut down so much that the conversation essentially became meaningless and fragmentary, far removed from our problems. The main thing was not mentioned in the program, which elicited a protest from me.

[G. Pogosyan] I would like to add a few words to that. You evidently saw the program and probably paid attention to the fact that there were two segments with my participation. It should be stated that what you heard on the screen (the discussion concerns the interview with me) was arbitrarily excerpted from the context of a whole speech that lasted roughly 23 minutes (on the screen I spoke for three minutes). Unfortunately, precisely those places that could be treated arbitrarily, in any form, were taken out of the context of the whole speech. Strictly speaking, that is what happened. I feel that Comrade Beketov used a forbidden method in this instance. It seems that if central television will use such methods in the future as well, it will scarcely be possible to get an interview in Nagorno-Karabakh at all.

[Question] Why wouldn't you, Genrikh Andreyevich, come out with an article in the central press or on television so that the Soviet people would get information on Nagorno-Karabakh firsthand, so to speak? Was there such an attempt? If so, why did it prove unsuccessful?

[G. Pogosyan] In recent months I have repeatedly given interviews to very serious and very reputable publications. But for some reason not a single one has been published—either in the central newspapers or in the central journals. One can only guess what is going on. Probably they did not correspond in substance to the spirit of the information that our press wanted to present to a broad circle of readers.

[Question] Will the Karabakh problem continue to be regarded as a nationalistic one?

[G. Pogosyan] I think there is no one who doesn't consider this a nationalistic question. Why is it not being resolved? This is the point. One day recently our delegation was received by Comrade Gromyko. Then I was received by Comrade Yakovlev and Comrade Gorbachev. We discussed the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh for a long time in great detail. The impression was created for me that these eminent leaders had an understanding of the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the point is that they must be guided by the existing Constitution in resolving it. And although this Constitution suffers from some imperfections, a solution to the question is possible only within the confines of it. It is probably this circumstance that dictates the ways of approaching our problem.

[Question] Boris Aleksandrovich, would it be possible to introduce changes into the Constitution of the USSR? If so, within what time frame?

[B. Malkov] The conference noted the necessity of changes in connection with improving the political system. Time frames can be discussed here with great precision, since it is well known that elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet are coming up in the spring of next year. As for other changes, it is more difficult to predict. Both in substance and in timing. If we are discussing relations among nations, then as far as I was able to gather from conversations at the conference and from the documents, the discussion will move first and foremost toward raising the independence of union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and national okrugs.

[Question] And did any of the conference participants bring up the issue of Article 78? Was a proposal to review it introduced?

[B. Malkov] No, that was not discussed.

[G. Pogosyan] But no one abrogated our right to pose the question of corrections in this ill-starred Article 78. Our deputies have the constitutional right to pose questions of amendments to the Constitution, to convene extraordinary sessions and to demand a review of certain articles. I think we should make use of that right. As for the ultimate resolution of the issue on changing articles, this falls under the purview of a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Question] Fifteen years of Kevorkov voluntarism have had a grave effect on the socio-economic life and moral climate of the oblast. Leninist personnel policies have been subjected to especially monstrous deformations. You will have to rectify all of this. What could you say on this score? I will mention in advance that we are all waiting for the new leadership of the obkom to display determination and principle in evaluating the activity of the former and current leadership personnel. This ultimately, in our opinion, dictates the necessity of basic preventive work being carried out in party and soviet organs. It is evidently time to move to action.

[G. Pogosyan] A reasonable question. Proceeding from further questions of restructuring, questions of personnel advancement will be widely discussed in the collectives and at workers' meetings in all types of apparatus—party, soviet and economic. I hope that the author of these notes himself will take an active part in the election of leaders. There should be no voluntarism in this matter. I would ask that all television viewers and all those sitting here display activeness on this issue. This will undoubtedly assist us in avoiding possible errors in the selection and placement of personnel.

[Question] We have seen a videotape of the session of the oblast soviet where you, Genrikh Andreyevich, stated confidently that our issue will be resolved negatively. Whence such confidence?

[G. Pogosyan] I did not say that at the session. The discussion there was about proclaiming the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. I, in speaking at the session, was talking about the unconstitutionality of such a postulation of the question and was insisting on consideration of the issue within the bounds of the existing Constitution.

[Question] In Moscow you had meetings at the highest level. Amaliya Vagarshakovna, please tell us about those meetings.

[A. Agadzhanian] We were received by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman A.A. Gromyko. The discussion lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes. Our delegation, and especially Genrikh Andreyevich, decisively supported the just demand of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and requested that the aspirations of the people be taken into account. Genrikh Andreyevich declared openly that an erroneous understanding of our issue in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet could create a serious situation in both republics. I related the events in Sumgait and what a tragedy for our family the beastly murder of our countryman in Sumgait had been. A.A. Gromyko heard us out attentively and at the end stated that the issue will be resolved within the framework of the USSR Constitution.

[Question] What do you think, did the delegates to the conference have at least an approximate conception of events in Karabakh?

[G. Pogosyan] Those that were interested in them did. But the overwhelming majority of the delegates do not know what Nagorno-Karabakh represents and what problems are troubling the Armenian population of the oblast. We must do a great deal of work in this direction, especially as relates to newspapers and television. We must make use of every means for an objective illumination of the events in Nagorno-Karabakh.

[Question] You took part in the work of the 19th Party Conference and had personal conversations with officials. What, in your opinion, are the prospects for a positive resolution of the Karabakh question?

[G. Pogosyan] I must say here that the question is being considered at the highest levels. A return to discussion of the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is proposed in the near future at a session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I think that an unambiguous refusal to resolve the question will not follow. But it must be kept in mind that it will be resolved in the context of the directives that arise out of the USSR Constitution. That is all I can say about the course of consideration of our issue. At the same time, I hope that the question will be resolved in such a way that it will be possible to consider it, if not an ultimate solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, at least somewhat of a stage in its solution.

[Question] Does this mean that the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh will not be considered at the Plenum on Relations Among Nations?

[G. Pogosyan] No, not in any case. The issue was ways of resolving the question before the Plenum. It is difficult to forecast the direction the solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem will take at the plenum. As well as too early.

[Question] Genrikh Andreyevich, why do the central organs not want to give any answer at all to the substance of the issue? Doesn't our strike trouble them?

[G. Pogosyan] I also put that question to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He is very troubled by the strikes that are taking place. The most terrible thing is the moral harm being inflicted on the country and to the very resolution of the question of Nagorno-Karabakh. In striking we are losing all of the political dividends we have earned.

[Question] We are all naturally discussing the strikes. But what could be proposed to counterbalance them? Wouldn't going to work now signify burying a positive resolution to our question?

[G. Pogosyan] I do not feel that a strike is the only method of expressing our will and aspirations. There are far more democratic and acceptable methods. I think it is necessary to halt the strike and turn to other forms, by way of example, to collective displays of will—meetings, demonstrations and letters to the appropriate organs and organizations. We must constantly recall the state of affairs in our oblast. And finally, after all, any constructive dialogue is also a reminder of our work, it is also a sort of forward movement. As for the strike, I am sure that it will not solve the problem. What is more, we are disposing public opinion against us and our allies. One also must not forget that the strike in the NKAO served as grounds for a strike in Armenia as well. And this is threatening most serious consequences. And we should reckon with that as well.

[Question] On Armenia, by the way—do you know anything about the events in the Armenian SSR?

[G. Pogosyan] I know that serious clashes have occurred in Armenia. There have been casualties. Many were crippled. Making use of that instance, I would like to appeal to all of the workers of Stepanakert and all residents of Karabakh to return to their jobs, and to appeal in turn to all the workers of Armenia to return to a normal working life and not to step beyond the bounds of democratic methods of struggle. After all, we really are losing all of the advantages that we had in the preceding months.

### Legal Limits of Popular Front Movement Examined

18080006 Riga CINA in Latvian 22 Jul 88 p 3

[Article by E. Melkisis, professor, doctor of judicial sciences, head of the department of State and Law Theory and Political Sciences at the Latvian State University imeni P. Stuchka, under the rubric: "Viewpoints": "On Popular Front Boundaries"]

[Text] The processes of perestroika and rejuvenation taking place in society aroused the people's desire to more actively participate in resolving republic problems and to do so not only in words, but in concrete deeds, thus assuring the irreversibility of perestroika. The widespread apathy of the years of stagnation is disappearing. For example, the Culture Fund is carrying out important, lasting work. The environmental protection movement is beginning to bring results. The Writers' Union and other creative organizations are making constructive proposals.

In the background of these public activities there are proposals for the creation of a broad people's movement for which in my opinion, the proper name would be the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika. This front would participate in activities directed both at things we should fight for and things we should fight against. The things to fight for are all those which support the moral and political rejuvenation of our society and its rise to a new level of socialist development; those which would subsequently cause the development of democracy, glasnost, and social justice; and those which arouse creative, constructive initiative in all spheres of life. The things to fight against are all those which perpetuate any vestiges of the times of the cult and of stagnation, bureaucratism, voluntarism, and narrow, local departmental interests.

I view the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika as a movement of broad popular masses. Many people have the same views; however, further notions on the Front's activities are divided.

Some people think that it should be formed based on already existing public organizations, unions, and societies, and would operate within the boundaries of the existing political system. The Popular Front would serve only as a movement coordinating and uniting all these civic organizations under the leadership of the Communist Party as specified by the USSR Constitution. In their time, the Popular, Democratic, and National fronts were organized based on such a principle. However, the shortcoming of such a proposal is that the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika would not offer anything essentially new, since under the existing social and political structure organized citizens already have the opportunity and, to a large degree, even a duty to actively participate in perestroika.

However, others express a completely opposite view, namely, that the Popular Front should be formed mainly based on individuals including even those living in other republics and foreign countries, a notion which I consider to be a political irresponsibility. It is easy to imagine what would happen if those living abroad were to make decisions on processes taking place in Latvia. Should only individuals make up the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika, separation from existing political structures, rather than constructive cooperation with them, would occur. Naturally, this would not stimulate the observance and promulgation of the interests of broad popular masses.

Therefore, I think that the most constructive approach is the one, wherein the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika would be comprised both of individuals united in groups of the Popular Front based on a territorial, or occupational basis, as well as of existing civic and other public organizations, including the so-called informal groups, whose goals and activities coincide with the goals of the Popular Front. In this context then, speaking of the participation of civic organizations, only those civic or public organizations whose members express the desire to participate would join the Popular Front. As for the individual members, they could all be citizens permanently residing in the republic, who have reached a certain age (for example, 14 or 16 years old), regardless of their ethnicity or CPSU membership; in other words, anyone, who wants to support the restructuring of society with active deeds, initiative, and proposals.

In my understanding, the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika will be neither a new political party, nor a new civic organization. The Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika should recognize the one-party system historically established in our country and the leading role of the Communist Party confirmed by the USSR Constitution, and by no means should become an oppositionary social movement.

Occasionally I hear opinions expressed that the Popular Front could become a form of people's self-government. Yes, I can agree with this opinion in its broadest meaning. However, in my opinion, the governing cannot become the task of the Popular Front. It can only participate in the process of governing by assuring that it coincides with the interests of the people. It should be clearly understood and written down that the Popular Front would not usurp power or take over government functions.

Therefore, the Popular Front, according to its social essence, would be a new form of direct people's democracy, a new organizational form which would enlist the participation of the republic residents in solving the problems of the State and of social life including proposals for, development of, control over, and the realization of decisions.

In this connection, a question of the Popular Front's place and participation in the socio-political system arises. In general, the notion of a political system is not uniform or unambiguous. Some people consider the political system to be a united totality of organizations and means that ensure the political government and the governing of society. In my opinion, it would be more correct to consider the political system to be the whole totality of organizational and legal forms and means by which the peoples realize their political power. Yes, at the present time, the existence of the Popular Front, or a similar mass movement, has not been provided for by the political system of our society in the Constitution. But it is not forbidden either. Therefore, there cannot be any objections against organizing this movement and its participation in the political system. Just the opposite! Such a measure would be advisable.

The 19th CPSU conference's resolution "On Soviet society, democratization and political system reform" states: "We must positively assess the phenomenon taking place lately, that is, the appearance of new public associations and unions which have as their goal assisting socialist rejuvenation." And further, "The Party on its part... will do everything for the continuous development of the national people's patriotic movements supporting the course of perestroika."

At the same time, while developing proposals for the structure of the Popular Front for Assisting Perestroika, we must also think about its program. This should be a subject for a separate discussion, but I would like to express some thoughts about it here.

First, I think that it would not be advisable to work out a finely detailed program for the Popular Front activities. This is because life is developing so very quickly and dynamically, and new, currently completely unforeseen problems will appear in the process of its activities. Therefore, only the main goals and directions should be determined.

Thus, the political basis for the Popular Front action could be the decisions of the 19th CPSU conference and the desire to help the LaSSR CP and Government to realize them in accordance with the concrete interests of the people. And no adventurist or Utopian ideas, which I caught during the account of the Valdis Turin, who is an active member of the Environmental Protection Club, during last Sunday's radio program Mikrofon-88 would be accepted. This account ignored the existing realities and could kindle political or national passions. Our own history itself convincingly enough testifies to the fact that the peoples had to pay a very, very high price for political adventures or Utopias.

### **Moldavian Paper Silent on Republic's Agricultural Problems, Claims PRAVDA**

*18000021 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Sep 88 p 2*

[Article by B. Yevladov, PRAVDA correspondent, under "Press Survey" rubric: "Prescriptions for Farmers"; first paragraph in boldface is PRAVDA introduction]

**[Text] During the years of perestroika the mass news media have, so to speak, gotten their second wind. It cannot be said that the wave of innovation has not touched the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA. There have been many notable changes. But when you turn to the thematics of the items dealing with agricultural problems, you discover that, in a certain sense, the newspaper has even lost its own point of view.**

Serious criticism was leveled at the republic from the rostrum of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. It was noted that Moldavia's agriculture has remained stagnant. Naturally, the newspaper's editors should have drawn from this direct conclusions for themselves, to think why they had not succeeded previously in seeing the major problems which had piled up long ago in the agro-industrial complex and precisely defined their own role in solving the most important of them. It was suggested, for example, that they begin monitoring without delay not only the production but also the storage and the industrial processing of products of the fields and livestock farms. Because, after all, it is a well-known fact that the republic has allowed great losses of these things, and that the storage system and many canneries are in an extremely neglected condition, whereas the funds allocated for construction and basic modernization are being absorbed very badly and are being used for secondary purposes.

More than 50 issues of SOVETSKAYA PRAVDA have already been published since the party conference. But let's take, for example, the situation in rural construction projects. The newspaper is silent. And, you know, the plans have fallen short of fulfillment not just on one—but on many of them, including those which were supposed to provide technical progress to the sector, to bring it out of its stagnation; there is a construction shortfall with regard to facilities for social, cultural, and everyday services.

Out of all the production increases being proposed, the newspaper selected one topic—the potential of the peasant farmstead. In principle, attention does not to be paid to this matter. An extended interview with G. Bratunov, chairman of the Kagulskiy Rayispolkom. Therein it was noted, with justifiable concern, that many of this rayon's inhabitants are turning to the city for products, that, for example, in the large village of Moskovya there is only one cow for every 150 farmsteads, while every four farmsteads average only three pigs. Also discussed here was what the local soviets are doing to correct the situation. Their initiative could attract attention.

What else are the activists employed on publications doing, if only on this narrow topic of farmstead-type livestock raising, which, obviously, could be more effectively developed by the rayon-level newspapers? SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA has been unable to find any new approaches, and, subsequently, this matter has been limited to a few news items. Everything else which is connected with the development of this backward sector has remained outside the newspaper's field of vision. Many avenues of journalistic inquiry have so far be marked merely by photo reports.

The editors have not yet accumulated their own experience, nor have they noted the experience of other republic-level newspapers in connection with working out the socioeconomic problems of rural areas. Such slowness is shameful. The bitter lesson of past years, when the fruit-and-vegetable "conveyor" was operating with serious interruptions and breakdowns, prompted editors concerning the need to seek out ahead of time methods to improve this matter. It seemed appropriate, for example, for a press brigade to conduct a "raid" to check up on the preparedness of the refrigerated-truck motor pool and the warehouse system. These and other forms of actions with follow-up articles would help to expose the organizational defects in the actions of the agro-industrial complex partners, as well as to cut short enormous losses of vegetables and fruit. But no, the newspaper has not undertaken to monitor these and other important trends; almost nothing is being done to warn against chronic troubles. And the latter have already again begun to adversely affect the smooth rhythm, quality, and end results of delivering agricultural products to industrial centers, to Moscow, and to Kishinev as well.

The issue of July 12 published an appeal by the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, directed to party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, as well as to all working people in this republic. It concerns the mobilization of forces to increase food resources. This document is not marked by any spirit of innovation. It maintains an excessively hortatory and didactic style. Nevertheless, it does set forth the key problems. The year's outcome and, to a great extent, the possibility of catching up on the shortfalls regarding the five-year plan depend upon solving these problems. Unfortunately, SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA fully adopted from the appeal merely its didacticism. We must...it is important...we ought to...it is necessary...we are obliged to.... The imperative mood in all its shadings became predominant in the articles and reports explaining the prescriptive truths for the farmers.

The newspaper will be able to get away from making banal judgements and recommendations to plow and sow on schedule only if it raises the level of its own competence and attracts people to work with it who are capable of thinking and acting in the new way, of turning to a democratic discussion of the problems which arise. It seems, however, that the editors are not too concerned with this aspect of the matter. One of the correspondents

has unwittingly expressed, I think, the point of view long held by a number of his fellow staffers. In the issue of 24 July he wrote as follows without beating around the bush: "You do not even have to turn off the highway in order to sense all the intense heat of the hard work at harvest-time." You can see everything from the window of your car and come to the conclusion that "in general, there is no clear picture as to how the harvest work is progressing...." Indeed now, to reach such conclusions, you do not have to leave your car or even your chair at your desk in the editorial office. That is the way certain "agrarian" journalists proceed. On 10 August there appeared what could be termed a program-editorial entitled "Everything Is Urgent." It directly enumerated what seem to be all the concerns for autumn. It mentions the contracts, the reaping delays in a number of rayons, the lag of certain farms on harvesting vegetables and fruit, as well as in preparing the soil for sowing winter crops. It speaks about material incentives and the weak demand of party organizations, the lack of which has led, supposedly, to a situation whereby in Rezinskiy Rayon one out of every ten tractors needs to be adjusted, while this is true of one out of every four trucks in Bessarabskiy Rayon, and in Leovski Rayon repairs have been delayed on every other piece of equipment. It is also noted that some people are in no hurry to prepare seeds for sowing the winter crops, nor are they ensuring that production at canneries is on schedule. And here it is likewise stated that we need to pay attention to livestock breeders, that certain rayons have reduced meat production, whereas milk production has increased. Among these urgent matters requiring crash-type work, preparations for winter and supplying livestock farms with animal feeds have not been forgotten. And the conclusion drawn from this entire "memorandum" is amazingly simple: "Gosagroprom and RAPO must...."

For the sake of fairness we can note a few (only a few) articles which are out of the ordinary. On 11 August there appeared an article by F. Sekriyeru, director of the sovkhos "50 Years of October," Leovski Rayon, and a candidate of agricultural sciences. He utters some thoughts, based on specific examples, concerning the initial experience with leasing contracts. It is a pity that the newspaper did not furnish such material for a discussion. If it had been on time, it could have facilitated the understanding of this still scanty practice and disseminated the experience.

In general, the newspaper does not have any appetite for large-scale problems which require profound economic analysis. The republic's agroindustrial complex is now undergoing a comprehensive readjustment, and major structural changes are occurring in it. Until recent times the principal mainstays of its economy were tobacco-growing and growing grapes for wine-making. It was precisely these sectors which provided the most income. Nowadays fruit orchards and vegetable gardens are moving to the foreground, but they are not so profitable. However, it is difficult to follow from the newspaper how the radical changes are being carried out, how the

scientists and men in the field conceive the possibilities for the now leading sectors of agriculture, and what they propose for their assured development.

The power of the press lies in its acute purposiveness, in tackling problems in its articles, in the latter's journalistic white heat, and, consequently, in their capacity to stir up thoughts and feelings—to activate the human factor. All this presupposes smoothness of operation in the collective, a mutual understanding among those who have climbed up to the "captain's bridge" and those who constitute the crew. In the past there has not been such mutual understanding. In response to the PRAVDA article entitled "A Sail without Wind," (10 October 1984) this republic's Communist Party Central Committee deemed it necessary to strengthen the leadership staff of SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA. Appointed as editor was the chief of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, and two instructors from this same department became his deputies. Although this measure was decisive, it was not, however, reinforced by constant

attention to the newspaper. The editorial plans did not become the subject of a broad, motivationally concerned discussion. Many members of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Buro did not consider it their duty to avail themselves of this newspaper's rostrum for articles on acute problems, and the latter, because of this neglect, became greater in number. Nor was it considered that the collective, particularly the leading departments—party and agro-industrial—acutely needed an influx of fresh forces, an upgrading of the skills of the staff members in their probationary periods as editors with the rich traditions and confident writing of militant journalism.

Recently a new captain climbed up to the editorial "bridge." One would like to believe that, after looking about and having checked the course, he would issue the command to "set sail" and that they would be filled with the fresh wind of perestroika.

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